Eloquent Wisdom: The Role of Rhetoric and Delight in the Theology of Saint Augustine of Hippo by CLAVIER, MARK,FORBES,MORETON
Durham E-Theses
Eloquent Wisdom: The Role of Rhetoric and Delight
in the Theology of Saint Augustine of Hippo
CLAVIER, MARK,FORBES,MORETON
How to cite:
CLAVIER, MARK,FORBES,MORETON (2011) Eloquent Wisdom: The Role of Rhetoric and Delight in
the Theology of Saint Augustine of Hippo. Doctoral thesis, Durham University. Available at Durham
E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/601/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eloquent Wisdom: 
The Role of Rhetoric and Delight in  
the Theology of Saint Augustine of Hippo 
 
The Rev. Mark Forbes Moreton Clavier 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted for PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Durham 
Department of Theology and Religion 
2010 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This study examines Augustine’s conception of the role of delight (delectatio) 
in the divine acts of creation and redemption.  In the first part of the dissertation, I 
argue that Augustine, who was trained as a rhetor and taught rhetoric before his 
conversion, came to conceive of theology as the fulfilment of Cicero’s conviction 
that wisdom and eloquence ought to be united.  His approach to Cicero’s rhetorical 
theory as found in De inventione, De oratore, and Orator shares many similarities 
with that of Late Antique rhetors (especially Marius Victorinus) in whose works 
the orator functions less as a statesman than as a physician of the soul.  
Accordingly, an orator’s role is not to sway the senate or deliberate in law courts 
(as in Cicero’s thought) but to inform and persuade people towards a fruitful return 
to the divine.   
 
In the second part of the dissertation, I demonstrate how this approach 
influenced Augustine’s understanding of redemption.  He conceives of God as 
Cicero’s ideal orator, in whom wisdom and eloquence are perfectly united.  God 
engages in a rhetorical contest with the devil whom Augustine portrays in terms of 
the false orators in Cicero’s De inventione.  The devil’s rhetoric comprises an 
illicit delight in actual sin and an inordinate delight in created goods, both of which 
exert their power over the human will through suggestion, delight and persuasion 
and result in a bondage to sin and death.  By contrast, God ‘utters’ creation as a 
delightful song and opposes death’s nihilistic rhetoric by pouring his own delight 
into the hearts of the faithful; this delight persuades the will to move towards a 
joyful participation in the divine that is the happy life for which all people long.  
Ultimately, Augustine identifies this spiritual delight most closely with the Holy 
Spirit who functions as God’s eternal eloquence. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
 
A Beleaguered Rhetor in a Beleaguered City 
By summer of 384, Augustine had been vexed beyond endurance.  His 
experience of Rome had been a disagreeable one and he was eager to escape from the 
Eternal City.  The omens had been poor from the start.  First, he had to endure the 
tearful entreaties of his mother Monica to remain in North Africa or, if he must go, to 
take her with him.1  Next, no sooner had he arrived than he fell seriously ill and 
believed himself to be ‘on the way to the underworld’.2  Perhaps worst of all for a 
man schooled in rhetoric and whose reputation and position in life were due entirely 
to his teaching of rhetoric, he found his new situation in Rome, which he had admired 
from afar, very disappointing.  Apparently, Augustine’s reputation and influential 
contacts were such that he had little trouble attracting pupils.  Infuriatingly, however, 
he soon discovered that the well-heeled Roman students had a disagreeable habit of 
transferring to a new rhetor once payment of their fees was due.3  No wonder 
Augustine was ready to endorse the decision of so many prominent Romans—
including the emperors—and return to enjoying the idea of Rome from afar instead of 
its reality from close proximity. 
Fortunately, Augustine had come into the orbit of one of the most prominent 
men of late Roman society: Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, an immensely powerful 
senator, vocal defender of traditional paganism, and profuse litterateur.4  By his own 
                                               
1
  conf. 5.8.15. 
2
  conf. 5.9.16. 
3
  conf. 5.12.22. 
4
  On Symmachus, see John Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court AD 364-425 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 1-31; John Matthews, The Roman Empire of Ammianus 
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account, Augustine caught Symmachus’s attention partly through the networking of 
his Manichean friends and partly through an impromptu oration he delivered before 
Symmachus.5  As a result, the old senator, still smarting perhaps from his recent 
political duel with Ambrose over the removal of the Altar of Victory, selected 
Augustine to become the new rhetor in Milan.6  With his travel expenses covered by 
the imperial court, Augustine bade farewell to Rome and, though he did not yet know 
it, his former life.  His move from the orbit of Symmachus into the orbit of Ambrose 
marked the beginning of his own conversion to Christianity; although he owed his 
advancement to the help of his Manichean friends, already he had come to reject the 
religion that he had shared for nine years.7 
Milan of the fourth century was with Trier one of the two administrative 
centres of the Western Empire.8  When Augustine arrived in the autumn of 384, the 
court of the young emperor Valentinian II had for seven years resided defenceless at 
Milan.  Though Augustine now taught rhetoric near the centre of western authority, 
he had come to an unhappy and beleaguered city.  The empire itself was in disarray 
following the crushing defeat of Valens at the Battle of Adrianople (378), and even as 
Augustine contemplated leaving Rome, in far away Britain Magnus Maximus 
                                                                                                                                      
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), passim; and Neil B. McLynn, 
Ambrose of Milan: Church and Court in a Christian Capital (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), passim. 
5
  conf. 5.13.23.   
6
  McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 169-170 proposes that the fact that Symmachus had been asked 
to find a rhetor for Milan and that he chose an unknown provincial for the post highlights the 
political weakness of the adolescent emperor.  This seems to fit the facts better than Peter 
Brown’s description of Augustine as a ‘protégé of Symmachus’ (Peter Brown, Augustine of 
Hippo, A Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 70). On Symmachus’s 
debate with Ambrose over the restoration of the Augustan Altar of Victory see Matthews, 
Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court 203-211 and McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 166-167.   
7
  Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 46.  T.D. Barnes, ‘Augustine, Symmachus and Ambrose’ in 
Augustine: From Rhetor to Theologian, Joanne McMilliam, ed. (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1992), 7-13 argues that Symmachus and Ambrose may have been first 
cousins.  McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 263-264, however, demonstrates the tenuous nature of 
Barnes’s evidence. 
8
  Peter Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 25. 
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assumed the purple and led his army into Gaul where he caught and killed 
Valentinian’s older brother, the emperor Gratian.9   
What must have affected Augustine more than the distant signs of imperial 
collapse, however, was the bitter struggle within Milan itself in which Ambrose 
contested on the one hand the Arian policies of Valentinian’s mother, empress 
Justina, and on the other hand the attempts by the remnant of powerful pagans to 
preserve their traditions.  The imperial court’s open conflict with Ambrose, 
culminating in the attempted confiscation of some of the Milanese churches for use 
by the Arian supporters of Justina, was particularly bitter and potentially fatal to the 
tenuous nature of Valentinian’s regime.10   
Considering Augustine’s Manichean background and his debt to the pagan 
Symmachus for his new position, it is remarkable that he was immediately drawn to 
the Bishop of Milan.  By his own admission, however, Ambrose attracted him less 
because of his Catholicity or even his holiness and more because of his eloquence.  
Augustine writes, ‘I was not interested in learning what he was talking about. My ears 
were only for his rhetorical technique; this empty concern was all that remained with 
me after I lost any hope that a way to you might lie open for man’.11  The second part 
of this statement refers to the Scepticism of the New Academy to which Augustine 
had turned during his time in Rome and which he first encountered in his studies of 
Cicero.12  Thus, disillusioned and without any of the faith that had previously 
                                               
9
  Matthews, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court, 173.  For Ambrose’s role in these 
events see McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 160-163.  At this time, almost all of the troops of the 
western empire were under Maximus’s command. 
10
  McLynn, Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court, 170-219 discusses in detail Ambrose’s 
political struggles with the imperial court and questions Ambrose’s portrayal of Justina’s role 
as the prime antagonist.  Augustine mentions the conflict in Conf. 9.7.15-16. 
11
  conf. 5.14.24. 
12
  conf. 5.10.19; Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 79. 
11 
 
sustained him, Augustine fell back on the only two pillars of which he was certain: 
his admiration for rhetorical technique and his esteem for Ciceronian philosophy.13 
 
‘...now I have grown old’14 
At first glance, Hippo Regius in North Africa in 427 would seem a world 
away from the Milan of Augustine’s younger days.  Not only did more than a 
thousand miles and a wide sea lie between the two places, but more importantly a 
conversion and an entire episcopal career separated the elderly Augustine from his 
earlier ambitious self.  Instead of working on the very threshold of imperial 
government, Augustine lived now in a self-imposed, monastic retreat far from the 
political affairs of a fast crumbling world.15  Only three years from his death, 
Augustine could now focus on setting his affairs in order. 
 Yet, the similarities between the circumstances of Augustine in Milan in 384 
and Hippo Regius in 427 are striking.  First, in many ways Augustine was a 
disillusioned bishop.16  He had devoted over twenty-five years to fighting the 
Donatist heresy, achieving success with the aid of Roman legal and military 
authority.  Yet, if Peter Brown’s view is to be accepted, just at the moment of 
triumph, Augustine lost faith in the combination of the Church’s true doctrine with 
the empire’s military might.17  What perhaps awakened him to this was the execution 
of Marcellinus, an effective ally against the Donatists, in 413, a sudden event that 
                                               
13
  On Augustine’s disillusionment, see Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 79. 
14
  ep. 213.1. 
15
  Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 427. 
16
  Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 338 refers to Augustine of this time as feeling ‘old and 
ineffective’. 
17
  Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 336-337.  Brown points out that at the same time Catholicism 
was achieving victory through the State over the Donatists, the governing authority was 
moving rapidly in a militaristic direction in response to the sack of Rome and the general 
collapse of the western empire. 
12 
 
Augustine was entirely impotent to prevent.  He retreated from Carthage to his books 
in Hippo Regius: ‘I decided, if the Lord is willing, to spend as much time as I am 
allowed by those obligations demanded of me, given the needs of the Church that I 
serve as my duty, on the task of studies pertaining to the ecclesiastical sciences, 
where, if it is pleasing to God’s mercy, I may do some good for future generations’.18  
What perhaps proved even more dispiriting was the lapse of Boniface, Count of 
Africa, into what Augustine considered to be heresy and immorality.  The ambitious 
general, whom Augustine had only recently talked out of retiring to monastic life,19 
had returned from Rome with an Arian wife and a number of concubines.20  Ep. 220, 
in which Augustine scolds the general, reveals a bishop deeply scandalised by his 
former friend.21  Indeed, when Boniface visited Hippo, Augustine refused to see 
him.22 
 Also, like Milan in 384, North Africa had the feel of a beleaguered land.  
Potential and actual enemies hemmed the province on three sides.  First, from the 
south, Berber nomads had grown bolder in their raids, humiliating Boniface in 
Augustine’s eyes, whose vast military might remained sheltered in and around 
Carthage while farms and towns along the southern frontier were sacked and 
pillaged.23  The reason why Boniface’s forces remained in the north is that he was 
                                               
18
  ep. 151.13. 
19
  ep. 220.3. See also Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 422.  Augustine provides an insight into the 
instability of the times when he reminds Boniface that he was convinced not to seek out the 
cloistered life by being reminded of the need of Church’s need for continued protection from 
‘barbarian hordes’. 
20
  ep. 220.4. 
21
  Augustine refers to himself as ‘dumb with amazement’ at the news of his friend’s remarriage 
(ep. 220.4). 
22
  ep. 220.1. Augustine’s excuse was that he had been laid low by ‘bodily weakness’. 
23
  ep. 220.7. 
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preparing himself for an attack from Rome.24  Finally, the citizens of North Africa 
must have watched in dread as the enormous province of Hispania, only seven miles 
across the Strait of Gibraltar from Roman Africa, fell to the Vandals in the first 
quarter of the fifth century.25  As North Africa was the breadbasket of the western 
empire, few could have been under any illusions about where the hungry barbarians 
would turn next.26   
 In the midst of all these concerns and as he critically reviewed his own opus 
vitae in his Retractationes, Augustine turned his attention to completing a work he 
had left unfinished in around 396, De doctrina Christiana, dwelling at length on the 
role of eloquence in Christian teaching.  Just as his thoughts in Milan in 384 had been 
filled with appreciation for the art of rhetoric and with the philosophy of Cicero, so 
now he returned to mull over both in a manner that would profoundly influence 
rhetoric in the West for more than thousand years.  On the one hand, book four of De 
doctrina Christiana reveals the influence that thirty years’ of reflection and 
experience, first as a Christian and then as a preacher, writer, and bishop, had on 
Augustine’s initial training as a rhetor.  On the other hand, the two episodes suggest 
that despite his conversion, his subsequent experiences, and even his apparent 
protestations to the contrary, Augustine in fact remained a rhetorician to the end of 
his days.27 
                                               
24
  Boniface, commander of one of the three standing armies of the west, attempted to play the 
part of kingmaker in late imperial politics.  In the years leading up to 427, he opposed the 
powerful Felix, commander of the armies in Italy, whose forces unsuccessfully attacked 
Boniface at Carthage in 427. See Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, 259-261. 
25
  Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, 266.  Cartagena fell to the Vandals in 425. 
26
  For an excellent survey of the importance of Carthage and North Africa to the western empire 
and their swift collapse before Vandal invasion see Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, 
266-280, 288-289. 
27
  Augustinian scholars have frequently been imprecise with their terminology about those 
involved with rhetoric, using ‘rhetorician’, ‘rhetor’, and ‘orator’ interchangeably.  While the 
differences between these last two will be explained in the following two chapters, for 
purposes of clarity I will use ‘rhetor’ to describe a teacher of rhetoric, ‘orator’ to describe one 
14 
 
 
Augustine: Rhetor and Theologian 
Yet, one does not encounter in Augustine’s own account of his early years in 
the Confessiones a man who seems to approve of rhetoric.  To the contrary, he 
repeatedly denounces the art as at best pretentious and at worst gleefully dishonest.  
In his own estimation, as an adolescent he was taught rhetoric not to equip him for a 
pursuit of truth but to elicit praise.28  And so, he can dismiss his own promising career 
as a rhetor by writing: 
In those years I used to teach the art of rhetoric.  Overcome with greed 
myself I used to sell the eloquence that would overcome an opponent.  
Nevertheless, Lord, as you know, I preferred to have virtuous students 
(virtuous as they are commonly called).  Without any resort to trick I taught 
them the tricks of rhetoric, not that they should use them against the life of 
an innocent man, but that sometimes they might save the life of a guilty 
person.29 
Again and again, he derides the vanity and treachery of rhetoric, arguing that it lacks 
substance, ignores truth and justice, and is interested solely in self-promotion.30 And 
thus it is not entirely unusual that theologians have by and large taken Augustine at 
his word and looked on his conversion to Christianity as a conversion away from his 
life as a rhetor.31   
At the same time, historians such as Marcia Colish, James Murphy, James 
Ward, George Kennedy and Mary Carruthers (among others) have highlighted the 
                                                                                                                                      
who delivers speeches (typically in classical times in the forum) and ‘rhetorician’ to describe 
both roles where no distinction is needed. 
28
  conf. 3.3.6-7. 
29
  conf. 4.2.2. 
30
  See Calvin L. Troup, Temporality, Eternity, and Wisdom (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1999), 11 for a discussion of Augustine anti-rhetorical rhetoric. 
31
  One book actually takes this conversion for its title: Joanne McMillan (ed.), Augustine: From 
Rhetor to Theologian (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992). 
15 
 
importance of Augustine’s thought to the emergence of a medieval rhetoric.32  
Kennedy and Murphy in particular have added to our knowledge of how Book Four 
of De doctrina Christiana serves as a bridge between classical and medieval theories 
of rhetoric.33  Yet, possibly because all of these scholars are primarily interested in 
rhetoric, few have considered how rhetorical theory may have influenced Augustine’s 
theology.   Despite Augustine’s apparent rejection of rhetoric, the failure to study his 
theology in light of rhetorical theory is more than a little strange.   
First, Augustine trained as a rhetor and devoted more than a decade of his life 
to teaching rhetoric in Thagaste, Carthage, Rome, and Milan.  Grammar and rhetoric 
therefore profoundly shaped his intellectual life in a way that nothing else did.   So, 
when Augustine encountered first philosophy and then Christian theology, and when 
he turned to the careful study of Scripture following his conversion and ordination, he 
did so as one deeply versed in classical rhetoric.  No matter how profound his 
conversion, even had he wanted to reject his pagan training entirely, he would have 
found it exceptionally difficult to do so.   
Second, scholars have been much less willing to be taken in by Augustine’s 
criticism of Neoplatonism, arguing that after his conversion Augustine (particularly in 
his early years) remained fundamentally a Neoplatonist with only slight adjustments 
                                               
32
  Marcia L. Colish, Mirror of Language: A Study in the Medieval Theory of Knowledge 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968), 1-54; James Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle 
Ages: A History of Rhetorical Theory from Saint Augustine to the Renaissance (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1974), 43-88; John O. Ward, ‘From Antiquity to the 
Renaissance: Glosses and Commentaries on Cicero’s Rhetorica in James J. Murphy, (ed.), 
Medieval Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Medieval Rhetoric, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1978), 27.; George A. Kennedy, A New History of Classical 
Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 267-270; Mary Carruthers, The Craft 
of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), passim. 
33
  Kennedy, A New History of Classical Rhetoric, 265-270; Murphy, Rhetoric in the Middle 
Ages, 47-63. 
16 
 
made for the demands of Christian theology.34  Whatever the merits of this view, it is 
peculiar that scholars should notice the influence on his theology of a particular 
strand of philosophy which he had only studied in depth shortly before his conversion 
to Christianity, and in which he was largely self-taught, while failing to notice the 
influence of rhetoric in which he had been educated and which he had taught.  If 
someone were to form an opinion of Augustine solely from such scholarship, he or 
she might be forgiven for believing that Augustine shows an interest in rhetoric only 
in parts of the Confessiones and in Book Four of De doctrine Christiana!35  
Fortunately, scholars have begun to redress this imbalance but the overwhelming bias 
remains towards reading Augustine’s theology in light of Neoplatonism with little 
attention given to the influence of rhetorical theory.36 
Third, as shown above, the art of rhetoric seems to have remained prominent 
in Augustine’s mind throughout his life.  How could it not have remained so 
considering that much of his life was spent in two of the oratorical theatres of the late 
Roman Empire: the pulpit and the law court?  Indeed, as will be shown, the 
episcopacy itself uniquely embodied the ideals of a Ciceronian orator, uniting in a 
single office the role of sage, orator, judge and statesman.  To this extent, Augustine’s 
                                               
34
  The debate about Augustine’s Neoplatonism dominated mid to late twentieth-century 
Augustine studies.  See, for example, P. Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint 
Augustin (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1950), 157-167; P. Courcelle, Les Confessions de Saint 
Augustin dans la tradition littéraire: Antécedents et posterité (Paris: Augustiniennes, 1963); 
John J. O’Meara, ‘The Neoplatonism of Saint Augustine’ in Dominic O’Meara, (ed.), 
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), 
34-41. 
35
  Gerald Press, in his perceptive essay on the subject and structure of De doctrina Christiana 
laments the tendency among scholars to examine only Book Four for Augustine’s rhetorical 
theory as ‘too narrow’.  See Gerald Press, ‘The Subject and Structure of Augustine’s De 
doctrina Christiana’, Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), 118. 
36
  Two recent studies of Augustine in light of rhetoric are Robert Dodaro, Christ and the Just 
Society in the Thoughts of Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and 
Paul R. Kolbet, Augustine and the Cure of Souls (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2010).  The 
two works make are interesting to read together: both situate Augustine within a rhetorical 
tradition—primarily Cicero—but Dodaro reveals how that tradition influenced Augustine’s 
political theology while Kolbet shows how it shaped his understanding of the necessity for the 
healing of the soul in redemption. 
17 
 
consecration may be viewed as the culmination of his ambitions as a rhetor, though 
he certainly did not view it as such.  Next, Augustine stands in a long line of North 
African theologians who were intimately familiar with the principles of rhetoric: 
Tertullian, Cyprian, Minucius Felix, Arnobius, Lactantius, and Marius Victorinus.37  
All of these, except Tertullian (though he was probably trained as a lawyer and thus 
grounded in forensic rhetorical theory), were formally trained as rhetors and before 
their conversion functioned as such; in this respect, Augustine was their natural heir.   
Finally and more subtly, Augustine shared with rhetors, especially Cicero, a 
high regard for the role of delight (delectatio) in human motivation.   At key moments 
of his thinking—in his treatment of music, God and creation in De musica, in his 
grappling with the question of the will in Ad Simplicianum, in his placement of 
Romans 5.5 at the heart of his understanding of redemption, in his influential insights 
into the mechanics of Romans 7 and 8, in his controversy with the Pelagians, and 
above all in his understanding of love—delight appears, pointing him in interesting 
directions that warrant further exploration and explanation.   The closest parallel to 
Augustine’s use of delight is in classical rhetoric, especially the place of delight in the 
Ciceronian mechanics of persuasion.  In almost every case that Augustine dwells on 
the nature and role of delight in his theology it appears as either a means or goal of 
persuasion.   
In fact, Augustine always remained a man disciplined in the Ciceronian 
tradition of speaking ‘so as to prove, to please, and to persuade’,38 and likewise 
remained firmly convinced that delight lay at the ground of human motivation.  One 
can only wonder how often he observed a proficient orator change the hearts of an 
                                               
37
  Little is known about Minucius Felix, though his one surviving work, Octavius, demonstrates 
his deep classical learning.  
38
  Cicero, Orator 69 (LCL 356): ‘...ita dicet, ut probet, ut delectat, ut flectat’. 
18 
 
audience—likely he had accomplished this himself—through not only the wisdom of 
his conviction but also the delightfulness of his oratorical performance.  His life prior 
to his conversion had been devoted to the art of shaping and directing the will of 
others through words both wise and charming.  Who better, therefore, to know first 
hand the phantasm of free will than one trained in the manipulation of the will 
through words?  Augustine might claim that he had rejected the ideals of the rhetors 
for those of the philosophers (a common enough claim among rhetors), but the 
Christian God he came to embrace after his conversion was a strangely eloquent 
Deity. 
 
Delight 
It will be my contention, therefore, that the basis for Augustine’s 
understanding of redemption is found in rhetoric; his interpretation of Scripture, 
particularly Romans 7 and 8, are deeply influenced by his rhetorical knowledge.  The 
nature of delight in Augustine’s thought can be found most forcefully expressed in 
Book Four of De doctrina Christiana, where Augustine, drawing directly from 
Cicero, states, ‘A hearer must be delighted (delectandus) so that he can be gripped 
and made to listen, and moved so that he can be impelled to action’.39  Delight here is 
not a modest appreciation but a potent force that overwhelms the defences of the will, 
demands attention, and prepares it to be spurred into action.  Indeed, as will become 
clear, Augustine accords delight such enormous power that even sin and virtue are 
wholly dependent on it.  The only way either sin or virtue can obtain people’s free 
acquiescence is by delighting them so that they can be gripped and moved towards 
either virtuous or sinful action.  Because of that estimation—perhaps only fully 
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appreciated by classical rhetors—Augustine devoted much of his work to guiding 
others towards a true and secure delight or preventing them from straying (either 
through immorality or heresy) farther away from it.40 
The usual word Augustine uses is delectatio (in its noun form) or delectare (in 
its verb form).  Delectare is generally synonymous with placere (to please) and 
gaudere (to rejoice), and Augustine uses all three terms (along with iucunditas, suavis 
and dulcis) to describe the act, object or source of pleasure.  The interchangeable 
definition of these words is reflected in the translations of Augustine, all of which use 
‘delight’ as an English equivalent for all these Latin terms.  Confusingly, translators 
at times use alternative words where Augustine only uses one; thus, for example, in 
Confessiones 10.3.4, Henry Chadwick translates delectat as both ‘delight’ and 
‘pleasure’ within the space of a dozen words.41 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines delight in three ways: 1. as ‘pleasure, 
joy, or gratification felt in a high degree’, 2. as ‘source of great pleasure or joy’ or, 3. 
‘the quality (in objects) which causes delight; quality or faculty of delighting; charm, 
delightfulness’. 42  The OED defines delight in its verbal form as ‘to give great 
pleasure or enjoyment to, to please highly’, or in its reflexive form as ‘to be highly 
pleased, take great pleasure, rejoice’.43  As the OED’s citations of ‘delight’ 
demonstrate, normally in English delight has a positive connotation: a ‘high degree’ 
of enjoyment of something for its own sake. 
Augustine’s description of delight in De doctrina Christiana suggests, 
however, that he defined the concept a little differently.  Delight for him can be 
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forceful, sweeping the delighted up into the love of the other and bonding the two 
together.  In such cases, delectatio is reminiscent of the English word ‘sublimity’, 
particularly as defined by Edmund Burke and the early Romantics.44 Similarly, his 
understanding of the forcefulness of delight can at times be similar to our own 
concept of addiction as when he writes, ‘Before the habit is acquired, either there is 
no pleasure (delectatio) whatsoever or it is so slight it is scarcely present....If he then 
goes so far as to perform the corresponding act, the craving seems to be satisfied and 
extinguished, but a more intense pleasure (delectatio) is enkindled when the 
suggestion is repeated afterwards.  This pleasure (delectatio), however, is far less than 
that which has turned into a habit by continuous acts, for it is very difficult to 
overcome this habit’.45  Delight for Augustine is therefore a powerful experience that 
cannot be easily resisted. 
Passages such as these might easily lead one to think that Augustine had a 
mainly unfavourable opinion of delight.  Certainly, such a view accords with the 
popular notion of the character of Augustine’s thought and, indeed, of the medieval 
theology he so influenced.  But such an interpretation would be mistaken.  Augustine 
speaks of delight as originating in God; he is equally happy to speak of God himself 
delighting especially as Scripture often does so.  Indeed, in en. Ps. 85, Augustine is 
willing to say to God: ‘You alone are delight’, using the word iucunditas with its 
connotation of playfulness.46  Finally, central to his understanding of how Christians 
persevere to salvation is the necessity, as he sees it, of a victorious ‘delight in 
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righteousness’ (delectatio iustitiae) that is imparted to the faithful through the power 
of the Holy Spirit.47  Obviously, delight is a very complex concept in Augustine’s 
thought. 
Surprisingly, despite Augustine’s educational background and for all his use 
of the concept of delight, no scholars have made delight the primary focus of their 
studies. Certainly, many studies of Augustine’s theology make some mention of 
‘delight’, and a few key works even devote a section to its role.  Yet most scholars 
prefer to discuss the importance of ‘happiness’ in Augustine, pointing out the possible 
inspiration of the Enneads or placing his thought within the Aristotelian tradition of 
eudaemonistic ethics.48   
Undoubtedly the most influential discussion of delight is that found in Peter 
Brown’s Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, where he argues that through analysing 
the ‘psychology’ of delight, Augustine reached the conclusion that delight ‘is the only 
possible source of action, nothing else can move the will’.49  According to Brown, 
this epiphany led Augustine to discard his earlier optimism about the will’s ability to 
cooperate with God’s grace for a more pessimistic view in which the will completely 
relies on God’s initiative.  Such is the influence of Brown’s proposal that almost all 
subsequent examinations of delight are influenced by it.50 As a result, delight has 
been reduced to an entirely motivational force without any deeper or theological basis 
for its power over the will.   
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It is worthwhile to compare Brown’s understanding of delight in Augustine’s 
thought with that of Oliver O’Donovan in order to illustrate how a dominant concern 
can significantly influence an appreciation of what Augustine intends by delight.  
Brown’s emphasis, of course, is on the transformation of Augustine from the young, 
optimistic Christian philosopher into the father of a dour strand of western theology 
fixated on the bondage of the will, original sin and predestination.  ‘Delight’ is central 
to Brown’s argument.  He writes: ‘Augustine came to view “delight” as the 
mainspring of human action; but his ‘delight’ escaped self-control.  Delight is 
discontinuous, startlingly erratic: Augustine now moves in a world of “love at first 
sight”, of chance encounters, and, just as important, of sudden equally inexplicable 
patches of deadness’.51  Here, Brown is carried away by his own rhetoric, concluding 
his chapter by portraying Augustine as a ‘Romantic’ abruptly swept into a world of 
alarming uncertainties.52  His account is beguiling and accords well with Augustine’s 
portrayal of delight in De doctrina Christiana. Yet, his approach should give one 
pause.  Brown believes that Augustine reached his conclusions about delight after a 
careful psychological analysis of the concept of delight.  But one wonders whether 
Augustine’s hypothetically new insight arose from a psychological analysis or from a 
deep theological consideration.53  In fact, Brown’s psychological account of 
Augustine’s concept of delight hardly compels him to consider the possible 
theological reasons for Augustine’s view.  He makes a passing reference to delight’s 
connection to grace and to God serving as the source of delight, but he expends no 
effort in pursuing either thought.  He never asks why Augustine understands delight 
as central to human motivation or why it finds its source in God.  Brown’s sole 
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concern is with how Augustine’s psychological analysis of delight facilitates his 
supposed change of heart.   Finally, given that Brown’s hypothesis appears in his 
biography of Augustine, he surprisingly makes no attempt to understand Augustine’s 
approach in light of his education and earlier profession as a rhetor.54  Thus, Brown’s 
account leaves one with two important questions: what is the theology behind 
Augustine’s supposed metamorphosis and how was that theology informed by his 
training as a rhetor?   
While Brown comprehends Augustine’s delight as a kind of ‘Romantic’ turn, 
Oliver O’Donovan presents it as a kind of refined rationalism.  In the first chapter of 
his insightful The Problem of Self-Love in Saint Augustine, O’Donovan seeks to 
guard against a false polarity between a ‘cosmic’ and a ‘positive’ love in Augustine 
by categorising Augustine’s use of love into four aspects: ‘cosmic’, ‘rational’, 
‘benevolent’ and ‘positive’.55  Within this scheme, he understands delight as 
synonymous with a ‘rational love’ that is ‘neither “appetite” nor “movement” but 
estimation, appreciation, and approval’. 56   Earlier he describes this ‘rational love’ as 
‘an admiring appreciation of the good, in which the subject recognises the teleology 
which he himself has not imposed but from which he can maintain an observer’s 
independence’.57  In short, O’Donovan presents delight as a refined and measured 
love with the lover very much in control (necessary for the observer’s independence) 
of his or her own appreciation.  Yet, as the passage quoted above from De doctrina 
Christiana makes clear, far from being a detached appreciation of the beloved, 
Augustine speaks of delight as something that grips, forces attention, and compels 
action.  These are violent terms more like Donne’s ‘Batter my heart three-person’d 
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God’ than any Platonic appreciation of the good or the beautiful. Surely, therefore, 
delectatio is not always synonymous with a ‘rational’ and demurely appreciative 
love.58  Yet, O’Donovan seems to suggest so. 
What one finds in each of these descriptions of delight is not so much a 
misinterpretation of Augustine as the failure fully to pursue his concept of delight.  
Even Brown, who at first glance appears to concentrate on delight, really concerns 
himself not so much with delight itself as with how Augustine’s use of that concept in 
Ad Simplicianum reveals his theological transformation.  Likewise, the only 
explanation for O’Donovan’s equating of delight with ‘rational love’ is that he has 
not considered other ways in which Augustine makes use of the word delectatio (or 
its various synonyms).  Thus, while O’Donovan’s account of ‘rational love’ is sound, 
less so is his unqualified correspondence of ‘rational love’ with delectatio. 
What then are we to make of Augustine’s concept of delight?  First, delight is 
more than a pleasant if overpowering source of motivation or a mere facet of 
eudaemonistic ethics.  In fact, delight is first and foremost the affective element of 
God’s love.  Because God is love, Augustine can speak of delight as a property of the 
Trinity itself, one which he most closely associates with the Holy Spirit.  Thus, he 
refers to the Holy Spirit as ‘blissful delight’ and of God himself as actually 
delighting.59  Augustine can also picture heaven as where ‘delight beyond measure’ 
will be enjoyed because there the faithful will be given ‘the chance to contemplate the 
Lord’s own delight’.60 Consequently, whenever Augustine speaks of delight he refers 
to something that is more than mere psychology; delight is not an emotion 
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manufactured by the human psyche but, fundamentally, the expression and 
confirmation of love that finds its origin in God.  It should not, therefore, be 
surprising to find Augustine referring repeatedly to delight in his discussion of God’s 
acts of creation and redemption.  Delight is present in the act of creation, involved in 
the movement of that creation towards God, and present at the end of all virtuous 
striving.  Delight also plays a vital role within redemption as an integral aspect of the 
love that draws the faithful to God and enables them to persevere or abide in that 
love.  
Yet, Augustine’s approach to delight is not wholly sanguine.  In fact, delight 
is a central part of his understanding of the Fall and of why people turn away from 
God in the embrace of death.  While a ‘spiritual’ or ‘eternal’ delight may compel one 
towards God, illicit and temporal delights entice one towards death.  Such delights 
manifest themselves either as the enjoyment of wickedness itself or as an unhealthy 
fixation on the mutable and transitory.  Such is the power of delight in Augustine’s 
thought that it makes even death seem sweet and pleasurable.  The perversity of fallen 
humanity causes it to enjoy its own journey towards death.  
 
A Rhetorical Theology 
What one finds in Augustine, therefore, is a mature and developed 
understanding of the nature of delight that is unparalleled in either Christian theology 
or rhetorical theory yet draws heavily from both.  It is as though Augustine the rhetor 
discovered in the Christian God the source of the almost magical power that the 
classical world ascribed to orators.  For Augustine therefore, delight is not a 
secondary concept to be understood only in the light of other overarching concerns.  
Delight is in fact of such paramount importance that it influences not only what he 
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writes but how he writes.  The failure to grasp this point not only leads to the 
misconstruing of Augustine’s theological concerns (often assuming that they are the 
same as present-day ones) but also ignores what arguably is Augustine’s greatest 
legacy to medieval theology: a theology and spirituality grounded in rhetorical 
principles. 
I begin Part One of my study, therefore, by examining Augustine’s rhetorical 
background in order to show the historical and rhetorical milieu in which he 
developed his theology.  The period of rhetorical theory and practice during 
Augustine’s day is normally termed ‘Second Sophistic’ (a named coined by 
Philostratus the Athenian during the third century) and is marked by an exaggerated 
esteem for style over content.61  If one carefully studies Augustine’s supposed 
rejection of rhetoric, it becomes clear that what he really condemns is this overly 
ornamented approach to oratory, which to his mind is both facile and self-promoting.  
Instead, he upholds an understanding of rhetoric that is most clearly expressed in 
Cicero’s enormously influential De inventione.62   In the proemium of that work, 
Cicero maintains that rhetoric and philosophy depend on each other.  While 
eloquence without wisdom is potentially very harmful, wisdom without eloquence is 
mute and ineffectual.63  For Cicero the eloquent expression of philosophical wisdom 
is a political act necessary for the formation and continued well-being of the 
commonwealth.   
Augustine’s own approach to philosophical rhetoric bears much resemblance 
to Marius Victorinus’s Neoplatonic commentary on De inventione entitled 
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Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam.  Written before Victorinus’s dramatic 
conversion to Christianity, this long commentary reinterprets what for Cicero is 
primarily a political art into one which makes the embodied soul receptive to the 
wisdom that will enable it to ascend back to the divine.  Victorinus’s work represents 
an important turn in classical rhetoric away from a civic role within law courts and 
the forum towards a more ‘religious’ and personal role in the reditus of enlightened 
souls back to their original nature and their disembodied participation in the divine. 
Both De inventione and Victorinus’s commentary on that work shed much 
light on Augustine’s understanding of redemption and the role of delight within it.  
My study of Augustine’s theology, therefore, begins with a careful examination of 
Cicero’s rhetorical theory—both as it represented Republican ideals and, more 
importantly, as it sought to shape those ideals—in order to illustrate the shape and 
influence of Cicero’s model for the ideal orator in whom eloquence and wisdom 
coalesce.  Central to that theory is the myth in the proemium of De inventione in 
which he conceives of people originally roaming like cattle, scattered around the 
countryside and living by brute force, unaware that they could be something better.  
Eventually, a wise and eloquent man arose who could convey his wisdom with such 
eloquence that those within earshot could not help but be charmed.  His wise speech 
gathered the people together, formed them into a civilisation, and taught them divine 
truths and human duties.  This could only have been accomplished by someone in 
whom wisdom was united with eloquence. 
Equally important is Cicero’s development of his wise orator in De oratore 
and Orator, in which defines the purpose of eloquence as proving, pleasing, and 
persuading in such a skilful way that the will of the audience is overwhelmed.  
Cicero’s ideal orator is one who can convince his audience to hand over its will to 
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him and to want to do as he compels them.  The orator is not a philosopher, he does 
not seek to convince through a series of carefully reasoned proofs; he is a rhetorician 
who seeks through argument and emotional appeal to convince the audience to act in 
a particular way.  The difference is expressed well by Marjorie Boyle in her survey of 
medieval dialectic and rhetoric: ‘Dialectic seeks an act of the intellect...through 
compulsion of reason, and it secures its religious end in contemplation.  Rhetoric 
seeks an act of the will...through persuasion of feeling, and it secures its religious end 
in conversion.” 64   
 Cicero himself, however, would not have naturally conceived of either 
dialectic or rhetoric as necessarily directed towards a religious end.  For him, the role 
of rhetoric is primarily civic: to advocate in the law courts and deliberate in the 
Senate.  But by Augustine’s own day those expectations had changed.  To show how 
classical rhetoric had developed by the fourth century, I next discuss Second 
Sophistic, the dominant rhetoric after the fall of the Roman Republic in which 
Augustine was trained and against which he later rebelled after reading Cicero’s 
Hortensius.  Within late Imperial rhetoric, however, there developed two frequently 
intertwined types of rhetoricians who sought, either consciously or not, to preserve 
Cicero’s ideal of a wise and eloquent orator.  The first, of which Victorinus and the 
pre-conversion Augustine are representative, is the philosophical rhetor.65  These 
rhetoricians attempted to adapt and preserve the Ciceronian ideal by adjusting it to the 
expectations of a society that increasingly sought a form of salvation away from the 
world, especially through the Neoplatonic return to the divine.  People such as 
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Victorinus and Martianus Capella (both North Africans) conceived of Cicero’s theory 
as providing a way for the soul to shed itself of worldliness as it rediscovers its own 
original nature in the divine.  In the hands of philosophical rhetors, Ciceronian 
rhetoric was imbued with a religious quality largely lacking in Cicero’s own works.  
Thus, by Augustine’s day Cicero’s scheme for explaining the rise and maintenance of 
the State had been interiorised and adapted to a Neoplatonic worldview: sweet 
eloquence gives voice to mute wisdom to ennoble the human soul.  
The second tradition is represented by the late antique bishop.  This often 
overlooked aspect of late Imperial bishops has been recently recognised by Paul 
Kolbet, who begins his book by noting, ‘The sudden, extraordinary influence of 
Christian bishops in the fourth and fifth centuries was due in no small part to their 
ability to make publicly recognised practices and strategies of the Greco-Roman 
orators and philosophers their own—even as they adapted them to conform to 
Christian principles’.66  In the West, such bishops deliberately or not became models 
of Cicero’s ideal orator, in many cases despite their less than sanguine appreciation of 
Cicero.  But their role in society as statesmen who provided for the well-being of 
their community, i.e. the Church, through their eloquent expression of Scriptural truth 
came to embody more than anyone else Cicero’s ideal.  Few others personified that 
ideal better than Saint Ambrose and it is therefore no coincidence that through him 
Augustine the rhetor was eventually reconciled to Christianity. 
After establishing the wider historical context for Augustine’s theology, I will 
examine Augustine’s own consideration of rhetoric in light of Cicero and in 
comparison to Victorinus.  I will seek to demonstrate that Augustine did not reject 
classical rhetoric, let alone Cicero, but that his own thought and theology were deeply 
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influenced by the ideal of a philosophical rhetor.  That ideal can be most clearly seen 
in his treatment of Christian teaching in De doctrina Christiana that both in its 
structure and argument translate that ideal into a Christian context.  While Augustine 
may be willing to disagree with Cicero on questions of style he retains the 
fundamental picture of a person devoted to wisdom and seeking to make people 
receptive to that wisdom through eloquence.  What partly clouds a historical view of 
Augustine’s reliance on Cicero is that he downplays Cicero’s mainly civil rhetoric in 
favour of one directed towards the inculcation of salvific truth.67  But this is not a 
rejection of Cicero himself so much as it is the baptism of late antique Ciceronianism.  
Where Augustine is original, however, is in his understanding of the source of both 
wisdom and eloquence: ultimately, for Augustine, the preacher-orator is wise and 
eloquent primarily because he gives space for God to be wise and eloquent through 
him. 
One of the reasons why the grounding of Augustine’s theology in the 
principles of rhetoric is so important is that they provide a richer context in which to 
read his theology.  There has been a tendency, particularly in some quarters of the 
Church, to dwell on Augustine’s theology of grace in, as it were, splendid isolation.  
This has been recognised by Paul Kolbet who, drawing upon the work of Stephen 
Duffy, argues that Augustine’s doctrine of grace has been disengaged from its 
‘original context within the bishop’s ministry and his more basic conviction in the 
incarnation of the divine Word: a Word spoken rhetorically, adapted to the human 
condition, and meant to persuade us’.68  He concludes by arguing that ‘...rhetorical 
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theory has been so internalised by Augustine that it not only expresses his theological 
vision, but also informs it.  Moreover, even as it is employed, rhetoric itself is revised 
and infused with theological content’.69  As Kolbet argues here, Augustine’s theology 
is informed by his rhetorical training, and nowhere is that clearer than in his treatment 
of human redemption in terms of persuasive delight.   
To begin to understand how that delight operates within Augustine’s theology, 
however, one must first understand the world in which that delight operates.  Part 
Two of my study therefore begins by delving into Augustine’s enormously rich view 
of a created existence that is wholly contingent.  He argues repeatedly that all of 
creation derives and continues its existence through an active participation in God’s 
being or goodness.  God is the ground of all existence.  He is Being itself; everything 
else has been ‘uttered’ into existence through his eternal Word: Christ.  Or, as 
Augustine succinctly puts it: ‘You do not cause it to exist other than by speaking’.70  
To explain how this works, he develops an idea that would later cause some heated 
debate among medieval theologians: that God began by uttering into existence an 
unformed material that existed on the very cusp of nothingness.  This material was 
good because God had created it, but it lacked any form and was therefore almost 
non-existent.  Then, God called the formless material back to himself through his 
Word and through that conversion gave it all form.  And so, creation itself is a kind of 
divine speech that was uttered into existence and called back into formation through 
the Father’s eternally uttered Word.  Speech and persuasion are therefore part of the 
act of creation itself: to exist means to have been both spoken and persuaded to turn 
from nothingness. 
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Humanity holds a central place within creation and shares in creation’s 
precarious existence on the cusp of nothingness.  In that sense, the audience for God’s 
redemptive oratory is a restless one, never stationary but always tending towards 
either God or death.  Outside of heaven, static existence does not exist.  Contingent 
being is thus also an action subject to motivational forces.  At the same time, 
humanity has fallen from perfection, which has created an irresistible bias towards 
death; fallen humanity finds the devil’s charming words sweeter than the Word 
through whom they were created. Acutely conscious of this human capacity for sin 
and corruption, Augustine provides a soteriology whereby the participation of the 
faithful in God is accomplished by means of a prior and necessary participation of the 
divine in human nature.  As with Irenaeus of Lyons and Athanasius, the key to 
redemption for Augustine is the Incarnation wherein God became man so that men 
can become God; only this divine initiative can overcome the pride of human 
sinfulness.  By deigning to participate in fallen humanity, the Word enables humanity 
to turn towards God and away from its tendency towards prideful self-destruction.  
The entirety of human life is, therefore, dependent on participation: both existence 
and redemption—equally acts of God’s love—spring from that one communion 
between God and humanity. 
All of this is the theoretical theology behind Augustine’s approach to the 
pastoral question of how that redemption and participation work out within human 
experience.  It is one thing to state that by participating in human nature, Christ 
opened the door for human beings to participate fruitfully in God’s own being and 
eventually to share in his divinity, and another thing altogether to state what this 
actually means in real terms—and one must remember that most of Augustine’s work 
was directed at congregations either directly through his preaching or indirectly 
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through his defence of the faith.  It is, in fact, precisely in his spelling out of the 
implications of participatory existence and redemption that he draws from his 
rhetorical training.   A helpful way to think about this is to ask the question: what is 
the experience of damnation or salvation really like?  How does it feel to be on the 
road to heaven or hell?  Interestingly, Augustine’s answer is that each involves 
delight.  But for him the peculiar thing about delight is that no one has control over it.  
In his letter to Simplicianus (from which Peter Brown developed his theory of 
Augustine’s conversion), he asks, ‘Who can welcome in his mind something that 
does not give him delight?  But who has it in his power to ensure that something that 
will delight him will turn up, or that he will take delight in what turns up?’71  When 
delight presents itself to the human senses or mind, it overwhelms them, and moves 
the will.  In other words, people are persuaded and converted by delight, and just as 
Cicero’s eloquence takes hold of the audience’s mind and compels action, so too does 
delight take hold of the mind and compel action.  The dynamics of this are beyond 
human control; as Augustine understands it, people do something because it pleases 
them, but the fact that it does please them is something they can neither understand 
nor control. 
In order to present the fullness of Augustine’s concept of delight, I will next 
discuss in turn the two kinds of delight that contend for control over the human will.  
I will begin with worldly delight because Augustine, drawing from Romans 7, 
believes that humanity is already enthralled to it.  Worldly delight manifests itself 
either as the actual delight in illicit activity—a delight in sin—or as an inordinate 
delight in the temporal that distracts people from seeking God.  Both forms of 
worldly delight enslave the will and direct it towards death.  In fact, so powerful is 
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this kind of delight that the experience of it forms a habit or chain that is impossible 
to break without God’s grace. For Augustine, delight therefore gives substance to the 
Pauline idea of bondage of the will to sin.   
 Part of my argument in this section will be that Augustine’s worldly delight 
can be compared to Cicero’s ‘babbling stupidity’ against which the true orator must 
contend.  In Cicero’s myth in De inventione he conjectures that in the course of 
events, men ‘who were accustomed to stand on the side of falsehood against truth’ 
employed a charming fluency to woo the people into believing them fit to govern.72  
Similarly, Augustine conceives of a diabolical fluency that uses charm and falsehood 
to beguile people into surrendering the governance of their own will.  He has made 
the devil or sin into Cicero’s anti-orator: his charm and false wisdom cause harm. 
Although Cicero’s republic has been supplanted by the individual will, his original 
logic remains.  Sin therefore presents itself as a kind of rhetoric, tempting people with 
its sweetness and fluency to surrender their will and act in a manner that removes 
them farther from God.  In fact, Augustine’s perception of how sin charms people is 
not altogether different from his perception of Second Sophistic: both offer vanity 
and falsehood dressed in the fine apparel of groundless delight.  In other words, sin is 
persuasive rather than coercive; people progress towards self-destruction through 
being gripped by delight and compelled to action.   
Set against worldly delight is God’s own eternal delight, the source of which 
Augustine locates in God himself.  Drawing upon Ps. 27.4 (26.4), Augustine returns 
frequently to an image of heaven as where the faithful will contemplate the ‘Lord’s 
delight’.  I will examine his use of this passage to show that he envisions delight as 
existing within the Godhead and identifies it most closely with God’s goodness.  That 
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identification allows him to perceive all creation—which only enjoys existence by 
partaking of God’s goodness—as being inherently delightful.  His typical way of 
presenting the delightfulness of creation is as beauty, and this comes out powerfully 
not only in De ordine and De musica, in which he speaks of creation as God’s cosmic 
carmen, but also in his various discussions of the measure, number and order 
imparted to created existence.  In fact, the delightful beauty of creation itself shares in 
God’s oratory by both praising its Creator and calling the inquiring mind to share in 
that praise. 
I will conclude my discussion of spiritual delight by observing Augustine’s 
definition of the beata vita, the happy life, which is the true goal of human life.  
Within his thought, happiness is not a subjective search in which people individually 
undertake an Enlightenment ‘pursuit of happiness’.  True happiness itself is 
synonymous with a participation in God; the pursuit of happiness, therefore, is the 
search for God and that search is propelled by delight.  People respond as they do to 
delight—be it temporal or spiritual—in their quest to find a happiness that is both 
secure and satisfying.  Because of the Fall, humanity has succumbed to the lure of 
worldly delights; despite that, however, the memory of God continues to haunt the 
heart, causing it to remain restless.   
Finally, to understand how God intervenes to draw the restless heart towards 
salvation and to free it from bondage to sin, I will discuss the role of the Holy Spirit 
within Augustine’s theology.  The same logic that compels Augustine to believe that 
there can be no love without delight, leads him to associate a divine delight most 
closely with the Holy Spirit, whom he identifies as the loving communion shared 
between the Father and the Son. That eternal delight becomes eloquence when turned 
towards humanity.  By infusing love and delight into the hearts of the faithful by the 
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outpouring of the Holy Spirit, God overwhelms enslaved wills and draws them back 
towards a happy participation in his own divine nature.  Augustine repeatedly cites 
Rom. 5.5, where Paul speaks of God pouring the Holy Spirit into the hearts of the 
faithful, to explain how Christians are saved.  But he understands the dynamic of this 
outpouring through his developing understanding of Romans 7 and 8.  The insight 
Augustine gained from his long meditation on that passage leads him to believe that 
only by delighting in righteousness can people discover freedom.  God cannot coerce 
people into turning back towards him through fear or violence because this would not 
allow for human freedom or love.  People must want to love God and to live good 
lives.  In order to do that, they must delight in God and goodness.  Because they have 
been enslaved to the delight of sin, God must therefore pour his true and eternal 
delight into their hearts.  Without the outpouring of delightful love, humankind 
continually delights in its own death.  Ultimately, the faithful must enjoy God 
because their existence and redemption depend on that enjoyment.  Any other 
enjoyment effectively leads to the collapse of one’s contingent nature. Boldly stated, 
therefore, delight determines the status of human existence.   
 Ultimately God is the orator; he is the wisdom conveyed; he is the eloquence 
that delights.  Humanity has been created by that Author, that Wisdom, and that 
Eloquence and it has been redeemed by all three as well.  As with Cicero’s audience, 
Augustine’s humanity is passive: the human will is enslaved either to the soul’s 
detriment to sin or to its everlasting benefit to God.  In other words, one or the other 
will always take hold of the mind; there is no question of individuals being their own 
master.  But because delight is at the heart of human existence in a strange way 
people are happy with either form of bondage: either happy in their own self-
destruction or in their own divinisation.  But only the latter will bring with it 
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satisfaction and rest.  In the end, Augustine never forsook rhetoric but rather 
transformed it into a theology that, like all good rhetorical theory, takes seriously the 
human condition. 
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2 
The Ideal Orator 
  
  Rome was sustained as much by the eloquence of her orators as by the might 
of her legions.  From at least the time of Cicero, rhetoric dominated the intellectual 
life of Rome; though philosophers might inveigh against sophistry, they never 
seriously threatened the devotion to ars rhetorica by the governing class.  Homer and 
Demosthenes in the East and Virgil and Cicero in the West remained the ideals of 
Greco-Roman literary culture until the dominance of Christianity in the late fourth 
century.73  These authors were ‘burned into the memory’ of the elite from an early 
age, shaping their language, their ideals, and their culture.74  Augustine, both a 
student and later teacher of rhetoric, was no exception.  Indeed, he learned his craft in 
North Africa where, if the works on rhetoric by Marius Victorinus, Martianus 
Capella, and possibly Fortunatianus are anything to go by, seems to have been a 
centre of rhetorical learning in Late Antiquity. 
Before beginning to discern the ways in which rhetoric may have shaped 
Augustine’s theology, one has to come to grips with the nature of rhetoric in his day.  
This is by no means an easy task.  Scholars have long debated not only the character 
of that rhetoric but also Augustine’s attitude towards it.  Some have seen Augustine 
as utterly Ciceronian while others maintain just as vigorously that he subtly rejected 
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Cicero.75  Others still have taken a middle road, arguing that while Augustine sought 
to replace Ciceronian rhetoric with a Christian one, he was too beholden to the old 
orator to leave him behind entirely.76 
Unfortunately, few of these authors have made a serious attempt to place 
Augustine within the wider historical and cultural context of classical rhetoric in his 
own day.  Certainly, some have tried to argue that in the Confessiones and De 
doctrina Christiana, he rejected not so much rhetoric per se as Second Sophistic.  But 
what does that assertion mean?  Rhetors and orators in Augustine’s day did not define 
themselves by particular modern categories of styles.77  Similarly, rhetoric itself 
cannot so easily be separated from the rest of culture and learning; Roman education 
from a young age was steeped in grammar and rhetoric.  As Christine Morhmann 
states in her essay on Augustine and eloquence, ‘For Augustine and his 
contemporaries, a “vir eloquentissimus” was a cultivated man, someone who had 
absorbed the culture of his times and expressed it in his way of life’.78  Could 
Augustine actually distance himself from the dominant rhetorical culture without 
distancing himself from the whole realm of late classical education and learning? 
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Just as importantly, when comparing Augustine to Cicero, few scholars 
address the emergence prior to Augustine’s own time of a Neoplatonic adaptation of 
Ciceronianism, expressed clearly by Marius Victorinus (whose theology and 
conversion so influenced Augustine) in Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam, his 
commentary on Cicero’s, De inventione.   Likewise, in examining Augustine’s 
apparent contempt for ars rhetorica, no one explicitly distinguishes between a rhetor 
and an orator.  While this may seem a minor point, it is surely of interest that Cicero, 
the western paradigm of an orator, demonstrates the same contempt for rhetors and 
their handbooks as does Augustine.  Rhetors, teachers of rhetoric, enjoyed a very 
different status within western Roman society than orators.  No self-respecting 
Roman gentleman ever aspired to be a rhetor; but an orator in the tradition of Cato the 
Elder, Seneca, and Cicero remained a powerful model throughout the West in 
Antiquity. 
The primary task of this chapter is therefore twofold: to examine rhetoric as 
defined in the late Republic and particularly by Cicero and also as understood in 
Augustine’s own day and especially in comparison to the ideals of Cicero.  In order to 
see how Ciceronian rhetoric may have influenced Augustine’s theology, one must 
understand the concerns and debates regarding rhetoric during the late Republic.  Of 
particular interest is the distinction made between the rhetors who taught ars 
rhetorica and the Roman orators who spoke in courts and assemblies and deliberated 
in the senate.  This distinction between the two roles within Roman society will shed 
light on Augustine’s own attitudes towards rhetoric found in Confessiones and De 
doctrina Christiana.  Next, we will examine how the classical debate about the 
relative merits of rhetoric in comparison with philosophy was carried on in the late 
Republic.  Both topics will provide an introduction to Cicero’s own rhetorical theory.   
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There are three aspects of Cicero’s thought that shed light on either 
Augustine’s language about rhetoric or the influence of classical rhetoric on his 
theology.  First, I will examine how Cicero distinguishes between rhetors and orators, 
and how that distinction connects with his understanding of eloquence. Cicero by and 
large shared the disdain for rhetorical teachers common among the Roman elite of the 
late Republic.  This influenced his own attitudes towards rhetorical rules and theory 
in relation to eloquence itself. Second, I will observe how Cicero sought to solve the 
debate between philosophy and oratory by grounding eloquence in wisdom.  Cicero’s 
orator is one in whom the wisdom of philosophy is conjoined with eloquence for the 
good of the Republic.  Influenced by the traditional Roman disdain for what was 
perceived as a Greek tendency to withdraw from public life to pursue a private life of 
philosophy, Cicero presents the myth of the heroic proto-orator whose philosophic 
wisdom and eloquent expression called humanity away from its original barbarism to 
form civilisation.79  Finally, I will discuss how Cicero defines eloquence and 
understands its power over the audience.  For Cicero, eloquence is best expressed by 
the threefold duty of an orator: to speak so as to prove, please, and persuade.  An 
orator’s speech must therefore overwhelm the will of the audience so that it will not 
only prefer the orator to other speakers but also come to desire, praise, and lament 
what the orator wishes them to desire, praise and lament.  All three aspects of 
Cicero’s thought can then be brought together to describe his ideal orator: an image 
that will have a powerful influence over Augustine. 
Having established the primary features of Cicero’s rhetorical theory, I will 
next give some attention to the rhetoric of Augustine’s own day.  In this section I will 
illustrate how the collapse of the Republic and the rise of rhetorical schools 
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transformed rhetoric into something far removed from Cicero’s ideal.  Judicial and 
deliberative oratory gave way to epideictic, a rhetoric of praise and blame typically 
delivered at ceremonial occasions, even as the role of rhetors in Roman society 
became more fluid.  Instead of Cicero’s orator/statesman whose wisdom and 
eloquence serve the preserve the State, the epitome of a late imperial orator is the 
celebrity, worshiped by his students and adored by his audience.  No longer are 
people to be persuaded through eloquence towards the common good; now the 
primary purpose of oratorical performance is to enhance the status of the speaker 
through entertainment.  
Finally, by way of joining together the sections on Cicero and on Second 
Sophistic, I will briefly examine how Christian homiletics in general and the public 
role of bishops in particular both resisted the lure of Second Sophistic and in many 
ways epitomised the Ciceronian ideal.  One encounters Cicero’s orator most 
convincingly in men such as Ambrose, devoting their public life to edifying their 
commonwealth, i.e., the Church, by conveying the wisdom of Scripture through the 
eloquence of preaching.  Certainly, Cicero’s philosophical wisdom has yielded to 
Scriptural wisdom, but in every other aspect the ideal holds.  Perhaps it was no 
coincidence that at the very time that the young Augustine was wrestling with 
Cicero’s philosophy he was drawn to Ambrose; in the Bishop of Milan he 
encountered the orator of De inventione and De oratore in person. 
 
Late Republican Rhetoric 
During the late Republic, the Roman approach to oratory experienced a 
profound transformation that was part of the Greek influence over Roman intellectual 
life in the second and first centuries B.C.  According to the traditional Roman model, 
43 
 
after receiving a private education in fundamentals, a young man would be 
apprenticed to an orator at the forum and learn his craft by imitating his elders.80  
Such a system, employing private tutors and forensic apprenticeship, was obviously 
reserved for the Roman elite.  In this respect, such training provided for a distinct, 
elite culture in which eloquentia itself functioned as a status symbol; people would 
know a patrician not only by dress but also by diction.  Just as importantly, such an 
education was intended to prepare young aristocrats for public service in the 
Republic; in theory, to be an accomplished orator was to be a statesman. 
 Starting with the Roman conquest of Greece during the second century B.C., 
the Roman educational system began to change.  Initially, wealthy Romans employed 
Greek slaves to provide technical instruction in grammar and rhetoric for their young 
before they entered their apprenticeship in the forum.81  The emergence in Rome of 
Greeks skilled in rhetorical theory and technique thus post-dated the well-established 
role of an orator in Roman civic life.82  Whereas orators remained an entirely 
aristocratic phenomenon, rhetors themselves enjoyed only a low status in society.83  
Of the thirty-nine documented grammarians and rhetors in the late Republic, thirty 
were slaves or freedmen of the most powerful families.84  Anthony Corbeill interprets 
this as suggesting that the best tutors were difficult to find and were guarded from 
other interested parties as a mark of familial prestige.85  Even after they obtained 
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freedom, grammarians and rhetors were barred from establishing their own schools, 
and generally appear to have continued a client relationship with the families to 
whom they were formerly enslaved.86 
Thus from the start, an enormous social divide separated those who 
deliberated in assemblies or the senate from those who taught rhetoric.  Orators 
generally disparaged rhetors and considered the teaching of rhetorical theory and 
techniques as a ‘debased’ Greek practice suited only for household slaves.87  Some, 
such as Cicero, might deem rhetorical teaching an honourable activity among those 
‘whose social position they are appropriate,88 but by and large the emergence of 
rhetors was greeted with suspicion.  The tenor of these misgivings was perhaps most 
forcefully expressed by Cato the Elder who railed against the use of Greek slaves in 
the education of aristocratic children because to have slaves reprimanding their 
betters and patricians indebted to slaves for their education overthrew the ‘natural’ 
social order.89  Not surprisingly, in 161 B.C. the senate reacted strongly against the 
growing use of Greek slaves in Roman education by banishing all philosophers and 
rhetors from Rome.90 
But despite the best efforts of the senate, rhetors were in Rome to stay.  A 
further development occurred in the late second century when grammar schools were 
founded.91  These were followed early in the first century by the first school of 
rhetoric aimed at low-born citizens and even slaves.92  The first of these independent 
faculties of rhetoric styled themselves rhetores Latini, suggesting awareness on their 
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part that they were providing something Greek in origin (rhetoric) now reoriented 
towards a Latin speaking world.  Such a development horrified traditionalists in the 
Roman establishment and in 93 B.C. the censors Crassus and Ahenobarbus briefly 
suppressed the first school of rhetoric.93  Part of the reason why the elite may have 
reacted against the creation of rhetorical schools is that they provided training 
hitherto only available to the elite through private tutors, and thus potentially 
provided access into the upper echelons of society by low-born citizens.94  In De 
oratore, Cicero has his character Crassus explain that the reason behind this edict was 
a concern that the Latin rhetors would make Roman youths too bold.95  Also, Corbeill 
argues that rhetors operating as independent contractors were hardly likely to conduct 
themselves as the elite expected freedmen to behave, and this must have caused 
tensions in society.96   
So, during the formative period of Roman rhetoric, one finds a strong social 
distinction between the teaching and performance of oratory that resulted in the 
approval of the latter over against the former.  The two activities of rhetors especially 
attacked were their inculcation of rhetorical theory through impractical exercises and 
the composition of rhetorical handbooks.97  All of the most vocal critics of rhetorical 
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teaching were themselves accomplished orators.  In the words of Seneca the Elder, 
writing during the first century A.D., ‘the teaching of the most noble of subjects was 
restricted to freedmen, and by a quite unsatisfactory custom it was accounted 
disgraceful to teach what it was honourable to learn’.98  It is worth noting that this 
distinction is not one that the Greek East shared.  There, a rhetor could be a teacher, 
an orator, or both.99  
Handbooks on the rhetorical theory and techniques came in for particular 
criticism.  For example, in De oratore, Cicero criticises the systematic rules of these 
handbooks as utterly impractical for an actual orator in the forum who needs to be 
able to adjust to the different difficulties cases might present.100  Later, in his final 
work on rhetoric, Orator, he defends himself from the charge of sinking to the level 
of a rhetor who produces guides to rhetoric.101  He writes: ‘For the thought occurred 
to me that there might be found, not only envious men—but even admirers of my 
success, who will think it ill becomes one whose achievements have been praised 
more highly than those of any other man by the senate with the full approval of the 
Roman people to write so much about the technique (artificio) of oratory 
(dicendi)’.102 
In their criticism of rhetorical handbooks, Roman orators such as Cicero 
entered a debate about the relative merits of rhetoric that stretched back at least to 
Plato.  The debate centred on the question of how broad a scope could be allowed for 
rhetorical theory and practice.  Beginning with Hermagoras of Temnos in the first 
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century B.C., rhetorical handbooks generally began by dividing rhetorical material 
into two categories: theses, or general questions, and hypotheses, or specific 
questions.103  Hypotheses concerned the specific events, persons and circumstances 
that typically arose in judicial and political matters.  Thus, an orator might need to 
know about how to address questions surrounding a murder or (to use a favourite 
subject of Second Sophistic rhetorical exercises) rape.104  Usually, hypotheses were 
subdivided into three types of oratory: judicial, deliberative, and epideictic.105   
Theses, on the other hand, addressed questions of a philosophical or generally moral 
nature such as ‘Should one marry?’ or ‘What is wisdom?’106  By including theses 
within the range of rhetorical theory (even though such claims were never supported 
by any actual theory), such handbooks staked a claim to philosophical questions.107   
Philosophers argued stridently that general questions were beyond the ken of rhetors 
who lacked both the knowledge and training to address such subjects.  Wisdom, they 
argued, was the profession of philosophers; rhetors and orators ought to keep to their 
own profession: eloquence. 
In broad terms, the debate was between the relative merits of wisdom and 
eloquence, and it is here that the old argument was caught up in the Roman mistrust 
of Greek influence on their society.  Because Republican oratory was inherently civic 
and practical—what one might term a political science—Roman theorists judged 
rhetoric superior to philosophy, which struck them as often impractical and, worse, 
overly prone to become the sort of private musings that failed to serve the needs of 
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the commonwealth.108  No serious re-evaluation of philosophy occurred in the West 
until religious practices there, affected first by the collapse of the Republic and then 
by the gradual disintegration of Imperial civilisation, took a metaphysical turn 
through the influence of Neoplatonism, Christianity and the emergence of mystery 
cults.109  By then the civic role of rhetoric had long since diminished while at the 
same time withdrawal into a comfortable world of leisure (otium) had become the 
ideal of Roman aristocracy. 
 
‘...quidam eloquens’:  Cicero110 
The person who above all others sought both to defend the central role of 
oratory in civic life and to fuse wisdom and eloquence was Marcus Tullius Cicero.  
That he was largely unsuccessful in these attempts did nothing to diminish his 
reputation.111  Indeed, Quintilian mentions that in his own day, Cicero was more 
associated with the notion of eloquence than with the historical person.112 Throughout 
the western Empire, Cicero’s works remained the core curriculum of rhetorical 
schools until well after the fall of Rome, though he would have shuddered to know 
that his earliest work, De inventione, would become his most popular legacy.113  One 
of the great ironies of late classical rhetoric is that even while it had abandoned the 
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seventeen, as ‘sketchy and unsophisticated’ (incohata ac rudia). 
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forensic focus of Ciceronian oratory, it continued to base its rhetorical training on his 
theory.114 
 At first glance, Cicero might not seem well-disposed towards the rhetorical 
developments of his own day.  In De oratore, he rejects the rigidity of rhetorical rules 
for parts of a speech.115  Instead, he argues that oratory must be exceptionally difficult 
to master since so few have done so despite the ‘the utterly magnificent rewards held 
out for eloquence’.116  Such is the difficulty of becoming a true orator that Cicero 
warns:  
They [‘our children’] should not rely on the precepts or the teachers or the 
methods of practice in general use, but be confident that they can achieve their 
goals by means that are of a quite different order.  It is at least my opinion that 
it will be impossible for anyone to be an orator endowed with all praiseworthy 
qualities, unless he has gained knowledge of all the important subjects and 
arts.  For it is certainly from knowledge that a speech should blossom and 
acquire fullness: unless the orator has firmly grasped the underlying subject 
matter, his speech will remain an utterly empty, yes, almost childish verbal 
exercise.117 
Later, he has one of his interlocutors, Crassus, slightly modify this judgement on 
rhetorical art by suggesting that formal rhetorical theory might serve to ‘remind the 
orator of the points of reference for each occasion’ so that he does not stray too far 
from his goal.118  But then Crassus adds that no one has become a great orator by 
following these rules; rather the rules try to capture the essence of great orators.  He 
concludes that although ‘eloquence is not the offspring of art, but art of 
eloquence....becoming acquainted with it [rhetorical theory] is not unsuitable for a 
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gentleman’.119  So, all in all, Cicero takes a dim view of the teaching of rhetors; good 
oratory depends less on their art than on natural ability combined with the knowledge 
of appropriate word choice, arrangement, emotions, history, civil law and statutes and 
how to regulate one’s own body and use humour.120  Considering this contempt for 
formal rhetorical instruction, it is no wonder that, as we have seen, he goes to great 
lengths in Orator to distinguish his own tutorials in rhetoric from the menial task of 
Greek rhetors.121 
 So, instead of providing instruction on how one can become an accomplished 
orator, Cicero paints a picture of an impossibly ideal orator for students to imitate.  In 
a sense, he is providing an old model for rhetorical training in a new form; instead 
having them imitate an actual orator (which he doubts exist anymore) he provides a 
fictional one of his own, whose idealised portrait he hopes will inspire students to 
become great orators themselves.  Although this ideal is the focus of both De oratore 
and Orator, one first encounters it in what would become his enormously influential 
prologue to De inventione.  Cicero begins the work with a dilemma: ‘I have often 
seriously debated with myself whether men and communities have received more 
good or evil from oratory and a consuming devotion to eloquence’.122  After 
considering how historically orators have both caused harm and brought benefit to 
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‘mighty cities’, Cicero concludes: ‘For my own part, after long thought, I have been 
led by reason itself to hold this opinion first and foremost, that wisdom without 
eloquence does little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is 
generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful’.123  Thus, eloquence must be 
founded on the ‘study of philosophy and moral conduct’ so that the orator will not be 
‘useless to himself and harmful to his country’. 
 Not satisfied with this exalted consideration of oratory’s civic role, Cicero 
proceeds by evoking a myth of the proto-orator.  He begins by imagining an original 
state in which people lived little better than animals, lacking wisdom, religion or civil 
laws:124  
 At this juncture a man—great and wise I am sure—became aware of the 
power latent in man and the wide field offered by his mind for great 
achievements if one could develop this power and improve it by instruction.  
Men were scattered in the fields and hidden in sylvan retreats when he 
assembled and gathered them in accordance with a plan; he introduced them 
to every useful and honourable occupation, though they cried out against it 
because of its novelty, and then when through reason and eloquence they had 
listened with greater attention, he transformed them from wild savages into a 
kind and gentle folk.125 
Cicero concludes: ‘To me, at least, it does not seem possible that a mute and voiceless 
wisdom could have turned men suddenly from their habits and introduced them to 
different patterns of life....unless men had been able by eloquence to persuade their 
fellows of the truth of what they had discovered by reason’.126 As Dugan points out 
this proto-orator is an almost messianic agent of civilisation; only by uniting 
philosophy and oratory in a single person was humanity able to climb out of 
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barbarism into the light of civilisation.127  May and Wisse indicate that Cicero’s use 
of this myth to undergird his own coupling of wisdom and eloquence would have 
been recognised as a direct challenge to philosophers who employed a similar myth to 
claim a superior role for philosophy.128 The popularity of De inventione in late 
classical rhetorical instruction means that Cicero’s version of the myth was 
hammered into generations of Roman youth. 
 We encounter Cicero’s myth again in De oratore 1.33 where he has Crassus 
ask, ‘what other force could have gathered the scattered members of the human race 
into one place, or could have led them away from savage existence in the wilderness 
to this truly human, communal way of life, or, once communities had been founded, 
could have established laws, judicial procedures, and legal arrangements?’ Later, in 
the same work, he (again in the guise of Crassus) advocates calling an orator who 
joins wisdom with eloquence (sapientiam iunctam...eloquentiae) a philosopher.129 He 
continues in a vein reminiscent of De inventione: ‘I myself would prefer inarticulate 
wisdom to babbling stupidity.  But if we are looking for the one thing that surpasses 
all others, the palm must go to the learned orator’.130  His reasons for this is that all 
the knowledge is present in the ideal orator (because he must be knowledgeable in 
order to achieve the ideal) while philosophical knowledge does not guarantee 
eloquence.  If only philosophers would grant this point, Cicero concludes, then the 
age old debate between rhetoric and philosophy would be settled; or in Cicero’s 
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memorable phrase, Socrates’ ‘rupture, so to speak, between the tongue and the brain’ 
would be undone and wisdom and eloquence once again united.131 
 In Orator 11, Cicero claims originality for this attempt to end the 
rhetoric/philosophy debate through synthesis and acknowledges that his approach will 
meet with criticism.132  Certainly, his synthesis failed either to end the age-old debate 
or to prevent Roman rhetoric from slipping into the ‘babbling stupidity’ he so 
despised.  Nor must his presentation of wisdom have been very convincing to 
philosophers.  Despite his exalted language about philosophy, his characterization of 
wisdom at times seems to amount to little more than the necessary knowledge of a 
particular legal case and of human psychology for swaying the opinion of the judge 
and audience.  Jakob Wisse argues that against Greek philosophers, particularly Plato, 
in De oratore Cicero argues that philosophy does not carry any inherent moral force; 
philosophy by itself could not make a bad person good.133   Instead, in De oratore 
3.55, he has Crassus argue that virtues must be joined to eloquence and philosophy.  
The importance of philosophy is to enable the orator effectively to manipulate the 
audience through knowledge of human character and behaviour.134 It would seem 
therefore that Cicero had mainly a utilitarian view of wisdom that would not have 
convinced a serious Platonist. 
 Likewise, Cicero’s conjoining of wisdom and eloquence is entirely aimed at 
serving the commonwealth.  There is very little metaphysical in his portrait of the 
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ideal orator, other than providing a Platonic ideal for actual men to imitate.135 The 
benefit of uniting philosophy and rhetoric has little to do with enabling either the 
orator’s soul or that of each of his auditors to ascend to the realm of the blessed, as 
important as that ascent might be to Cicero.136  Rather, his ideal orator is a statesman 
or, at the very least, an effective lawyer who serves the public good.  He is the one 
who enables and preserves civilisation without which people are little better than 
animals.  Cicero’s theory is above all else civic-minded. 
 In his book on Augustine’s understanding of a ‘just society’ Robert Dodaro 
draws a similar conclusion about Cicero’s rhetoric, albeit drawing from his De re 
publica, that helps to illustrate the nature of Cicero’s orator.137  He describes Cicero’s 
orator / statesman as one ‘skilled at communicating ideas yet also capable of bridging 
the gap between erudition and its practical application to political life’.138  Both 
wisdom and eloquence, therefore, are directed towards the public; orators are ideally 
‘outstanding men’ (viri optimi/excellentes) whose position and ability will allow them 
to purify Rome of its decadence and to restore the commonwealth.139   Because the 
good of the commonwealth is the orator’s chief concern, Cicero emphasises the 
importance of practical knowledge over the speculative: hypothesis over thesis.  
Cicero, however, allows for and even commends orators who do delve into 
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speculative wisdom because it makes him esteem the divine over the desire for wealth 
and glory.140  But philosophy here is primarily self-oriented; its sole purpose is to 
make an ‘excellent man’ even better so that he can be of even more benefit to the 
commonwealth.   
 Before turning our attention to the development of rhetoric after Cicero, it is 
necessary to define what precisely Cicero means by eloquentia.  While the purpose of 
almost all of Cicero’s rhetorical works is to describe in great detail the nature of 
eloquence—that is, the mechanics of inventio and elocutio—for our purposes it is 
sufficient to focus again on his ideal.141  Generally speaking, Cicero differentiates 
between oratory and eloquence.  Oratory is simply speaking so as to persuade; 
Cicero’s usual term for this is dicendi copia, or fluency of speech.142  Such speech 
may be edifying or harmful.  What transforms dicendi copia into eloquentia is 
ethics.143  In De oratore 3.55, Cicero judges that although all virtues are technically 
equal (a Stoic axiom), eloquentia is ‘more beautiful and splendid in appearance’ than 
the others because ‘it unfolds the thoughts and counsels of the mind in words, in such 
a way that it can drive the audience in whatever direction it has applied its weight’.  
Because of this power, eloquentia must be joined to ‘integrity and the highest 
measure of good sense’ lest it cease to be good oratory and become a weapon ‘in the 
hands of madmen’.   Thus, eloquentia is fundamentally ethical speech. 
But such speech must also be effective and so Cicero devised his three duties 
of an orator.  Drawing upon Aristotle’s division of rhetoric into logos, pathos, and 
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ethos, he first puts forward his officia oratoris in De oratore: ‘The method employed 
in the art of oratory, then, relies entirely on three means of persuasion: proving that 
our contentions are true, winning over the audience, and inducing their minds to feel 
any emotion the case may demand’.144  Earlier in the same work, Crassus puts bluntly 
the purpose of these three duties: ‘I think nothing is more admirable than being able, 
through speech, to have hold of people’s minds, to win over their inclinations, to 
drive them at will in one direction, to draw them at will from another’.145  In Orator 
69, Cicero returns to his officia oratoris, this time using even clearer language: ‘The 
man of eloquence (eloquens) whom we seek...will be one who is able to speak in 
court or in deliberative bodies so as to prove, to please and to sway or persuade.  To 
prove is the first necessity, to please is to charm, to sway is victory; for it is the one 
thing of all that avails most in winning verdicts’.146  In effect, Cicero gives a twofold 
purpose to eloquence: to capture the audience’s attention and to persuade them of the 
orator’s point of view.  Unless the people listen to the speaker, he cannot influence 
them through his words; on the other hand, there is no point in gaining their attention 
unless he can then move them through his words to do as he wills.  Note here that 
Cicero thinks of the audience as passive.  Ideally, the orator is the active agent, 
turning the audience’s will to his own.  But the magic of eloquence is that the 
sweetness of his words makes the audience of their own free will agree with the 
speaker.  In Cicero’s myth, barbaric humanity at first ‘cries out’ against the orator’s 
wisdom until his wisdom and eloquence capture their attention and transforms them 
into civilised men and women.  Thus, eloquent oratory is very much a matter of wills: 
through the sorcery of words, the orator ‘induces’ the audience blithely to turn control 
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of their wills over to his. Armed as he was with such an extraordinary view of an 
orator’s power, one deepened through his own experience, one can perhaps 
understand why Cicero believed so deeply that ‘the foundation of eloquence...is 
wisdom’.147  As will be shown later, this view of the power of eloquence, particularly 
in combination with wisdom, provided Augustine with basis for his own 
understanding of the effects of delight on free will. 
 Gathering up the various strands of Cicero’s thought, therefore, one is 
presented with an ideal orator who has obtained wisdom through his own study of 
philosophy, civil law, and human behaviour and united this with a largely natural 
aptitude for eloquent speech.  Morally upstanding, this orator seeks to gather the 
people together through his eloquence and then impart his wisdom for the good of 
society and civilisation through a style of speech intended to overwhelm the wills of 
those who listen.  The audience itself is assumed to be both passive and unlearned, 
whether in terms of a particular judicial case or in the necessary insight for the good 
of the Republic.  In the end, it is this ideal orator in whom wisdom is made accessible 
through an eloquence that draws together and enamours those who come under its 
spell. 
 Since much of what has been argued here may seem remote to Augustine’s 
theology, it is important to note by way of conclusion to this section three important 
factors.  First, while the debates and concerns of the late Republic were not identical 
to the debates and concerns of the late fourth and early fifth century Empire, the 
earlier debates were mediated to later generations through Cicero’s own works.  If a 
later rhetor, for example, were seeking to restore utility and wisdom to oratory by 
turning, at least in part, to Cicero, his theory would be influenced by Cicero’s 
                                               
147
  Cicero, Orator 70. 
58 
 
concerns and prejudices.  Second, Cicero employs terms such as sapientia and 
eloquentia that were still very current in Augustine’s day.  In other words, Victorinus 
or Augustine understood (or at least thought they did) what Cicero was saying when 
he wrote about either concept and could, therefore, follow his arguments.  But, the 
definition of both sapientia and eloquentia had in reality changed dramatically by 
their own day, and this could not but influence how they understood Cicero (which 
may be very different from how Cicero intended his work to be understood or, for 
that matter, how modern scholars understand Cicero).  Finally, in reacting to the 
rhetoric of their own day, the only accessible model for someone like Victorinus or 
Augustine was Cicero, and so again they could not help but be influenced by his 
presuppositions.  But before we can examine how the two North Africans translated 
Cicero’s rhetoric into their own terms, we must first examine how rhetoric developed 
during the nearly four centuries that separate Cicero from Augustine. 
 
Late Roman Rhetoric 
As has already been noted, late Republican oratory was inherently forensic 
and deliberative.  Training among the elite in rhetoric was aimed at furnishing them 
with the skills to debate in the forum and ultimately in the Senate itself.  Although 
orators such as Cicero mention epideictic oratory in their works on rhetoric, for the 
most part their focus remained on the deliberative and judicial.  One of the most 
influential rhetorical handbooks of the first century, Rhetorica ad Herennium, is a 
prime example of this, devoting most of its teaching to judicial and deliberative 
oratory.  Cicero himself passes quickly over the epideictic, which he sees as a minor 
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form of oratory less deserving of formal precepts than other forms of speech, such as 
giving testimony, that have never been distinguished as separate genres.148 
The collapse of the Roman Republic and the rise of the Empire had a 
profound effect on the Roman approach to rhetoric.  No longer did the forum or the 
Senate play a meaningful role in the decision-making of the State.  So, in a single 
generation the raison d’être of Roman oratory, particularly as Cicero had envisioned 
it, became less apparent, and so too the original reason for the Roman educational 
system.  This is not to suggest that forensic oratory vanished altogether.  People such 
as Tertullian and Augustine reveal that forensic rhetoric continued to be taught 
throughout Late Antiquity.  But it became much less emphasised among the 
aristocracy.  At the same time, rhetorical training became much more accessible with 
the establishment of rhetorical schools in the West.  These two factors combined to 
transform rhetoric in the West in at least three dramatic ways.  First, the role of 
rhetors in society changed; second, with a diminished practical role in Roman civic 
life, oratory itself became dominated by the epideictic; and third, because of that 
epideictic turn, the contrast between philosophy and rhetoric, between wisdom and 
eloquence, became starker. 
The rhetoric of this period is known as Second Sophistic.  Although that term 
was coined by Philostratus of Lemnos to describe the Greek declaimers who were 
more interested in the artistry of orations than in argumentation, it now normally 
refers to the cultural and literary movement that began in first-century Greece and 
flourished from the second through fourth century.  In its strictest sense, Second 
Sophistic refers only to the Greek rhetoric of that period; however, such are the 
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similarities between Second Sophistic and later Latin rhetoric that many scholars 
have used the term to describe all Imperial rhetoric: both Greek and Latin.    
Whatever the term used, late Roman rhetoric has enjoyed not a small number of 
critics.  Writing at the start of the second century A.D., Juvenal turned his satire on 
the Greek, sophistic culture invading Rome:  
What of the fact that the nation excels in flattery, praising the talk of an 
ignorant patron, the looks of one who is ugly, comparing the stalk-like neck of 
a weakling to Hercules’ muscles as he holds the giant Antaeus aloft well clear 
of the ground, admiring a squeaky voice which sounds as wretched as that of a 
cock, which seizes his partner’s crest in the act of mating?149 
Juvenal’s assessment has generally been shared by modern scholars.  Peter Brown 
calls rhetoric in Late Antiquity ‘creatively impoverished’ and concludes that 
‘allusive, steeped in vocabulary and examples of a distant age, the formalised speech 
of the upper classes was not designed to express sudden challenges and novel 
sentiments, and still less to indulge in unwelcome plain-speaking’.150  According to 
Graham Anderson, Second Sophistic was ‘a sort of academic debating society with a 
touch of grand opera—but with a difference: it is as if the prima donna has to 
improvise the arias as well as the cadenzas, and in the language of Dante for good 
measure; and if there is not hissing and booing on this occasion there is certainly a 
hint of backstage backbiting’.151 Anderson also argues that as the Empire became 
more autocratic, rhetorical conventions became more outlandish and that while 
Second Sophistic claimed to be able to speak about philosophical matters, they did so 
only in a superficial way meant for entertainment rather than instruction.152  Kaster 
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points out that as early as the first century, critics attacked the practice of declamation 
that was divorced from reality, employing themes and characters ‘who seemed to 
have stepped from the stage of New Comedy’, in a ‘hot-house’ atmosphere far 
removed from the gravity of law courts and assemblies.153 
 Yet, Kaster also points out that as a culture of declamation endured for more 
than six hundred years, it must have fulfilled an important function within Greek and 
Roman society.154  He suggests that its primary role was to inculcate ‘approved 
values’ into young, aristocratic males, and that while the themes declaimed might be 
eccentric, the arguments employed were conventional.155  Kennedy makes one of the 
strongest cases for the integrity of late classical rhetoric by drawing attention to the 
fact that many Second Sophistics held chairs of rhetoric in Greek cities, served as 
Roman diplomats, and pled court cases.  They were also employed by cities to 
advocate their interests before the emperor.156  Finally, Anderson concludes with faint 
praise: ‘But if the goal was to pretend to be in the fifth century B.C., however 
contrived and perverse such an ideal might seem to us, then the Second Sophistic was 
well on its way to achieving it.  If the aim was to invest present literature with a sense 
of continuity with the classical past, then again the illusion was largely successful’.157 
One way to look at the transformation of rhetoric after the fall of the Republic 
is as a professionalisation of rhetors even as rhetoric became increasingly dominated 
by the culture of declamation.  Despite the best efforts of ‘traditionalists’ in the last 
days of the Republic to prevent the establishment of rhetorical schools, by the late 
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Augustan age they had become typical.  Grammarians and rhetors functioned in most 
cities of the Empire as the backbone of the Roman education system.  Unlike in the 
late Republic, however, the chief purpose of this education was not to prepare the 
wealthy for a life of profitable civic service in the forum and Senate where they 
would be expected to deliver speeches on political matters.  Instead, while rhetoric 
was a necessary means of entry into the imperial administration, the primary purpose 
of rhetorical teaching was to define the elite over against ordinary people.158 
Rhetorical schools could only be found in an ‘archipelago of cities’ particularly open 
to Greek influence, where they served the interests of the local governing class and 
those wealthy enough to afford to travel there from the provinces.159  Through an 
education in grammar and rhetoric, the rhetorical schools created a common 
aristocratic culture, standardised formal communication and created the illusion that 
those so educated were as superior to the ordinary person as humans are to cattle.160 
The rhetors themselves played a different role in Roman society than they did 
in Cicero’s day.  No longer bound to particular families, they taught in a city’s forum, 
typically in exedras, or small, semicircular recesses that opened out onto porticoes.161  
The rhetor’s duty was to teach the complex system of rhetorical rules developed in 
Greece during the age of the sophists.162  Their goal was avowedly to cultivate 
fluency, ornament, and style through the imitation of classical standards.163  The 
students, in turn, were supposed to become people who could ‘charm’ and ‘overawe’ 
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through speech; as Peter Brown states, in their own eyes they were learning 
something that ‘carried with it something of the ancient thrill of sorcery’.164  But 
unlike in Cicero’s day, the point of this education was to prepare students to persuade 
not so much through argumentation as through literary flair and wordplay. 
Rhetors enjoyed a higher standard of living than either pedagogues or 
grammarians, and the most successful rhetors could even, through the patronage of 
their former students, attain the highest offices of the Empire.165  Beginning in the 
reign of Vespasian, chairs of rhetoric were established in Rome and later Athens, 
where they could, as in the case of Quintilian, obtain both prestige and wealth.166  
Still, the teaching of rhetoric generally did not provide an enormous income, and the 
distinction between a proper orator and a rhetor remained, though less starkly than in 
former times.  This distinction can be found in Marius Victorinus’s commentary on 
Cicero, where he writes: ‘A rhetor is he who teaches letters and hands on the skills of 
eloquence; a sophist is one from whom the practice of speaking is learnt; an orator is 
he who in private and public causes fully and perfectly uses eloquence’.167  Thus, 
while a great man such as Symmachus or Sidonius Apollinaris might employ every 
Attic device of late Roman rhetoric in his letters or oratory, he would not have 
considered himself a rhetor.  Again, this is a distinction almost never made by those 
studying Augustine’s criticism of rhetoric. 
Rhetors could, however, enjoy a position in society utterly foreign to that of 
the first Latin rhetors; they could become the ancient world’s equivalent to 
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celebrities.168 Anderson describes the devotion showed by students to their teachers 
as a ‘frenzied loyalty’ that was bordering on a personality cult.169  Large crowds were 
drawn to their performances, and the greatest of rhetors could travel freely around the 
Empire putting on oratorical entertainments not unlike present-day rock concerts.  A 
description from the Vitae Sophistarum provides a delightful glimpse into this world 
of the ancient superstar: 
The lower orders are awestruck at your performance, your voice, your walk, 
your pacing about, your intoning, your sandals, and your infamous expression 
‘what’ersoever’; and when they see you sweating and gasping they are bound 
to believe that you are a formidable opponent in debate....And if anyone 
comes up to you, make amazing claims about yourself, go over the top in your 
self-glorification, and make yourself objectionable to him: ‘What was the son 
of Paian in comparison with me?’ or ‘Perhaps just one of the ancients can 
compete with me!’ and other things of the kind.170 
As with today’s ill-behaved celebrities, the crowds keenly consumed such 
affectations.  An accomplished rhetor could become enormously rich and, through his 
devoted ‘fans’, tremendously influential.  Thus, by Augustine’s day, the ideal orator 
in the popular imagination was no longer Cicero’s wise and eloquent statesman but a 
flashy entertainer. 
The main reason for the dramatic difference in the two ideals is that rhetorical 
teaching had shifted from the judicial and deliberative to the epideictic.  During the 
first century, the rhetorical curriculum became standardised, aimed at recreating the 
idealised style of classical Greece (thus, in the East rejecting two hundred years of 
linguistic development and in the West conforming Latin to a classical Greek 
structure) through the imitation of classical texts.171  Marrou points out how enduring 
and uniform this curriculum remained: the same subjects of declamation keep 
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reappearing over a very long period of time.172  Instead of teaching students how to 
deliver a speech in a legal case or in a political assembly, rhetors taught them to 
deliver speeches of praise or blame that normally treated subjects from mythology or 
classical history.  A description of one such Second Sophistic rhetor paints a clear 
picture of what such performances were like: 
He would appear before [his audience] not with a condescending or conceited 
air, nor with the manner of someone in fear of them, but as was appropriate 
for a combatant going into the fray to win reputation for himself and knowing 
full well that he would not fail.  He used to talk from his chair in an agreeable 
manner, but when he was on his feet for the performances his orations had 
more polish and vigour....He had a very melodious voice and a charming 
diction, and he would often slap his thigh in order to spur on both himself and 
the audience.  Moreover he was also an expert in the use of ‘figured speech’ 
and ambiguity.  But he was still more impressive in handling the more 
demanding themes, and especially those concerned with the Medes, involving 
treatment of Darius and Xerxes....he used to act out the arrogance and frivolity 
of the barbarian character.  It is said that on these occasions he would sway 
about more than usual, as if in some Bacchic frenzy...173 
As this passage illustrates, the oratory itself was highly-stylised, making use of 
figured speech and ambiguity, and focused on mythological or historical subjects.  A 
favourite theme of late classical oratory was the re-enactment of mythological or 
historical scenes with the orator playing the part of the various characters.  Such 
performances were entirely for entertainment and a far cry from the sober oratory of 
Cato the Elder, Crassus and Cicero.   
The result of the late imperial approach to rhetoric was a divorce between 
wisdom and eloquence. One must stress, however, that such a judgement is not one 
shared by the rhetors themselves.  By and large they considered themselves eminently 
qualified to include philosophical questions in their performances.174  Graham 
Anderson describes several sophists who passed between philosophy and rhetoric 
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with ease.  Yet, the use of philosophy is purely for ornament or, worse, as fodder for 
ad hominem attacks on philosophers as when one sophist attacks Plato: 
Now, then Plato, did you ever lead the Athenians or any other people, Greek 
or barbarian, towards the noblest goal?  [...] You could not say that you did.  
For you did not lead them at all.  And what about your teacher and comrade 
Socrates?  Neither did he.175 
Anderson adds that, not surprisingly, the rhetors won these pretended debates 
between themselves and long deceased philosophers.176  Completely gone is Cicero’s 
civic dimension to eloquence or his belief that stylistic delivery must ground its 
content in philosophy. Generally speaking, such orators depended on commonplaces 
(topica) for their philosophical ornament; the primary focus therefore was not 
instruction or argument but rhetorical ornamentation. 
 Again scholars such as Kaster and Kennedy have warned against too harshly 
criticising late Roman rhetoric simply because it is so foreign to modern sentiments.  
That is probably true and worth keeping in mind when studying the literature of Late 
Antiquity.  On the other hand, as will be seen in the next chapter, the criticism shared 
by ancient philosophers and modern scholars alike reflect closely Augustine’s own 
conclusions about the rhetoric of his day.  In this respect, to a certain extent it does 
not so much matter whether late Roman rhetors were as facile and haughty as they 
have been portrayed as it does that many perceived them as such and perhaps none 
more so than Augustine after his conversion. 
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‘...cuius...eloquia strenue ministrabant...populo tuo’: Bishops177 
Despite the decline of the theatres in which orators might approximate 
Cicero’s civic-minded orator who employs his wise eloquence to the advantage of the 
State (and his own reputation), Cicero’s ideals continued to be taught by rhetors to 
generations of aristocratic youths.  But as there were fewer avenues in the 
increasingly autocratic empire for either forensic or deliberative oratory, this training 
invariably turned to the epideictic, focusing on oral delivery or an already written, 
rehearsed and memorised speech.178  Whether it is the overblown oratory of a Second 
Sophistic or the tediously stylised letters of a great man such as Symmachus, almost 
all examples of pagan Roman oratory after the first century are far removed from the 
ideals of the Roman Republic.  In general, the nearest one finds to an oratory that 
combines wisdom and eloquence is among the writings of philosophers or would-be 
philosophers-kings such as Marcus Aurelius. 
And yet, ironically, within the Roman world there arose a movement that 
shared Cicero’s concern for wise oratory: Christianity.179  Certainly, both the 
Christian source of wisdom—Scripture—and the style of oratory—preaching—would 
have been entirely foreign to Cicero; but preaching to convert is not altogether 
different from speaking to persuade.  So, from the very beginning, Christians were 
not above employing rhetorical techniques in order to express doctrine as can be seen, 
for example, in the occasional oratorical flair of the Pauline epistles. 
In her book, Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: 
Academic Traditions and Vernacular Texts, Rita Copeland demonstrates how 
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classical rhetoric found a new dynamism in Christian homiletics.  Training in 
rhetorical principles functioned to regulate affectivity, the style, and form of 
preaching.  Only now, inventio, the process of determining what to say and how best 
to say it, became grounded in biblical exegesis.180  Inventio thus becomes a 
hermeneutical process, or modus proferendi, through which the preacher might 
engage with the wisdom of Scripture and determine how to convey that wisdom most 
effectively.   
Yet, many Christians were uncomfortable with preachers and theologians too 
blithely embracing classical education.  According to Eugene Kevane, for many early 
Christians the classical system of education represented the ‘ripened social condition 
and expression of human sinfulness, idolatry and alienation from the One True 
God’.181 Some, such as Justin Martyr and later the Cappadocian Fathers could 
incorporate profane learning in their writings, either employing stylised rhetoric or 
profane allusions in their writings.  Although Basil’s To the Young, on How They 
Should Profit from Greek Writing, warns against mythology, atheism, and 
immorality, he still finds edification in Homer, Hesiod, and Plato.182  On the other 
hand, Tertullian, who was trained as a lawyer and thus deeply versed in forensic 
rhetoric, seems to reject recourse to classical learning, even while employing 
rhetorical techniques to express this opinion.183  Cyprian, an accomplished rhetor, 
never again referred to classical literature after his conversion (though, again, he 
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continued to use rhetorical forms, expressions, and convictions),184 and Jerome 
famously rejected Cicero when in a dream St Peter called him a Ciceronian rather 
than a Christian.185  Despite their avowed rejection of profane learning, each of these 
authors is among the finest examples of the classical style of rhetoric.186   
 Whatever the particular attitudes of these Church Fathers to classical learning 
they still fulfilled remarkably the role of Cicero’s ideal orator.  Whereas Cicero’s 
orator is a virtuous man who expresses wisdom eloquently for the edification of the 
Republic, Christian preachers are men who can express Scriptural wisdom eloquently 
for the edification of the Church.  In both cases the orator plays a central role in the 
life of the community, grounds his oratory in wisdom, and expresses that wisdom in 
such a way as to change hearts.  The similarities between the two become even more 
obvious with the rise, during the fourth century, of patrician-bishops.  Like Cicero’s 
orators, these were great men of society, delivering their oratory before the people in 
assemblies (the Church), legal courts and the Imperial centres of power for what they 
perceive to be the public good.187  Much of their power and influence were due to 
their knowledge and eloquence.  By turning to Augustine’s account of Ambrose of 
Milan, we can see clearly not only how patrician-bishops exemplified Cicero’s ideal 
orator but also that Augustine recognised this in his fateful encounter with Ambrose 
in A.D. 384. 
 The first description we are given of the Bishop of Milan recalls Cicero’s 
orator.  Augustine describes Ambrose as one ‘whose words actively ministered to 
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your people the fruit of your sustenance and the gladness of oil and the sober 
intoxication of your wine’.188  How interesting that Augustine should put it in this 
way.  Neither Ambrose’s office, wisdom nor even his celebration of the sacraments 
ministers to the people; instead it is his eloquia.  The phrase eloquia strenue 
ministrabant recalls Cicero’s orator using his eloquence for the good of the people 
and stands in marked contrast to the eloquence, which Augustine had learned and 
taught, that was directed towards self-glorification.  Moreover, that eloquence 
conveys to the people God’s abundant crop, glad oil, and intoxicating wine, all of 
which are metaphors for God’s wisdom.   
 Augustine himself, however, is initially immune to this wisdom.  He stands 
apart from it and in his confusion is completely unreceptive to it.  He is, in fact, not 
unlike the barbaric people in the prologue of Cicero’s De inventione.  Cicero’s final 
judgement of these uncivilised human beings neatly sums up Augustine’s description 
of himself before his conversion: ‘And so through their ignorance and error blind and 
unreasoning passion satisfied itself by misuse of bodily strength, which is a very 
dangerous servant’.189  Like them, Augustine presents himself up to this point as 
restlessly wandering: moving through Books One to Nine from youthful ambition 
through Manichaeism to a desire to become like Cicero’s philosophical rhetor.190  He 
refers to himself as finding no rest ‘in pleasant groves, nor in games or songs, nor in 
sweet-scented places, nor in exquisite feasts, nor in the bedroom or bed, nor finally in 
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books and poetry’.191 Also, at his arrival in Milan, he is in no state to receive the sort 
of wisdom that will turn him into a better man.  He is still a man shrouded in ‘clouds 
of muddy carnal concupiscence’,192 following the ‘driving force’ of his seething 
impulses,193 boiling with conflicting passions,194 wandering away in conceit and 
‘carried about by every wind’.195 Wisdom alone is therefore impotent, as Augustine 
demonstrates by his initial rejection of the Scriptural wisdom and subsequent foray 
into the error of Manichaeism.196  So, again like Cicero’s barbarians, he must be 
drawn to that wisdom by a great man in whom wisdom and eloquence cohabit; that 
man is Ambrose. 
 It should be no surprise, therefore, that Augustine initially is drawn to 
Ambrose by the bishop’s eloquence: ‘I used enthusiastically to listen to him 
preaching to the people, not with the intention which I ought to have had, but as if 
investigating his eloquence (facundiam) to see whether it merited the reputation it 
enjoyed and whether his fluency was better or inferior than it was reported to be’.197  
He adds that Ambrose’s eloquence quickly beguiled him even though he remained 
contemptuous of his subject-matter.  At this point, his ‘delight was in the charm of his 
diction’.  Again, this is like Cicero’s barbarians who, though they are initially drawn 
to the orator’s eloquence, ‘cry out’ against his wisdom.  But the eloquence has them 
trapped, they cannot resist, and so they eventually succumb to the wisdom it conveys.  
Augustine continues:  
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I was not interested in learning what he was talking about.  My ears were only 
for his rhetorical technique; this empty concern was all that remained with me 
after I had lost hope that a way to you might lie open to me.  Nevertheless 
together with the words which I was enjoying, the subject matter, in which I 
was unconcerned, came to make an entry into my mind.  I could not separate 
them.  While I opened my heart to noting the eloquence with which he spoke, 
there also entered no less the truth which he affirmed, though only 
gradually.198 
If Ambrose is Cicero’s ideal orator, then here Augustine is Cicero’s ideal audience: 
utterly charmed by the orator’s eloquence and passively receptive to his wisdom.  
Augustine cannot resist Ambrose’s eloquent wisdom because he cannot separate the 
charm from the subject-matter.  And so, like Cicero’s barbarians, he is converted; 
only now it is not to the civic virtues of the Roman Republic but to the sanctity of the 
Church.  
Yet, at the heart of Augustine’s account lurks a profound divergence from 
Cicero’s ideal.  Though Ambrose can use his eloquence in an entirely Ciceronian 
manner either by publicly defying the perceived harmful policies of the State or by 
debating in writing with a great man such as Symmachus, in this instance his 
eloquence is used to convey a metaphysical wisdom aimed at salvation.  Such use of 
eloquence was mostly foreign to Cicero, and to understand how Cicero’s rhetoric 
could be turned towards such a ‘religious’ exercise, we must now turn our attention to 
another man of eloquence: Marius Victorinus. 
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3 
 
The Philosophical Rhetor 
 
 
 
Marius Victorinus 
Very little is known about Caius Marius Victorinus (c. 300- c. 370).  Other than his 
own works,199 our only early sources are Augustine himself (primarily from Book 
Eight of the Confessiones), Jerome’s De viris illustribus and a few inscriptions.200  
Like Augustine, he was from North Africa and later moved to Rome to further his 
career as a rhetor, eventually becoming chair of rhetoric, a position created by the 
Emperor Vespasian, and once occupied by Quintilian.201  Such was his success as a 
professor of rhetoric that he was made a member of the lowest order of senatorial 
rank and given a statue in either the Roman forum or the Forum of Trajan.202  In 
many ways, Victorinus embodied the Ciceronian ideal: he apparently taught and 
wrote about philosophy and rhetoric with equal facility and was particularly noted for 
his translation of Greek philosophy into Latin.  In fact, Augustine’s reading of these 
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Latin translations caused him, while still unconverted, to seek out Simplicianus to 
learn more about the ‘one time rhetor in the city of Rome’.203  It is a curious fact that 
Augustine’s early discovery of Greek philosophy occurred through the works of two 
rhetoricians: Cicero and Victorinus.204 
 A large number of Victorinus’s works have survived, especially those written 
while he was a pagan rhetor in Rome on rhetoric and philosophy.  Victorinus was 
mediated to the medieval world through Augustine, Boethius, and Cassiodorus, and 
his grammatical and rhetorical works—particularly Explanationes in Ciceronis 
Rhetoricam—continued to be studied well into the Middle Ages.  Augustine, 
however, makes no mention of Victorinus’s rhetorical works, and so one cannot be 
certain whether he ever studied them, though it seems likely that he would have at 
least known of them considering the similarity between his and Victorinus’s 
background.205  Even if Augustine did not study Explanationes in Ciceronis 
Rhetoricam, that work still represents an example of how Cicero’s De inventione 
(which would have formed at least part of the basis for Augustine’s education) was 
being read and interpreted in Late Antiquity.  As will be shown, Victorinus’s 
Neoplatonic interpretation of Cicero bears many resemblances to Augustine’s own 
thought.206  
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 By all appearances, Cicero’s De inventione was used as a rhetorical textbook 
in the West during the fourth century, perhaps because it made Greek thought more 
accessible to those unable to read Greek.207  Pierre Hadot suggests that Explanationes 
in Ciceronis Rhetoricam should therefore be seen as an important example of 
‘professorial activity’ during that period.208  If this is so, then, as will be seen, 
Victorinus’s commentary suggests that Cicero was being read and interpreted in some 
quarters through a Neoplatonic lens and as a result reordered towards goals foreign to 
Cicero’s original intention.209   The civic dimension receded as a concern for a return 
of the individual soul to the divine grew in prominence.  Michael Leff refers to this 
Neoplatonic adaption of Ciceronianism as part of the growing ‘spiritualism’ of Late 
Antiquity, by which he means a shift in priority away from the civic towards the 
‘contemplative and absolute’.210  Thus, classical rhetoric was redirected to meet the 
spiritual needs of the late Roman West.  Paul F. Gehl offers a possible further 
explanation for this development by noting that during Late Antiquity rhetoric took 
an ‘orthopractical’ approach to language, by which he means a ‘tendency to assign 
practical ethical or spiritual value to the lessons learned in studying grammar, 
rhetoric, or other aspects of language’.211  Thus, the liberal arts came to be seen not 
merely as the means toward a well-rounded education but even more as the necessary 
foundation for an ascent towards wisdom. Gehl traces the origins of this development 
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in the West to Cicero’s De inventione and De oratore with their argument that 
wisdom must be transformed into language through eloquence for it to be useful.212   
A prime example of such an approach to rhetoric and philosophy is 
Augustine’s rough contemporary, Martianus Capella (fl. 5th c.), a native of North 
Africa whose De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii greatly influenced the development 
of the seven liberal arts during the Middle Ages.213 In that work, Capella allegorically 
portrays the marriage of wisdom and eloquence achieved through the study of the 
seven liberal arts.214  Although, as with Cicero, he conceives of wisdom and 
eloquence as joined hand-in-hand, unlike Cicero the purpose of this union is not to 
benefit the commonwealth but to enable the individual soul to return step-by-step to 
the celestial world.  The liberal arts are now directed less towards producing 
statesmen who can wisely govern the Empire (already in a state of collapse in the 
West) than towards driving the ascent of the purified soul towards union with the 
divine.  Ultimately, Capella’s allegory seeks to demonstrate divine approval for the 
coupling of wisdom and eloquence whereby one can achieve immortality.215 
 Although Victorinus avoids Capella’s intense and often strange allegorising216 
and retains a strong civic dimension to his interpretation of Cicero, the same 
Neoplatonic assumptions are at play in Explanationes in Ciceronis Rhetoricam.217  
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Victorinus’s combination of Ciceronianism and Neoplatonism has been much noted.  
John O. Ward proposes that Victorinus interprets the prologue of De inventione as 
explaining how the soul is emancipated from corporeal bondage by the mediation of 
wisdom through eloquence.218  Rita Copeland contends that Victorinus conceives of 
the uniting of eloquence with wisdom as the ‘manifestation of the inner substance of 
wisdom’.219  Eloquence ‘embodies’ wisdom as the human body embodies the soul.  
Victorinus redefines Cicero’s wisdom as the soul’s search to be liberated from its 
corporeal bondage through the arts, especially eloquence.   
Pierre Hadot, however, provides the most detailed examination of 
Victorinus’s rhetorical theory.  He argues that Victorinus not only approves of 
Cicero’s uniting of wisdom and eloquence but more profoundly reinterprets Cicero’s 
definition of natura in such a way as to transform Cicero’s vision profoundly.  
Drawing upon Stoic thought, Cicero had defined virtue as ‘a habit of mind in 
harmony with reason and the order of nature’.220  For Victorinus, however, ‘virtue is a 
state of the soul conformed to reason according to nature’.221  The difference between 
the two definitions become clearer in Victorinus’s explanation of what he means by 
this: ‘The soul is immortal; if it is immortal, it has descended from the divine; if it has 
descended from the divine, it is perfect’.222  But now the otherwise perfect soul is 
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trapped in the body and made oblivious of its own true nature.223  Hadot suggests that 
Victorinus substitutes Cicero’s Stoic understanding of a natural soul with a more 
Neoplatonic understanding of an eternal soul imprisoned in a corporeal body.224  
Virtue, for Victorinus, is therefore a return of the soul to its original nature.  
According to Hadot, the effect of this reinterpretation is to transform Cicero’s triad 
natura, studium, and disciplina: natura now refers to the transcendent state of the 
soul separated from the body, and studium and disciplina refer not to exercise and 
teaching but to the two aspects of philosophy—contemplation and moral ascesis—
that restore the soul to its original state.225  Contemplation and ascesis allow the soul 
to recall its original nature and compel it to move towards its original perfection 
through its growth away from the body through wisdom.  Sapientia in Cicero, 
therefore, ceases to be primarily a kind of useful knowledge for the edification of the 
commonwealth and instead becomes the philosophy needed to drive a Neoplatonic 
reditus.  For Victorinus, eloquence is the form in which wisdom manifests itself, and 
to this extent even philosophers are ultimately orators because they express their 
philosophy with words.226  Wisdom does not need eloquence (eloquence does not 
make wisdom other than it already is) but without eloquence wisdom cannot affect 
imprisoned soul; Victorinus agrees with Cicero that without eloquence wisdom is 
otherwise mute.227  True eloquence, then, is wisdom expressed through words and 
speech; any other form of rhetoric is simply dicendi copia.228 
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At the heart of Victorinus’s reading of Cicero, therefore, is the Neoplatonic 
understanding of a transcendent soul imprisoned in the body.229  His ultimate concern 
is very different from Cicero’s in De inventione: the thriving commonwealth is no 
longer the end of good philosophy and rhetoric, but merely an outgrowth of soul 
turned back towards their original nature and gathered together into a city.  Victorinus 
almost always keeps Cicero’s civic dimension in sight, but now civilisation is formed 
primarily through the calling of barbaric humanity away from oblivion into the 
memory of its original state.   The result of his Neoplatonic interpretation of De 
inventione shapes too the way in which he understands Cicero’s myth about the origin 
of civilisation.   Victorinus begins by defining Cicero’s proto-orator as ‘one who 
knows both divine and human matters well’.230  This orator was set in the midst of an 
original humanity, the occluded souls of which were imprisoned in the body, and 
further oppressed through their life of ‘plunder’ and ‘bad morals’.231  People lived 
entirely in the present, detached from individual and collective memory, and therefore 
oblivious to their own true nature.232  Such is the state of humankind, concludes 
Victorinus, without memory: because of the brevity of life, only memory can 
overcome bestial existence.233   He compares the soul to wine that retains or loses its 
strength and quality through the decanter in which it is kept.  In his interpretation of 
Cicero’s myth, the human soul, decanted into ignorant and beastly bodies, lost its 
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own potency; as a result, humanity wandered aimlessly like scattered cattle.234  This 
would have been the unending state of the human soul had Cicero’s proto-orator not 
appeared. Victorinus describes this sage as one in whom the soul had not been 
entirely blinded; its continued harmony with its own original nature allowed the 
orator to recognise the divinity that lay inside all people.235  This knowledge would 
have been useless to all but himself, however, had the sage not also been given the 
gift of eloquence whereby he could ‘draw men through teaching from living as beasts 
to a knowledge of the divine’.236  And so by his eloquence, he was able to impart 
wisdom—or a knowledge of the soul’s original state—to those otherwise unreceptive 
to his teaching.  Victorinus concludes from Cicero’s story that eloquence has a 
threefold function: it compels, gathers, and informs; it compels the unwilling to 
become docile so that they can then be gathered together and formed into a civilised 
people through instruction.237  The instruction itself is the philosophy of wisdom 
whereby savage humanity is ‘gently tamed and led from their beastly lives’ towards 
perfection.238 
 Victorinus’ commentary reveals that four centuries after the death of Cicero, 
well-trained rhetors could still adapt his rhetorical theory, developed for the 
aristocracy of a crumbling republic, to meet the concerns of their own day.  Cicero’s 
basic conviction remains in place: wisdom and eloquence are united in the ideal 
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orator for the good of others.  But the civic no longer remains the chief interest of the 
ideal orator.  Neoplatonic presuppositions and interests have now transformed him 
into someone who can advertise how imprisoned souls can return through wisdom to 
their original state within the divine.   That is the orator’s primary interest; in a sense, 
civilisation is the by-product of his success. Victorinus’s approach both personalises 
Ciceronianism and gives the ideal orator a spiritual role; he is now a kind of guru-
statesman.  Someone like Victorinus, who combined philosophical learning with 
rhetorical training, could provide the tools of enlightenment that would free people to 
seek to rise above this world.  That Martianus Capella’s work seeks to fulfil much the 
same role, albeit in a significantly more allegorical form, suggests that a less facile 
form of Second Sophistic existed alongside more flamboyant examples.  There is not 
an ounce of the celebrity in Victorinus (except ironically perhaps in his theatrical 
conversion to Christianity); not unlike Augustine, his concern is for converting souls 
to the divine. 
 Paul R. Kolbet’s book, Augustine and the Cure of Souls helps to shed further 
light on the goal of the rhetoric as advocated by Victorinus and Capella.239  He argues 
that within Second Sophistic there were rhetors who could direct their rhetorical and 
philosophical training towards the healing of souls.240  He points to Dio Chrysostom 
as an example of just such a philosophical rhetor who understood himself as a 
physician administering the cure of philosophical medicine to the souls of his 
listeners.241  This seems to have involved his convincing people that they waste their 
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lives in the pursuit of ‘money and reputation and certain pleasures of the body, while 
no one is able to rid himself of these and set his own soul free’ instead of the good 
life which comes through the dispelling of ‘ignorance and confusion of mind’.242  
What Dio illustrates, argues Kolbet, is a classical ‘psychagogy’ which he defines as 
‘pertaining to how a mature person leads the less mature to perceive and internalise 
wisdom for themselves’.243  In order effectively to achieve this inculcation of 
philosophy, the mode of teaching must be adapted to the state of the recipient and the 
nature of the occasion.  Kolbet concludes, ‘Thus, as a contemporary investigative 
category, psychagogy is a distinctive use of rhetoric for philosophic or religious 
ends’.244  Both Kolbet’s description of Dio Chrysostom and his definition of 
psychagogy describe Victorinus’s concern in composing Explanationes in Ciceronis 
Rhetoricam.  Indeed, the corpus of Victorinus’s works—both pagan and Christian—
manifests a mind directed totally to the teaching of rhetoric and philosophy for the 
good of the human soul.   That his career as a rhetor was committed to the healing of 
souls through the preaching of philosophy may explain why, before his conversion, 
he repeatedly (though perhaps naughtily) told Simplicianus that he was really a 
Christian.245 
 Victorinus (and Capella) illustrates that during the fourth and fifth century 
there were philosophical rhetors attempting to preserve and employ Cicero in a 
manner that went beyond the imitation of style.  If Augustine were to reorient 
Cicero’s philosophical rhetoric (either consciously or subconsciously) to the demands 
of Christian theology, then much of that work of adaption would have been already 
completed by the likes of Victorinus.  Indeed, Victorinus’s own commentary suggests 
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that Augustine probably never studied Cicero’s works in a way that modern scholars 
have assumed: the Neoplatonic interpretation was likely at least subconsciously in 
place from the beginning.  The absence, therefore, of a civic or forensic rhetoric in De 
doctrina christiana, so noted by modern scholars, may simply have never occurred to 
Augustine.  In the end, although the gulf between Cicero’s civic-minded orator and 
Augustine’s preacher may have been a large one, the gulf between Victorinus’s and 
Augustine’s was much less so.   
Finally, Victorinus and the appearance of philosophical rhetors help further 
explain Augustine’s reaction to Ambrose.  If a young and confused rhetor arriving in 
Milan in 384 were looking around to find a close embodiment of Victorinus’s 
Neoplatonic orator, who better to fill that role than Ambrose?  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Ambrose ministered to his people through his wisdom and 
eloquence.  But the wisdom he conveyed is less like Cicero’s civic knowledge and 
more like Victorinus’s contemplative and ascetic wisdom that heals and reorients 
souls towards God.  In other words, Victorinus neatly fills the gap between Cicero 
and Augustine.  Now, all the elements are in place—wisdom, eloquence, and salvific 
truth—for philosophical wisdom to undergo one final transformation and become 
simply theology.   
 
Augustine and Cicero 
The literature about Augustine’s opinion of rhetoric in general and Cicero in 
particular is vast, though almost all of it is focused either on the Confessiones or on 
Book Four of De doctrina Christiana.246  There is no need here to rehearse all the 
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arguments or their central concern with how Augustine may or may not have adapted 
classical rhetoric for an emerging medieval world.   My interest has little to do with 
his own rhetoric per se or how much that rhetoric relied on Cicero but instead on how 
he adapted Ciceronian principles to his own understanding of soteriology.  It will be 
my contention that consciously or not Augustine believed that philosophy and 
rhetoric are most perfectly united in Christian theology and that while bishops might, 
after a fashion, fulfil Cicero’s ideal orator, more profoundly God alone most perfectly 
realises that role.  In order to establish these arguments, I will first undertake to show 
that Augustine neither rejects rhetoric itself (despite the appearance of doing so in the 
Confessiones) nor the underlying Ciceronian conviction that wisdom and eloquence 
ought to be united.  What he does reject is what he perceives to be the facile 
pomposity of Second Sophistic and, in a thoroughly Ciceronian fashion, the 
usefulness of rhetorical theory itself.  Eloquence for Augustine—as for Cicero—
transcends the art of rhetoric.  Although, after his conversion, Augustine may have 
become less enthusiastic about rhetors he never rejected the need for orators; indeed, 
in the guise of preachers they are central to the life of the new commonwealth: the 
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Church.   But his image of an orator is much more like that of Victorinus: a person 
through whom wisdom and eloquence can draw people towards the divine.   
  
Augustine’s Education 
Augustine provides a wealth of information about his education in rhetoric, 
though always with a polemical bent.  In most ways it was a standard course of 
studies beginning at a young age with grammar and ending with rigorous training in 
rhetoric.247  As with many provincials, he received his grammatical education close to 
home before being sent off to a city—in his case, Carthage—to begin his training in 
rhetoric.248   He describes his rhetorical education by stating, ‘My studies which were 
deemed respectable had the objective of leading me to distinction as an advocate in 
the law courts’.249   Those studies undoubtedly centred on Cicero—almost definitely 
De inventione and likely either De oratore, Orator or both—and Rhetorica ad 
Herennium, which was believed to have been written by Cicero.250  C.S. Baldwin 
points out that in all of his works, Augustine never quotes or cites a rhetorician other 
than Cicero.251  Although Augustine claims the he was a quiet and studious pupil in 
the midst of a rowdy bunch of classmates, he also admits that his devotion to the 
‘books on eloquence’ had a less laudable purpose: ‘I wanted to distinguish myself as 
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an orator for a damnable and conceited purpose, namely delight in human vanity’.252  
He does not here imply anything about the books on eloquence themselves; his 
criticism is directed towards his own ambition: he was learning rhetoric in a typical 
Second Sophistic fashion to become well-respected and loved.  Not unlike teenagers 
today, he wanted to be a celebrity. 
 In the course of his training in ‘the eloquence wholly necessary for carrying 
conviction in one’s cause and for developing one’s thoughts’, Augustine practised 
declamation by delivering fictitious speeches.253  He mentions reciting a speech of 
‘Juno in her anger and grief’ for which he and his classmates received marks for their 
style and pathos.254  Looking back on his lessons, Augustine was repelled by the 
focus on style over truth, and claims that he was actually being trained to be more 
confident in expressing falsehood.  But he qualifies his criticism: ‘I bring no charge 
against the words which are like exquisite and precious vessels, but the wine of error 
is poured into them for us by drunken teachers’.255  In other words, he does not 
criticise so much the actual eloquence taught as the failure to unite that eloquence 
with truth.  His disdain is for the priorities of Second Sophistic, the prizing of style 
over substance, self-promotion and praise over the pursuit of truth.  His conclusion is 
that such an education led him towards vanity and a greater concern for the good 
opinion of his peers than for truth.256  Expectations were that through his training he 
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would be able to use eloquence ‘to gain access to human honours and to acquire 
deceitful riches’.257  
 During his rhetorical education, Augustine encountered ‘a book by a certain 
Cicero, whose language (but not his heart) almost everyone admires.  That book of 
his contains an exhortation to study philosophy and is entitled Hortensius’.258  This 
passage has been the subject of much debate: both Augustine’s phrase ‘a certain 
Cicero’ and his juxtaposing of ‘language’ and ‘heart’ have received conflicting 
commentary from scholars.259  Some interpret this passage as entirely negative, 
arguing that Augustine distances himself from the old orator by praising his style 
while not, from a Christian perspective, his heart.260  According to this interpretation, 
Augustine upholds Cicero as a typical example of those who, like his own teacher, 
promoted style over truth.  But this does not make sense within the larger context: 
Cicero’s Hortensius introduced Augustine to philosophy, the substance his own 
education had omitted.  A better interpretation of this passage is that Augustine 
believes his contemporaries seek to imitate Cicero’s style without any regard for his 
actual theory, particularly his promotion of philosophy; such an emphasis on style 
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over substance is, in fact, the very thing he accuses his original education of 
inculcating.261   
 Hortensius,262 a now lost work in praise of philosophy, written by a 
despondent Cicero after the death of his daughter, had an enormous impact on the 
young Augustine: 
The book changed my feelings.  It altered my prayers, Lord, to be towards 
yourself.  It gave me different values and priorities.  Suddenly every vain 
hope became empty to me, and I longed for the immortality of wisdom with 
an incredible ardour in my heart.  I began to rise up to return to you....I was 
impressed not by the book’s refining effect on my style and literary 
expression but by the content.263 
At first glance, Augustine seems to be saying that Hortensius transformed him from 
being a budding rhetor into a budding philosopher.  Of course, that he would go on 
from reading Hortensius to become a rhetor belies this first impression.  This passage 
comes immediately after Augustine has criticised his youthful goal of obtaining the 
adoration and success that would feed his human vanity.  After reading Hortensius 
that goal changes: now he longs for the ‘immortality of wisdom’; he says to God that 
he no longer desired vanities, but burned ‘with longing to leave earthly things and fly 
back to you’.264  The ‘immortality of wisdom’ is itself an interesting phrase.  Behind 
it may lie a passage from Hortensius that he later preserves for posterity in De 
Trinitate: ‘it must be supposed that the more these souls keep always to their course, 
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Company, Ltd., 1989), 109-111, for an attempt to provide an outline for Hortensius through 
remaining references and fragments.  John Hammond Taylor, S.J., ‘St. Augustine and the 
Hortensius of Cicero’ Studies in Philology 60:3 (1963), 487-498, argues that the influence of 
Hortensius had more to do with Augustine’s mood than with the merits of Cicero’s work 
itself. 
263
  conf. 3.4.7. 
264
  conf. 3.4.7. 
89 
 
that is to reason and to eager inquiry, and the less they mix themselves up in the 
tangled vices and errors of men, the easier will be their ascent and return to 
heaven’.265  But it also suggests a similar outlook to that of Victorinus.  In reality, 
Cicero performs for Augustine precisely the role of Victorinus’s orator-sage by 
turning Augustine from this world towards the divine through his eloquent wisdom.  
He was assigned Hortensius as a model for eloquence but discovered there a 
transforming wisdom.  As a result, Augustine did not suddenly become a philosopher 
but a true Ciceronian attuned to the discovery of wisdom through eloquence.266 
 Any doubt about this Ciceronian turn is laid to rest by the very next episode in 
the Confessiones.  Probably because of his own background, Augustine’s first step in 
his pursuit of wisdom ‘wherever found’,267 is to study Scripture.  But he is 
immediately repelled by its style: ‘It seemed to me unworthy in comparison to the 
dignity of Cicero’.268  Raymond DiLorenzo points out that Cicero defines dignitas as 
auctoritas, which explains why Augustine initially rejects Scriptural wisdom.269  
Lacking the eloquence that his tastes have been trained to discern, he cannot imagine 
how the Bible can contain wisdom.  His expectations are that while eloquence can be 
present without wisdom (as in the case of his pre-Hortensius education), expressed 
wisdom cannot be divorced from eloquence.  Indeed, his later criticism of himself at 
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this stage in his life is not that he expected wisdom to be eloquent but that he was too 
proud to recognise the true eloquence contained in Scripture.270   
 Despite his new interests, Augustine left his education behind to become a 
teacher of the ‘art of rhetoric’ (artem rhetoricam), instructing his students in much 
the same way as he had been.271  He admits that, motivated by greed, he tried to teach 
the ‘tricks of rhetoric’ not that his students could convict an innocent person but that 
they might save the life of a guilty one.  If Victorinus’s distinction between De 
inventione and De oratore (the former studied for rhetorical theory and the latter for 
providing an oratorical ideal) was a common one, then one can assume that 
Augustine’s reference to his teaching ars rhetorica implies that he taught his students 
either De inventione or Rhetorica ad Herennium (or both).272  He provided his 
students not so much with the overarching Ciceronian rhetorical theory but with the 
rhetorical ‘tricks’ that would make them successful declaimers.  In other words, 
despite his personal pursuit of wisdom, his greed and ambition pushed him to become 
a fairly standard, though promising, Second Sophistic rhetor.  Considering his own 
relatively modest background, this is not entirely surprising.  The opportunities for 
one like him to become anything like Cicero’s orator were remote; such a role was 
still largely reserved for the aristocracy (Victorinus’s example notwithstanding).  
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Instead, he joined the ranks of rhetors educating young men and living off the funds 
provided by the Imperial government and student fees.   
 With this in mind, one can easily understand why Augustine later decided to 
move to Rome.  By his own admission, he went in search of ‘promised higher fees 
and a greater position of dignity’.273 Rome had the potential of introducing him to the 
kind of aristocratic patronage that might lead to a higher office like that enjoyed by 
Victorinus, which is in fact what happened.  Other than his personal involvement in 
Manichaeism, there is no suggestion whatsoever that he attempted to become 
anything like Cicero’s orator, even though he had by then come under the spell of the 
Academics (again probably through the influence of Cicero).274  Despite the profound 
influence of Hortensius, he largely continued along his original course of seeking 
‘delight in human vanities’.  The disconnection between Augustine’s private beliefs 
and his public profession must have increased his dissatisfaction with life in Rome.  
Fortunately for him, he did finally come to the attention of an accomplished orator, 
Symmachus, who sent Augustine to Milan to become a ‘teacher of rhetoric’.275  At 
that point, it must have seemed like his life would be entirely devoted to working as a 
rhetor. 
 Augustine’s account of this period in his life presents a fascinating picture of a 
young rhetor attempting to pursue his career and form his beliefs in Late Antiquity.  
On the one hand, he faced the powerful expectation to become a typical rhetor, 
training young men in rhetorical techniques derived from various handbooks.  His 
colleagues, such as those who warned him about Roman students, would have been 
just this sort of teacher, and one can only imagine how many rhetorical performances 
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Augustine watched, critiqued, and discussed with those colleagues.  His life was 
given almost entirely over to the ‘fluency of speech’ that Cicero despised but by 
Augustine’s day had come to be identified with eloquence.  On the other hand, 
Augustine had been deeply affected by his reading of Hortensius, which had imparted 
to him an appreciation for eloquent wisdom, or a rhetoric ennobled by the content of 
philosophy.  He was a practising Manichaean, appreciative of the eloquence of their 
leaders, though increasingly sceptical about the wisdom of their beliefs.  In fact, he 
had begun to follow Cicero’s path towards Academic Scepticism.  Interestingly, there 
is no evidence that he had begun to read the works of philosophers themselves, except 
for Aristotle’s Categories.276  Like most other rhetors he seems to have initially 
derived his philosophical knowledge through commonplaces and Cicero himself.277  
It was also not atypical, again as Cicero himself demonstrates, for rhetors to 
downplay their own profession in comparison to philosophy.  It was a standard way 
for a rhetor to distinguish himself from all the others whom, he believed, taught only 
sophistry.  No doubt Augustine’s colleagues would have found any expression on his 
part of being a true devotee of wisdom rather than of empty eloquence as arrogant as 
Augustine later found them. 
 
Augustine’s Conversion 
If the above portrait has any merit, then Augustine arrived in Milan as a man 
pursuing a life that did not agree with his deeper beliefs and, therefore, lacking the 
very kind of inner ‘quietude’ that Cicero the Sceptic promoted.   If this is so, then in 
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one respect Augustine’s conversion to Christianity can be seen as the reintegration of 
his two conflicted selves.  And it is at least noteworthy that the same conversion that 
compelled him to give up teaching a form of rhetoric in which he did not really 
believe, culminated in his becoming the kind of eloquent orator—first as a priest and 
then as a bishop—that De inventione, De oratore and Hortensius had taught him to 
admire.  This is not to claim that Augustine converted because he realised that the 
Church offered him a chance to be the kind of orator that his station in life might have 
otherwise precluded.  To the contrary, Augustine’s first decision in converting was to 
withdraw into a life of leisure, to become, as it were, like the elder Cicero who, 
withdrawn from public life, composed Hortensius.278  But it remains fascinating that 
Augustine would eventually come to exemplify Cicero’s ideal in a way that likely 
would have remained beyond him had he never converted.  Even if it should be 
shown that he did reject rhetoric altogether, his manner of life as priest and bishop 
belies the conviction of his words.  But as will now be argued, he never rejected 
rhetoric, only the empty eloquence and rhetorical legerdemain in which he had long 
before lost faith.  To the end of his life, however, he remained convinced that wisdom 
is best expressed eloquently not least because he had learned from experience that 
falsehood so often is. 
 As already argued in the previous chapter, Ambrose attracted Augustine 
because he embodied Cicero’s ideal by ministering to people through his eloquent 
words of wisdom.  Ambrose is precisely the kind of man after which Augustine 
sought.  Earlier he had thought that the Manichaean Faustus might be that person.  He 
describes him as one by whom ‘many were captured as a result of his smooth talk’ 
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and that he was famous for his ‘soft eloquence’.279  He was reputed also to be a wise 
man, capable of answering all of Augustine’s difficult questions.  But Augustine was 
disappointed: 
When he came, I found him gracious and pleasant with words.  He said things 
they usually say, but put it much more agreeably....My ears were already 
satiated with this kind of talk, which did not seem better to me because more 
elegantly expressed.  Fine style does not make something true, nor has a man 
a wise soul because he has a handsome face and well-chosen eloquence 
(decorum eloquium).  They who had promised that he would be so good were 
not good judges.  He seemed to them prudent and wise because he charmed 
them by the way he talked.280 
Faustus therefore epitomises the kind of rhetor that Augustine despised, whose empty 
eloquence wins people solely through charm without expressing any deeper wisdom.  
In fact, Faustus turns out to have been a fairly typical Second Sophistic rhetor: he was 
learned in only ‘grammar and literature’ while ‘ignorant’ of the other ‘liberal arts’.281  
His popularity was due to a polished delivery that came from the daily practice of 
declamation.  Augustine presents this picture of Faustus very carefully to underscore 
his belief that he was precisely the type of man the pre-Hortensius Augustine aspired 
to become.  Furthermore, he exemplifies the false orator of Cicero’s De inventione, 
whose ‘fluency of speech’ is united with falsehood to draw people towards their ruin.  
In Faustus’s case, Augustine simply comments that his charming manner of speaking 
was a ‘great trap of the devil!’282  Not surprisingly, Augustine’s encounter with 
Faustus results in his beginning to doubt the wisdom of Manichaeism.283 
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 Augustine, however, mentions eloquentia in a short digression in the midst of 
his description of Faustus.  He thanks God that he had already learned that truth does 
not depend on eloquence:  
Already I had learnt from you that nothing is true merely because it is 
eloquently (eloquenter) said, nor false because the signs coming from the lips 
(signa labiorum) make sounds deficient in a sense of style.  Again, a statement 
is not true because it is enunciated in an unpolished idiom, nor false because 
the words are splendid.  Wisdom and foolishness are like food that is 
nourishing or useless.  Whether the words are ornate or not does not decide 
the issue.  Food of either kind can be served in either town or country ware.284 
While this can certainly be read as a criticism of eloquence, in reality Augustine is 
not arguing anything with which either Cicero or Victorinus would disagree.  He is 
making two claims.  First, that wisdom remains wisdom whether or not it is expressed 
with rhetorical flourish.  Victorinus states much the same thing when he comments 
that eloquence adds nothing to wisdom.285  This stands in contrast to Second 
Sophistic which, as Augustine (and modern scholars) understood it, claimed that style 
is of paramount importance.  For Augustine, eloquence is nothing more than a 
vehicle, either of truth or falsehood.  His second implicit claim, however, is that 
wisdom must be expressed in some manner in order for it to be received.  He uses the 
curious phrase ‘signs of the lips’ that is reminiscent of Cicero’s distinction between 
the voluntas, the will of the speaker or writer, and the signa or scriptum, the words by 
which the will is expressed.286  Augustine is here suggesting that eloquentia is signum 
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rather than res.  Wisdom, no matter the form in which it is presented, is the substance; 
the Second Sophistics and Faustus’s admirers err in responding to eloquentia as 
though it were the res rather than simply a signum.   
 Augustine offers Faustus as a foil to Ambrose.  Both are religious leaders 
famous for their eloquence.  But Augustine approached each person for different 
reasons: on the one hand, he listened to Faustus for his reputed wisdom only to 
encounter empty rhetoric, and on the other, he listened to Ambrose for his reputed 
eloquence to find, despite his deep prejudice, the wisdom for which he had 
yearned.287  Again, Ambrose fulfils the ideals of a philosophical rhetor: most of his 
time was devoted either to the public role of edifying his people through his eloquent 
wisdom or to the private practice of imbibing wisdom through his silent reading.288  
Thus, his whole life was directed towards redirecting the souls of his listeners through 
eloquent wisdom towards God.  And his eloquence was so powerful that, again like 
Cicero’s proto-orator, those who listened could not help but eventually consume his 
wisdom. 
 Augustine’s encounter with Ambrose began his process of conversion to 
Christianity.  Interestingly, it was during this unsettled time that Augustine turned 
from Cicero’s Academic Scepticism to study the books of the Platonists themselves, 
albeit in Victorinus’s Latin translation.289  Simplicianus, perhaps unaware of 
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Augustine’s flirtation with Scepticism, congratulated him that he ‘had not fallen in 
with the writings of other philosophers’ since in Neoplatonism ‘God and his Word 
keep slipping in’.290  Although during the past hundred years much has been made of 
the impact of Neoplatonism on Augustine’s thought, the debate has overlooked how 
his discovery of Plotinus (through the translation of a famous rhetor!) would have 
drawn Augustine even closer to the intellectual background of Victorinus and 
Capella; like them he was becoming a thoroughly Neoplatonic Ciceronian.  Of 
course, Hortensius itself, with its concern for freeing the soul from the entanglements 
of this life so that it may ascend to the divine, would have prepared him for this 
development.  But Augustine states explicitly that in reading the ‘books of the 
Platonists’ he was ‘admonished to return’ into himself where he became aware of a 
transcendent light that he recognised as true Being.291 In other words, Victorinus’s 
translations compelled him to reach out for the kind of virtue as defined by 
Neoplatonism and Victorinus: a soul conforming itself to its original nature and 
seeking to ascend toward the divine.  Whatever the impact, however, Augustine’s 
time as a Neoplatonic Ciceronian was short-lived as it quickly, though not without 
anguish, gave way to his complete conversion to Christianity. 
The approach of that conversion caused Augustine to decide that he could not 
continue to work as a rhetor.  The primary reason for this is that he no longer cared 
for the riches and vanity after which he had sought throughout his adult life.  His 
whole mind turned towards wisdom and discovering God as he began to mimic the 
elder Cicero who withdrew from a public life of oratory to a private life of 
philosophy.  But this was a gradual process for Augustine.  He writes, ‘I made a 
decision in your sight not to break off teaching with an abrupt renunciation, but 
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quietly to retire from my post as a salesman of words in the markets of rhetoric’.292  
He continued for a time to work as a rhetor, to ‘sell’ the ‘art of public speaking’,293 
but now he did so only to avoid public scandal and to use his impending vacation as a 
quiet way to retire from public life.294   
One should note the words and phrases Augustine uses to describe his 
decision to give up his career as an Imperial rhetor.   He is dismissive not of rhetoric 
itself but of rhetors and their craft; he never claims that he no longer esteemed oratory 
at the time of his conversion, but he saw little worth in teaching ars rhetorica, or at 
least, doing so to earn a living and to seek honour.295  Indeed, he doubts that oratory 
is something that really can be taught, sounding very much like Cicero who was 
equally dismissive about whether eloquentia could actually be inculcated through the 
teaching of rhetorical technique.296   In fact, as will be shown, Augustine’s attitude 
towards his former career is strikingly similar to that of first-century B.C. patricians 
towards the new-fangled rhetorical schools.   Ultimately, what Augustine rejects, like 
Cicero, is a cheap eloquence that he perceives as little more than verbal trickery. 
 
De doctrina Christiana 
Augustine initially sought a more secluded life by withdrawing to 
Cassiciacum to live a life of intellectual leisure ‘such as might have satisfied 
Cicero’.297  But the approaching armies of Maximus made northern Italy an 
increasingly precarious place to live, and so he planned to return to North Africa to 
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form a kind of monastic community with his mother, son, and closest friends.298  On 
the one hand, during this period (386-391), he seems to have rejected any role for 
himself as a philosophical rhetor; all indications are that he hoped to spend the rest of 
his life as a monastic or Christian philosopher surrounded by his books and friends 
and in pursuit of wisdom and God.  Such was not an uncommon decision in the West 
during Late Antiquity when many landed families transformed their villas into 
monastic communities in the midst of an increasingly insecure and crumbling 
civilisation.299  On the other hand, during this same period he composed De musica, 
which he planned to be the first book in a series on the seven liberal arts,300 and 
composed his first works of controversy.  Augustine’s ambition in composing De 
musica was very much in the vein of philosophical rhetoric, as demonstrated by 
Martianus Capella’s work, and his decision to become engaged in Manichean and 
Donatist controversies allowed Augustine to return to the very sort of debate for 
which he had been long trained. 
Augustine’s reputation and training could not go unnoticed in North Africa 
and so, according to his own later account, he was tricked into being ordained and 
shortly thereafter consecrated a bishop.  Despite his efforts to live a more 
philosophical life, he now embarked on a career that would lead him to embody 
Cicero’s ideal orator.  That he saw himself in this light is suggested not only by the 
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attention he gave to preaching, and (like Cicero with his orations) his publication of 
those sermons for wider consumption, but also by his continued engagement in 
theological controversy and the care he took in his involvement in the law courts.  
Indeed, the sheer bulk and scope of Augustine’s writing stand in testimony of the 
inherently oratorical nature of his episcopacy and the full flight he gave to the whole 
range of his training.  Several further activities suggest that he almost immediately 
tried to fulfil his priestly and episcopal duties as an orator.  First, he sought to engage 
Manicheans and Donatists in a series of rhetorical debates.  In 392, shortly after his 
ordination, he publically debated for two days with the Manichean leader 
Fortunatus.301  Later, in a letter written in 396 or 397, he laments that a Donatist 
bishop is afraid to engage in a public debate with him, ‘a mere beginner’.302  At about 
the same time, however, he did debate with another Donatist bishop, Fortunius.303  
Augustine’s description of the start of the debate reveals just how much his life could 
resemble that of a Second Sophistic rhetor: 
But after we had settled down in his home, no small crowd assembled because 
of the rumor spread about.  We, however, saw that there were very few in that 
whole crowd who desired that the issue be treated in a useful and salutary 
manner and that so important a question on so important an issue be discussed 
with wisdom and piety.  But the rest had assembled for the spectacle of our 
quarrel, as it were, in a manner of the theatre rather than for instruction toward 
salvation with Christian devotion.304 
This passage is wonderfully revealing because it shows the conflicting sides of late 
antique rhetoric.  Augustine and Fortunius aspire to a debate that will express wisdom 
and piety in a ‘useful and salutary manner’ but the people simply want a show.  By 
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now, Augustine has achieved the fame of a successful rhetor and so draws crowds of 
people looking for an entertaining rhetorical debate.  But both he and Fortunius have 
no interest in such theatrical displays; they wish to offer through their rhetoric a 
wisdom that is good for the souls of both the participants and their audience.  This 
cannot have been very different from the aspirations of Augustine when he served as 
an Imperial rhetor in Milan. 
Second, Augustine at this time produced the work for which he is arguably 
most famous, Confessiones, which is less an autobiography than an outstanding 
epideictic work that seeks through praise and blame to persuade his audience to seek 
God.305  In his Retractationes, he states clearly that the books of this work ‘praise the 
just and good God for my evils and my good acts, and lift up the understanding and 
affection of men to Him’.306 Raymond DiLorenzo argues that Augustine offers the 
Confessiones as a ‘rhetorical demonstration’ by God himself, through Augustine’s 
thoughts and words, for the purpose of reforming the spiritual life of the reader.307  
Similarly, Peter Candler calls the Confessiones a ‘grammar of participation’ whereby 
Augustine seeks not only to provide autobiographical information to the reader but 
also to transform him by rhetorically compelling him towards an ascent towards 
God.308  Thus, Augustine conceives of his life before and leading up to his conversion 
as a form of rhetoric, and relates it in such a way as to allow the reader to share in his 
                                               
305
  Scanlon, ‘Augustine and Theology as Rhetoric’, 41.  Scanlon explains that epideictic rhetoric 
is not concerned primarily with the ‘affectivity of good and evil’ through promoting praise or 
blame. 
306
  Ret.2.6 . 
307
  Raymond D. DiLorenzo, ‘“Divine Eloquence and the Spiritual World of the Praedicator”: 
Book XIII of St. Augustine’s Confessions’, Augustinian Studies 16 (1984), 76. 
308
  Peter M. Candler, Theology, Rhetoric, Manuduction or Reading Scripture Together on the 
Path to God (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), 53. 
102 
 
own process of turning from temporal delights towards the heavenly delight of 
God.309   
Finally, in 396 Augustine began to write the treatise that would help to 
transform rhetoric in the West: De doctrina Christiana.310  There has been a great 
deal of debate about how indebted Augustine was to Cicero for his argument and 
whether he ultimately accepted Cicero’s theory, rejected it, or transformed it.  Many 
of these studies have focused primarily on Augustine’s adaption of Cicero’s three 
styles of speech—plain, middle, and grand—and argued either for or against 
Augustine’s over-reliance on Cicero.  While these debates are important for those 
trying to understand the development of rhetoric from the classical to medieval 
period, Augustine’s adaption of rhetorical technique does not directly impact upon 
this study.  Of greater concern is what Augustine does with Cicero’s emphasis on 
eloquent wisdom or philosophical rhetoric and how his approach to that subject 
relates to Augustine’s theology.  As will now be shown, Augustine advocates a kind 
of preacher that is very similar to Victorinus’ interpretation of Cicero’s ideal orator.  
It is worth mentioning that almost all those who have stressed Augustine’s departure 
from Cicero in Book Four of De doctrina Christiana have failed to note how 
Ciceronianism developed in Late Antiquity; only Rita Copeland notes the similarity 
between Augustine and Victorinus.311 
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Christine Mohrmann is fairly typical of those who see De doctrina Christiana 
as ultimately a rejection of Cicero and the introduction of an entirely new Christian 
culture.  She argues that Augustine’s separation of eloquence from rhetoric was 
unheard of in the ancient world and she is particularly struck by his insistence that 
eloquence can be developed by reading good models better than through acquiring 
and applying a system of rhetorical rules.312  Drawing heavily upon Marrou, she 
views Augustine’s separation of eloquence from the ‘rules and precepts of the 
rhetoricians’ as an entirely novel development in rhetoric and ultimately a refutation 
of Cicero.313  She concludes, ‘For Augustine the Christian orator serves not the 
spoken word but truth, and this truth is in the first instance to be drawn from 
Scripture, which he must read over and over again and which must be his model and 
source of oratory’.314 
Next, Adolf Primmer argues in an otherwise perceptive essay that Augustine 
agrees with Cicero’s practice but not with his theory.315  Much of Primmer’s support 
for this dwells on Augustine’s courteous correction and adjustment of Cicero’s three 
styles of speech.  But he also notes more fundamental differences between the two.  
For example, he contends that while Cicero claims that he is prouder of his 
achievement as a wordsmith than as a politician and counsel, and further argues that 
an orator must above all else inspire admiration so that the audience will prefer to 
listen to him rather than his opponent, Augustine argues that a preacher ought not to 
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over-estimate his own role in what is really God’s grace in converting the 
audience.316 One of the most noteworthy differences between the two in Primmer’s 
mind is that Cicero is intent on success in the law court while Augustine is intent on 
the preacher enabling the listener to receive God’s wisdom.317  Their different 
concerns shape their approach to rhetoric and the relative importance of styles of 
speech.  So, whereas Cicero emphasises an appeal to emotion in order to sway the 
court, Augustine emphasises the wisdom that is taught.   
Ernest Fortin, however, is perhaps the strongest critic of those who see little 
originality on Augustine’s part.  In his essay, ‘Augustine and the Problem of 
Ciceronian Rhetoric’, he argues that Augustine has profoundly transformed Cicero by 
asserting the priority of teaching over pleasing and persuading and by investing the 
word docere and doctrina with a meaning utterly foreign to Cicero.318  Fortin 
contends that for Cicero the purpose of teaching is to educate a judge about the act of 
and motivation for a crime and to draw his attention to how various laws relate to the 
case.319  The sole purpose of an orator’s instruction is to make the judge aware of the 
facts in such a way as to persuade him to the orator’s point of view.  Instruction is 
therefore subordinated to persuasion in such a way as to make credibility more 
important than truth.  Fortin notes that Cicero does not advocate actual falsehood or 
believe that truth is unimportant but only concedes pragmatically that the truth is very 
often evasive.320  Fortin does recognise that there is another side to Cicero that is 
interested in the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric.  He even mentions that 
Cicero’s ideal orator is ‘someone in whom the accomplishments of the statesman and 
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the philosopher coalesce and are brought to a higher level of perfection’.321  But he 
fails adequately to pursue this line of investigation.  Instead, he focuses on the 
difference between Cicero and Augustine’s definition of docere/doctrina, arguing 
that for Augustine instruction is a preacher’s highest duty and that such teaching is 
directed towards salvation rather than subordinated to persuasion.322  Fortin 
concludes: ‘In and of itself it [‘saving truth’] has the power to transform the 
individual who apprehends it.  It is one and the same act both theoretical and practical 
and thus transcends the dichotomy between thought and action or between instruction 
and persuasion on which the classical understanding of rhetoric was predicated’.323 
Finally, like Primmer and Fortin, Michael Scanlon notes that for Cicero 
teaching is the least important duty of an orator because the purpose of rhetoric is the 
political and forensic search for justice.324  He argues that Cicero believed that 
instruction ought to be left to the philosophers rather than orators whose primary 
concern is with plausibility rather than truth.325  Augustine, on the other hand, 
emphasises the duty of instruction since he conceives of the preacher as merely a 
vehicle for transmitting truth.326  Eloquence and persuasive force are to be found not 
in style but ‘in their content’.327 
Some of the criticism expressed above can be readily answered because they 
fail to do full justice to Cicero’s own thought.  For example, Mohrmann’s contention 
about the uniqueness of Augustine’s separation of eloquence from rhetoric fails to 
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account for Cicero’s repeated questions about the usefulness of the rhetorical theory 
found in handbooks.328  Likewise, her view of the novelty of Augustine’s argument 
about the superiority of rhetorical models over handbooks is unsupported by actual 
classical rhetoric.  Augustine’s argument, in fact, is much more a reclamation not just 
of Cicero’s rhetoric but also traditional Roman method of learning oratory, which was 
based on the conviction that imitation of senatorial orators was superior to instruction 
by lowly rhetors.329  Augustine, of course, differs from the others in offering Paul, 
Cyprian and Ambrose rather than Virgil and Cicero himself as models, but otherwise 
his advice is strikingly conservative.   In a sense, he is replacing the old senatorial 
model with a new Christian one; only now the senator is a saint.330 
Similarly, the other critics exaggerate Augustine replacement of probare with 
docere in his reference to Cicero’s officia oratoris.  In the notes to her critical edition 
of Book Four of De doctrina Christiana, Sister Thérèse Sullivan points out that 
Cicero repeatedly uses docere in the place of probare in his own works.331 So, 
Augustine’s decision to use docere rather than probare does not in itself mean that he 
was intending to adjust Cicero’s theory.  But as Primmer, Fortin and Scanlon 
demonstrate, Augustine’s ultimate concern—the expression of salvific truth—is very 
different from Cicero’s more forensic interest.  In this sense, docere does make more 
sense since Augustine’s preacher is teaching truth rather than seeking to demonstrate 
a point.  What these critics detect is the eclipse of a civic dimension in Augustine’s 
approach to rhetoric and that absence obviously dramatically affects Augustine’s 
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representation of Cicero’s officia oratoris.  But their very emphasis of this point 
highlights that they have not discerned how Cicero’s rhetoric had already been 
transformed by philosophical rhetors such as Victorinus before Augustine’s own 
time.  In their analysis of Augustine’s attitude towards Cicero, they omit the passage 
of nearly four centuries and the development of rhetoric during that period.  This 
failure to read De doctrina Christiana in its wider historical context may explain why 
historians of rhetoric like Kennedy, Murphy, Ward and Copeland do not detect the 
same stark difference as do some theologians.  A much better approach to 
understanding what Augustine’s is attempting to do in De doctrina Christiana is not 
to compare it directly to Cicero but indirectly through someone such as Victorinus 
who had by Augustine’s time already adjusted Cicero’s rhetoric to the expectations of 
Late Antiquity. 
To put this argument another way, in his days of learning rhetoric and 
working as a professional rhetor, Augustine had two possible ways of using Cicero.  
The more popular way was to read Cicero’s works primarily as models of style, 
paying less attention to his overall theory than to how he expressed himself, 
particularly in his collected orations.  In other words, Augustine could have been like 
those Second Sophistics who admired Cicero’s language but not his heart.   The other 
way was that of people like Victorinus who in a sense read Cicero through the lens of 
De inventione.  Of course, Victorinus esteemed Cicero’s style, but his greater interest 
was for the heart of Cicero’s theory (as he understood it): namely, to express wisdom 
through eloquence by uniting philosophy and rhetoric to assist the imprisoned soul to 
become mindful of, and return to, the divine.  Broadly speaking, therefore, Augustine 
could have employed Cicero primarily as a model of style or as a means of clearly 
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expressing redemptive truth.332  Before encountering Hortensius, he was being 
trained to refer to Cicero entirely for style.  However, Augustine’s response to 
Hortensius, his delving into Neoplatonism, but above all his conversion and new role 
as a Christian preacher prepared him marvellously for the latter approach.  Before 
even setting pen to paper, therefore, Augustine would naturally have thought of 
Cicero’s theory as a way of leading souls to God.  Fundamentally then, all Augustine 
really needed to do was translate something like Victorinus’s theory into a Christian 
context.  And this is precisely what he does. 
That he had Cicero’s eloquent wisdom in mind from the start is suggested by 
the fact that although he did not complete the book until 427, from the outset he 
planned to address two topics: inventio and elocutio.333  In his very important essay 
on the subject and structure of De doctrina Christiana, Gerald Press criticises those 
scholars who have looked only at Book Four to compare Augustine to Cicero334 and 
notes that Augustine’s division of rhetoric into inventio and elocutio marks a return to 
Aristotle and Cicero.335  De doctrina Christiana, therefore, takes a conservative turn 
‘to a much older and more content-oriented rhetorical tradition’.336  Another way of 
understanding Augustine’s approach is to recognise that Books One to Three are 
concerned with wisdom and Book Four with eloquence. 
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But this is also where Augustine makes his first adjustment.  For Cicero, 
invention is primarily concerned with ‘the discovery of valid or seemingly valid 
arguments to render one’s cause plausible’.337  For Victorinus, invention is primarily 
about Neoplatonic wisdom and knowledge about the soul’s original nature.  For 
Augustine, however, invention is concerned with two matters: things (res) to be 
discovered from Scripture, which are ultimately about the twofold commandment to 
love God and neighbour, and the signs (signa) by which those things (res) are 
understood.338   In other words, Augustine transforms Cicero’s forensic knowledge 
and Victorinus’ Neoplatonic truths into a Christian theology that draws its wisdom 
entirely from Scripture.339   
For both Victorinus and Augustine, however, the discernment of truth through 
inventio places a new emphasis on teaching rather than on demonstration.  A wisdom 
that provides salvific truth (be that a Neoplatonic reditus or a Christian doctrine) is 
one that must be taught rather than proven.  The emphasis, as noted by Scanlon, is no 
longer on plausibility of a forensic narrative but on expressing transformative truths.  
But this is not as far removed from Cicero as is frequently believed.  Behind all of 
Cicero’s forensic focus stands his enormously influential image of the proto-orator 
who attracts savage humanity through his words and teaches them higher truths with 
his wisdom.  Cicero himself may not have returned often to this image in his later 
works, but that image remained powerful precisely because De inventione became his 
most studied and influential work.  The proto-orator therefore arguably loomed larger 
in late antique rhetorical theory (at least of those philosophical rhetors like 
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Victorinus) than Cicero’s more developed portrayal of orators in either De oratore or 
Orator.   
Gerald Press argues that the result of Augustine’s transformation of inventio is 
that rhetoric takes on an important religious role.340  This is the same feature of De 
doctrina Christiana noted by Primmer, Fortin and Scanlon.  But this development 
was really nothing new, as Victorinus’ commentary and Capella’s allegory 
demonstrate.  All of philosophical rhetoric had become religious insofar as it was 
concerned with personal ‘salvation’ from the bondage of earthly existence (be that 
through a Neoplatonic reditus or Christian teaching); the focus was not on the forum 
but on the divine.341  With the decline of law courts and councils in Late Antiquity, 
classical rhetoric was at least partly either directed towards entertainment or 
‘burdened with a profoundly spiritual mission, nothing less than the ethical formation 
and reform of individuals and societies’.342  Augustine is obviously attempting to 
provide the latter, though now grounded in a wisdom manifested through Scripture.   
Since the reception of wisdom is essential for ‘ethical formation’, the 
expression of that wisdom must be directed towards facilitating that reception.  In 
discussing elocutio, Augustine begins from precisely the same point as Cicero in De 
inventione: the use of rhetoric to give ‘conviction to both truth and falsehood’.343  
Behind this statement lurks Cicero’s argument that eloquence apart from wisdom is 
never helpful and often harmful.  If, as Augustine fears, Christian preachers avoid 
rhetoric because it is profane, then they will unnecessarily arm those who lead people 
into falsehood:  
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...who could dare to maintain that truth, which depends on us for its defence, 
should stand unarmed in the fight against falsehood?  This would mean that 
those who are trying to give conviction to their falsehoods would know how to 
use an introduction to make their listeners favourable, interested, and 
receptive, while we would not; that they would expound falsehoods in 
descriptions that are succinct, lucid, and convincing, while we would expound 
truth in such a way as to bore our listeners, cloud their understanding, and 
stifle their desire to believe...344 
Augustine’s description here of eloquence making people ‘favourable, interested and 
receptive’ or employing language that is ‘succinct, lucid, and convincing’ is entirely 
dependent on Cicero.  In a sense, Augustine is here asking why some would allow 
false teachers to use effective Ciceronian techniques but not Christian preachers?  The 
entire passage brings to mind the introduction to De inventione with a proto-orator set 
against false orators, both employing eloquence but the former doing so to express 
wisdom and the latter falsehood.  In effect, Augustine is arguing against those who 
would disarm Cicero’s sage, making him a man of wisdom unable to express that 
wisdom in a compelling fashion. 
 The opening passage of Book Four serves also to place eloquence in its 
rightful place.  Opposed to those who stress style over substance, Augustine makes 
clear that eloquence must be entirely in service to wisdom.  What makes eloquence 
good or bad is not a matter of stylistic flourish but whether it expresses truth or 
falsehood.  Augustine’s eloquence is, therefore, similar to that of Victorinus: it is 
directed towards compelling, gathering, and informing others so as to lead them 
towards perfection.345  Any eloquence that fails to accomplish this is of little value, 
no matter how pleasing it may be.  Eloquence is therefore entirely subordinate to 
wisdom.   
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But that does not make eloquence inconsequential.  Augustine believes that 
eloquence remains essential because it affords ‘delight’.  And that delight must be 
conveyed, either through the eloquence of the preacher or, failing that, through the 
eloquence of Scripture itself.  Augustine says of an inarticulate preacher: ‘For by his 
proofs he delights, even though he cannot delight by his bare statements’.346  Better 
still, however, is someone who wishes to ‘speak eloquently as well as wisely’ as this 
will certainly be more ‘beneficial’ for the edification of the recipient.347  It is as this 
point that Augustine first advocates imitating ‘eloquent speakers’ for learning how to 
speak sweetly, though he allows for the study of rhetoric by ‘wise speakers as well as 
eloquent ones’.348  The reason why eloquence is important for Augustine is precisely 
for the same reason that it is important for philosophical rhetors such as Victorinus: it 
facilitates the healing of souls.  Augustine explains: 
Eloquent speakers give pleasure, wise ones salvation (Quo enim eloquenter 
dicunt, suaviter, qui sapienter, salubriter audiuntur)....We often have to take 
bitter medicines, and we must always avoid sweet things that are dangerous: 
but what better than sweet things that give health, or medicines that are sweet?  
The more we are attracted by sweetness, the easier it is for medicine to do its 
healing work.  So there are men of the church who have interpreted God’s 
eloquent utterances (diuina eloquia), not only with wisdom but with 
eloquence as well...349 
Except perhaps for the reference to ‘God’s eloquent utterances’, this whole passage 
could be approved by any late antique philosophical rhetor.   What else is 
Victorinus’s version of Cicero’s ideal orator but someone whose sweet words make 
the bitter taste of medicine more palatable?  In both Cicero and Victorinus, in fact, the 
sweetness of eloquence not only attracts the multitudes but keeps them fixed on the 
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orator even when they initially are repulsed by the wisdom he offers.  This is 
precisely the role of eloquence for Augustine. 
 This becomes even clearer in Augustine’s most explicit invocation of Cicero: 
‘It has been said by a man of eloquence, and quite rightly, that the eloquent should 
speak in such a way as to instruct, delight, and move their listeners’.350  He explains 
that what is most essential is instruction as it relates directly to the wisdom 
discovered in Scripture whereas delight and persuasion are matters of style.  He 
continues,  
A hearer must be delighted so that he can be gripped and made to listen, and 
moved so that he can be impelled to action.  Your hearer is delighted if you 
speak agreeably, and moved if he values what your promise, fears what you 
threaten, hates what you condemn, embraces what you commend, and rues the 
thing which you insist he must regret, and if he rejoices in what you set forth 
in your preaching as something joyful, pities those whom by your words you 
present to his mind’s eye as miserable, and shuns those whom with terrifying 
language you urge him to avoid.351 
Perhaps what is most remarkable about this passage is how much in harmony it is 
with Cicero’s own thinking.  Just as in Cicero, the listeners are entirely passive, their 
attention devoted to the delightful speaker and their will given wholly over to his will.  
The exercise in eloquence is, of course, applied to the expression of salvific wisdom, 
but the role of the preacher remains an impressive one.  It is as though the 
combination of wise instruction, delight, and emotional appeal cast an overpowering 
spell on the audience.  Ultimately, eloquence makes the bitter medicine of wisdom 
not just sweeter but irresistible.   
 Augustine, however, qualifies his appeal to Cicero by suggesting that 
instruction or instruction and delight can be effective without an overt appeal to the 
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emotions.  If the listener is ‘persuaded’ (suadetur) or hands over his or her will to the 
expressed wisdom then the task has been accomplished.352  On the other hand, if the 
speaker instructs and delights but fails to win assent, then the listener must still be 
‘conquered’ through persuasion.  Interestingly, Augustine takes a subtly different 
approach to delight.  He argues that it is not always essential for the preacher to 
delight the listeners, which suggests that delectatio—Cicero’s second duty of an 
orator—is unimportant.  But this is not, in fact, the case.  Delight is actually essential, 
but that delight may (indeed, ought) to arise from the wisdom itself more than 
through the eloquence of the speaker: 
Nor is giving delight a matter of necessity, since when truths are being 
demonstrated by a speaker—this relates to the task of instruction—it is not the 
aim of the eloquence or the intention of the speaker that the truths or the 
eloquence should in themselves produce delight; but the truths themselves, as 
they are revealed, do produce delight by virtue of being true.353   
In this case, the role of the preacher is merely to enable the listener to become aware 
of wisdom’s delight through his exposition of that wisdom.  That wisdom itself can 
be delightful is an important insight that, as will be shown in the second part of this 
paper, goes right to the heart of Augustine’s rhetorical theology.  
 Very little of Augustine’s proposal would have been foreign to a philosophical 
rhetor within the Ciceronian tradition.  The controlling conviction in Augustine’s 
discussion of eloquence is the need to express wisdom for the well-being of the 
listeners.  As with Victorinus, the role of eloquence is to compel the attention of those 
ignorant of wisdom and to make that wisdom pleasant and desirable.  Like both 
Cicero and Victorinus, the listeners themselves are passive once eloquence has laid 
hold of their wills.  In this respect, the goal of any kind of rhetoric, however much it 
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may fail to conform to Cicero’s ideal, is a conquest of the will.  Only by 
overwhelming the will and making it both receptive and obedient to wisdom can the 
soul be directed towards God.354 
 Where Augustine diverges from Cicero and Victorinus, however, is in his 
conception of the orator himself.  Augustine writes: 
He should be in no doubt that any ability he has and however much he has 
derives more from his devotion to prayer than his dedication to oratory; and 
so, by praying for himself and for those he is about to address, he must 
become a man of prayer before becoming a man of words (orator antequam 
dictor).  As the hour of his address approaches, before he opens his thrusting 
lips he should lift his thirsting soul to God so that he may utter what he has 
drunk and pour out what has filled him....So let the person who wishes both to 
know and to teach learn everything that he needs to teach, and acquire the 
skills in speaking appropriate to a Christian orator; but nearer the time of his 
actual address let him consider that there is more suitable advice for a holy 
mind in what the Lord says: ‘Do not worry about what to say or how to say it; 
for you will be given word to speak when the time comes.  For it is not you 
who speak but the Spirit of your Father who speaks within you.  If the Holy 
Spirit speaks in those who are delivered to their persecutors for Christ’s sake, 
why should he not also speak in those who deliver Christ to their pupils?355 
Augustine plays on words here, making orator one who prays instead of one who 
speaks (dictor), to make an astonishing point about oratory.  After all that he has said 
about the importance of the preacher discovering wisdom and expressing it 
eloquently, he now states that the preacher is actually a vehicle of God’s own 
expression of wisdom and eloquence.  It is not so much the orator’s study of wisdom 
or his use of style (as important as both activities are) as the Holy Spirit’s inspiration 
that makes a preacher capable of uttering eloquent wisdom.  God provides the words 
and the expression by speaking within and through the preacher. 
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 Ultimately, this notion of an inspired preacher is where Augustine departs 
from classical rhetoric.  Although John Schaeffer argues that this amounts to 
Augustine’s replacement of the classical muse with the Holy Spirit, Augustine’s 
claim actually delves more deeply than Schaeffer indicates.356  Augustine initially 
hints at the reason when he states that truth itself can delight without any need of help 
from eloquence.  This suggests that the orator must not unnecessarily inject his own 
feeble stabs at eloquence if they distract from the more perfect delight found in truth 
itself.  Better that he prays to God so that he can reveal the truth’s own delight rather 
than make it sweeter with his own fabricated eloquence.   In the end, Augustine takes 
philosophical rhetoric farther than ever imagined by either Cicero or Victorinus: 
ultimately, perfect wisdom and eloquence are to be found not in the person of an 
orator—however wise and eloquent he may be—but in the only conceivable perfect 
orator: God himself.  To understand this point, we must now turn to Augustine’s 
theology.  
  
                                               
356
  Schaeffer, ‘The Dialectic of Orality and Literacy’, 1139. 
117 
 
4 
Participation 
 
At first glance, Augustine’s concept of participation would seem to have little 
to do with his theological use of rhetoric or with delight.  Yet, only by grasping his 
understanding of both created reality and redemption can one avoid misconstruing 
how rhetoric and delight operate within his theological framework.  Rhetoric actually 
lies at the heart of Augustine’s concept of participation and existence.  Indeed, God 
resembles nothing so much as Cicero’s ideal orator, but unlike Cicero’s orator, God 
does not speak to the other, an audience in no way connected to or dependent upon 
the speaker.  Rather, God delivers his oratory to a world whose goodness derives 
from and participates in his own divine goodness.  Indeed, that world is itself 
‘uttered’ and so its relation to God’s oratory is both more penetrating and 
determinative than anything imagined by Cicero.  God’s oratory produces and forms 
human existence, calls all people towards salvation, and establishes their eternal 
beatitude.  Conversely, the failure to heed his eloquence, to turn back towards God 
both at the moment of creation and in human redemption, results in ruin and misery.  
But conceiving of a divine oratory within a participative world does not really require 
Augustine to depart from Cicero’s rhetorical scheme.  God the Ideal Orator may 
operate within an infinitely larger theatre and the stakes of the contest may transcend 
anything Cicero ever envisioned, but these serve primarily to expand and transform 
Cicero’s scheme; wisdom and eloquence are as much a part of God’s identity as 
Cicero’s ideal orator. 
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An appreciation for how Augustine’s scheme of participatory existence and 
redemption works requires a close reading of the appropriate texts.  Studies that 
specifically address the topic of participation, however, have generally focused too 
myopically on two words: participo and deificari.357  Ever the rhetor, Augustine was 
entirely capable of explaining his thought without limiting himself to a couple of 
words.  In fact, his approach was far deeper than such a cursory examination reveals; 
what is required is a reading that takes into account both context and development.  In 
the following discussion, therefore, I will seek both to explain the role of participation 
within particular texts and to show Augustine’s development of participation in his 
later works.   
 
Participatory Existence 
One of the earliest discussions by Augustine of participatory existence comes 
in chapter four of his anti-Manichaean text, De moribus Manichaeorum (388), where 
he attempts to prove the goodness of all creation against Manichaean dualism.  He 
begins his treatise by suggesting that supreme goodness corresponds to supreme 
existence, which is immutable, incorruptible, and outside the bounds of time.  He 
reminds the reader that the very word esse signifies something that is immutable and 
self-contained—he will develop this further in later writings—and thus whatever is 
contrary to God is not so much evil as non-existent.358  This corresponds with the 
                                               
357
  For example, see Gerald Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, Journal of 
Theological Studies 37:2 (1986) 369-386; David Vincent Meconi, ‘St. Augustine’s Early 
Theory of Participation’, Augustinian Studies (1996) 81-98; David Vincent Meconi, S.J., ‘The 
Incarnation and the Role of Participation in St Augustine’s Confessions’, Augustinian Studies 
29:2 (1998) 61-75; and David Vincent Meconi, S.J., ‘Becoming Gods by Becoming God’s: 
Augustine’s Mystagogy of Identification’, Augustinian Studies 39:1 (2008) 61-74. 
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  Augustine’s first discussion of esse and non esse is found in De beata vita 2.8.  For a helpful 
discussion of that text, see Emilie Zum Brunn, Le dilemme de l'être et du néant chez Saint 
Augustin: des premiers dialogues aux ‘Confessions’, (Amsterdam : B.R. Grüner, 1984)  19-
24. 
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classic Neoplatonic spectrum with God as Supreme Being at one end and nothingness 
at the other, and a particularly effective apologetic against Manichaeism. 
What then of creation itself?  In chapter four, Augustine introduces the idea of 
participation to explain how creation both exists and depends wholly on God:  
There is one good in itself and in the highest sense, that is, by its own nature 
and essence and not by participation in some other good.  And there is another 
good that is good by participation, deriving its good from the supreme good 
which, however, continues to be itself and loses nothing.  This good, as we 
have said before, is a creature to whom harm can come through defect, but 
God is not the author of such defect, since He is the author of existence and, 
as I say, of being.359 
This concept of God as the summum bonum endowing creation with goodness 
through participation results in a paradoxical understanding of the Creator’s 
relationship with creation.  On the one hand, since only God is goodness itself (in the 
classical statement, God is what he has) he is wholly other than his creation; on the 
other hand, since creation obtains its goodness and existence through its continuous 
participation in God (who loses nothing in the bestowal) he must also be 
immanent.360  In short, creation’s goodness and existence depend on a gracious 
participation in God’s transcendent being.  And since existence depends on a fruitful 
participation in God, Augustine defines ‘hurt’ as a ‘falling away’ (defectum) from 
God.  This sets the stage for Augustine’s take on the nature of evil: it is nothing more 
than the privation of goodness, a growing distance between the creature and its 
Creator.361 
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  mor. 2.4.6 (CSEL 90.92). 
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  Meconi, ‘St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Participation’, 93. 
361
  See, for example, ord. 2.4.11 where Augustine argues that even the wicked have a place in 
God’s order, though because they have tended away from God towards nothingness they 
inhabit an inferior place in that order to those who have turned towards God.  Since God 
continues to possess them (even though they do not possess God), they continue to exist.  See 
Zum Brunn, Le dilemme de l'être, 26 for a discussion of this passage. 
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The concept of participatory existence and goodness next appears in De vera 
religione (391) where Augustine explains the content of the Catholic faith.  He begins 
with participation, this time using ‘life’ to indicate existence: ‘There is no life which 
is not of God, for God is supreme life and the fount of life’.362  This statement is 
followed by an argument very similar to that found in De moribus Manichaeorum: no 
life is evil except insofar as it ‘inclines towards death’ (vergit ad mortem).363  
Augustine argues that death is ‘wickedness’ (nequitia), which derives its name from 
nothingness (ne quiquam).364  He continues: ‘A life, therefore, which by voluntary 
defect falls away from him who made it, whose essence it enjoyed, and, contrary to 
the law of God, seeks to enjoy bodily objects which God made to be inferior to it, 
tends to nothingness’ (vergit ad nihilum).365  This is simply a rephrasing of the 
argument of De moribus Manichaeorum: existence or life or goodness comes through 
participation in God who is Supreme Being, Life, and Goodness.  Evil or wickedness 
is a falling away from God, an inclination towards nothingness.  In agreement with 
Plotinus, therefore, Augustine conceives of created existence as unstable and mutable.  
Only God is immutable.  The constant change endured by creatures can only be a 
growth towards fullness of being through a deeper participation with God or a 
collapse into oblivion by falling away from him.  
A few lines later Augustine develops his scheme by stating that creatures also 
have their form through God ‘who is the uncreated and most perfect form’.366  Both 
body and spirit are therefore good.  Corporeal bodies draw their existence and form 
by participating in the divine form (species), a thought which at this point he leaves 
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  ver. rel. 11.21 (CCL 32.200): ‘Nulla uita est, quae non sit ex deo, quia deus utique summa 
uita est et ipse fons uitae...’ 
363
  ver. rel. 11.21 (CCL 32.200). 
364
  ver. rel. 11.21 (CCL 32.200). 
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  ver. rel. 11.21 (CCL 32.200). 
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  ver. rel. 11.21 (CCL 32.200): ‘...et qui forma est infabricata, atque omnium formosissima.’ 
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unexplained except to state that every form derives from God.367   In order to 
understand what lies behind Augustine’s contention about form, one must turn to two 
chapters of his De diversis quaestionibus 83: q. 23, ‘On the Father and the Son’ and 
q. 46, ‘On the Ideas’, both written around 391.  In the first, Augustine further 
develops the argument laid out in the two earlier works by considering various 
creaturely characteristics enjoyed through participation: ‘Everything chaste is chaste 
by chastity, and everything eternal is eternal by eternity, and everything beautiful, 
beautiful by beauty, and everything good, good by goodness’.368  He continues in a 
similar vein to consider wisdom and likeness.  The underlying assumption is greatly 
coloured by Platonism with each property representing an Idea, though Augustine 
finds their source in God.369  Thus, God is himself chastity, wisdom, beauty, and 
goodness.  It is by participating in these properties that a creature can be said to be 
chaste, wise, beautiful and good.   
In q. 46 Augustine elaborates his approach to the Platonic Ideas.  While he 
admits that Plato, a pagan philosopher, was the first to employ the term ideas, he 
contends that the philosopher did not himself invent the concept as it can (in his view) 
be found among the wisdom of ‘various people’.370  Next, after displaying his 
rhetorical training by distinguishing between the literal translation of Plato’s Greek 
terms (formae or species) and the popular usage of the term ‘reasons’ (rationes),371 he 
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  ver. rel. 11.21 (CCL 32.201). 
368
  diu qu. 83 23. 
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  For a good discussion of Plato’s theory of Forms, see T. H. Irwin, ‘The Theory of Forms’, in 
Gail Fine (ed.), Plato 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999, 143-170.  Plato himself seems unclear whether or not the Forms were created by a 
Demiurge.  Although almost all of his discussions of the Forms state that they have existed 
eternally, he seems to suggest their creation by a Demiurge in the Republic.  For an 
introduction to this subject, see David Melling, Understanding Plato (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), 150-157. 
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  diu qu. 83 46.1. 
371
  diu qu. 83 46.2 (PL 40.30).  While Augustine does not himself note this, the role of Christ as 
the Word (logos) through whom creation comes into existence would naturally make the 
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defines the ‘ideas’ as ‘fixed and unchangeable… not themselves formed, and being 
thus eternal and existing always in the same state, are contained in the Divine 
Intelligence’.  All creation receives its form ‘in accord with these ideas’.  In other 
words, only by participating in the perfect Form or Idea do objects obtain form.  Such 
a definition is, of course, entirely consonant with Platonic thought.372  But Augustine 
does make a distinction.  Whereas in Plato, the Ideas are themselves eternal, 
Augustine is careful to bind the ‘reasons’ to God himself:  
As for these reasons, they must be thought to exist nowhere but in the very 
mind of the Creator.  For it would be sacrilegious to suppose that he was 
looking at something placed outside himself when he created in accord with 
what he did create.  But if these reasons of all things to be created or [already] 
created are contained in the Divine Mind, and if there can be in the Divine 
Mind nothing except what is eternal and unchangeable, and if these original 
and principal reasons are what Plato terms ideas, then not only are they ideas, 
but they are themselves true because they are eternal because they remain ever 
the same and unchangeable.  It is by participation in these that whatever is 
exists in whatever manner it does exist.373 
Thus, in q. 46 Augustine introduces a further development in his understanding of 
participatory existence: creatures derive their being (esse) by participating in God’s 
Being and their form (forma, species, or ratio) by participating in the Ideas found in 
the Divine Mind.374 
What underlies this approach to existence is Augustine’s complex conception 
of the divine act of creation.  According to Marie-Anne Vannier, Augustine explained 
the relationship between Creator and creation by reinterpreting the scheme of 
                                                                                                                                      
connection between formae and logoi more apparent than for a non-Christian Neoplatonist.  
See the next section for a discussion of Christ’s role in Augustine’s concept of participation. 
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  See, for example, Plato, Phaedo 78c10-e4. 
373
  diu qu. 83 q. 46.2. 
374
  See Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 373.  The earliest reference to both 
creatures’ creation and formation through God is ver. rel. 7.13: ‘When this Trinity is known 
as far as it can be in this life, it is perceived without the slightest doubt that every creature, 
intellectual, animal, and corporeal, derives such existence as it has from that same creative 
Trinity, has its own form, and is subject to the most perfect order’. 
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conversio-formatio found in Plotinus’ Enneads.375  Briefly, Plotinus conceived of all 
things emanating from the eternal and immutable first principle or the One.  Those 
things that emanate from the One—the Divine Intellect followed by intellect followed 
by soul followed by matter—emerge from the perfectly generous productivity of the 
One.376  The contemplative conversion of the lower towards the higher level forms 
each level of being: thus, the Divine Intellect turns towards (conversio) the One, the 
intellect towards the Divine Intellect, and so forth.  Dominic O’Meara sums this up 
succinctly: ‘As intellect exists as a contemplation of the One, and as soul exists as a 
contemplation of intellect, so is nature a contemplation of soul whose consequence, a 
kind of by-product, is the world’.377  The lowest form of this contemplative 
conversion is ‘nature’, defined as the power of the soul to organise matter.378  Matter 
itself exists on the brink of nothingness.  By this means, everything at its own level of 
existence emanates from and participates in the first principle.  
 Although Augustine retained Plotinus’ general pattern of formation by 
conversion to describe the manner in which creatures participate in God, his 
interpretation of Genesis 1-2 compelled him to introduce into that pattern the act of 
creation ex nihilo that results in a relationship between a deliberate Creator and his 
creatures.379  According to Vannier, this concept of creation-relation became 
Augustine’s substitute for the Neoplatonic idea of reintegration into the first 
principle.380  In other words, whereas within Neoplatonism, the generative ‘First 
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  Marie-Anne Vannier, ‘Creatio’, ‘Conversio’, Formatio’, chez s. Augustin, (Fribourg: Éditions 
Universitaires Fribourg Suiise, 1991), 73. 
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  Plotinus, Enneads, V.4.1; V.4.2.27-33; V.1.6.28-35.    
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  Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus, An Introduction to the Enneads, (Oxford: Oxford University 
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  O’Meara, Plotinus, 75. 
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  Vannier, ‘Creatio’, ‘Conversio’, Formatio’, 73.   
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  Vannier, ‘Creatio’, ‘Conversio’, Formatio’, 73.  Interestingly, in discussing a substitute for 
the more commonly used ‘emanation’, O’Meara, Plotinus, 61, immediately rules out the word 
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Principle’ is ignorant of that which emanates from it, the Biblical account of creation 
portrays a God intimately involved in a world he freely, deliberately and lovingly 
created.  The Christian doctrine of creation is therefore such a radical departure from 
Neoplatonism that it effectively overthrows the Neoplatonic scheme.  Augustine 
replaces this with his own scheme by which the created order emerges through a 
divine creation (creatio), conversion (conversio) and formation (formatio).  As will 
be shown, God’s utterance is integral to each stage of Augustine concept, thus 
providing the act of creation with a rhetorical character.  
 
Creatio and Formatio 
Despite the divergence between Christian and Neoplatonic notions of 
existence, Augustine conceived of creation in a manner that did not entirely part 
company with Platonism.  Instead of Plato’s pre-existent chaotic material from which 
God fashions everything or Plotinus’ Divine Intelligence (Nous) productively 
overflowing the One into self-reflective existence, Augustine interpreted Genesis as 
speaking of a two-staged creatio ex nihilo.  God begins by creating ex nihilo a great 
formless mass not unlike Plato’s initial chaotic material (hyle): the heavens and the 
earth mentioned in the first two verses of Genesis.  This notion came to Augustine 
very early; at the very beginning of his De Genesi adversus Manichaeos (388-389) he 
writes: ‘In the beginning God made heaven and earth; now the very earth which God 
made was invisible and formless’.381  While this actually states no more than do the 
first two verses of Genesis, Augustine found the idea of the formless world 
intriguing: ‘So then the first thing to be made was basic material, unsorted and 
                                                                                                                                      
‘creation’ as it would introduce ‘with it Christian ideas not relevant to Plotinus’.  In the end, 
O’Meara opts for the term ‘derivation’. Vannier also states (p. 3) that ‘creation’ is an idea 
entirely absent from Greek thought. 
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  Gn. adu. man. 1.3.5. 
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unformed, out of which all the things would be made which have been sorted out and 
formed; I think the Greeks call it chaos’.382  He describes the nature of this 
formlessness in a little more detail in De vera religione:  
‘Therefore, if the world was made out of some unformed matter (materia), the 
matter was made out of absolutely nothing.  If it was as yet unformed, still it 
was at least capable of receiving form.  By God’s goodness it is “formable”.  
Even the capacity for form is good’.383   
In his later writings, Augustine retained his conviction that creation involved a two-
staged process (conceptual stages, that is, rather than temporal).   
Although Augustine develops this line of thought only slightly in De Genesi 
ad litteram, imperfectus liber, 384 he devotes much of Book 12 of the Confessiones to 
expounding his ‘provisional understanding’385 of creation and the nature of ordered 
reality.  In 12.2.2, one again encounters Augustine’s conviction that God began the 
work of creation by fashioning a formless material from which to make heaven and 
earth. 386  Next, he recounts his difficult struggle with the idea of formlessness, 
admitting that he could not picture what a ‘nothing something’ could be like.387  But 
he does know that the formless material must have had the capacity to receive form, 
and that since this capacity could not be self-generative, it had to have come from 
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God.  Since God is the source of formatio, proximity to him determines the form and 
beauty of the creature: ‘Out of nothing you made heaven and earth, two entities, one 
close to you, the other close to being nothing; the one to which only you are superior, 
the other to which what is inferior is nothingness’.388 
Augustine is clear however that this initial, formless material appeared 
through God’s utterance.  He expresses this idea most clearly in Confessiones 11 
where he discusses how the eternal Word is spoken by God.  At once he discounts 
that God’s voice in the creation account could be same as it was at Jesus’ 
Transfiguration, for there ‘the syllables sounded and have passed away, the second 
after the first, the third after the second, and so on in order until, after all the others, 
the last one came, and after that the last silence followed’.389    God’s Word must be 
eternal and unchanging.  Drawing on John 1.1., he concludes: ‘The word is spoken 
eternally, and by it all things are uttered eternally.  It is not the case that what was 
being said comes to an end, and something else is then said, so that everything is 
uttered in a succession with a conclusion, but everything is said in the simultaneity of 
eternity’.390  And so, all of creation is spoken eternally by God as Augustine makes 
clear: ‘You do not cause it to exist other than by speaking’.391  That which is uttered, 
exists contingently by participating in God’s own eternal utterance: the Word.  The 
Word also determines both the beginning and the end of a creature.  Augustine is 
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forced to this conclusion by the logic of conceiving of an unchanging and eternal 
Word uttering that which is changeable and mortal.  He writes: ‘...everything which 
begins to be and ceases to be begins and ends its existence at that moment when, in 
the eternal reason where nothing begins or ends, it is known that it is right for it to 
begin and end.  The reason is your Word...’392   
 In all the above accounts Augustine presents a developed vision of created 
existence beginning with God’s creation of a formless material out of which heaven 
and earth and all that each contains were formed.  Since even the formless material 
was good, Augustine suggests that it necessarily contained the capacity for form, and 
by Confessiones 12, he has articulated that the source for the formatio must be the 
Trinity.  Yet, as Vannier contends, he seems not to have mastered the mechanics of 
precisely how formed existence emerged from the formless primordial material.393  
Drawing again from the Divine fiat in the Genesis account, here and there he uses the 
verb ‘call’ (vocatus) to describe this later formation.394  But the creaturely response—
the conversio—is only implied; it explicitly emerges in Augustine’s thought in his 
final commentary on Genesis: De Genesi ad litteram. 
For the moment, however, one should simply note that a vision of creation as 
uttered cannot but add deeper dimension to Augustine’s rhetorical theology.  If one 
conceives of redemption in terms of a rhetorical contest between God and the devil, 
then the idea that those whose souls are being contested are themselves the embodied 
utterance of the eternal Word means that the outcome of the contest will decide the 
life, felicity, and very nature of those souls.  To respond to God’s oratory is to move 
towards a deeper participation in him and a fuller life because that same voice has 
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determined humankind’s own existence.  Another way to look at this is as God’s 
uttered creatures tending, as words do, towards nothingness.  For those words to 
abide, they must be called from their inclination towards nothingness back towards 
God himself.  And it is this very logic that leads Augustine to conceive of not just a 
redemptive recalling (which we will examine shortly) but also an initial calling back 
from the verge of oblivion that is part of the creative act itself: conversio. 
 
Conversio 
 In Plotinus’s scheme of emanation each level of being is actualised when it 
turns back (conversio) towards the One, or more immediately the next higher being, 
and in that contemplation achieves self-realisation.  This is the manner in which each 
level of existence participates, literally partakes of, the higher, and such participation 
is necessary for the lower order’s existence.  Although Augustine began with creatio 
ex nihilo, an idea utterly foreign to Plotinus, he was committed to realising that 
Biblical notion within a wider Neoplatonic framework.  The missing link in his 
thought is conversio, the contemplative turn that results in formation. 
 Even in Augustine’s earliest commentaries on Genesis the elements are all 
present.  Although he begins with creation, the end result is formation out of 
formlessness and the cause for this is the fiat lux or God’s creative call.  In fact, it is 
strange that, except for in Conf. 13.3.4, Augustine never explicitly states that formatio 
resulted from the formless material’s response to God’s call and return to him.  Yet, 
in Confessiones 13 the scheme appears fully developed, suggesting that by that time 
Augustine had thought through the ramifications of his approach to creatio ex nihilo 
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and formatio. 395  In fact, Augustine’s language is deeply informed by Plotinus: ‘But 
just as it [formless creation] had no claim on you to be the sort of life which could be 
illuminated, so also now that it existed, it had no claim to receive light.  Its 
formlessness could not be pleasing (placeret) to you unless it were made light not by 
merely existing but by contemplating the source of light and adhering (cohaerendo) 
to it’. 396   In order for this reflective and quickening contemplation to occur, creation 
has to be turned back to a changeless God.  The word Augustine uses to describe this 
process is conversa. 
 Conversio comes almost immediately in De Genesi ad litteram: ‘it is by so 
turning (conversione), you see, that it [the formless material] is formed and perfected, 
while if it does not so turn it is formless, deformed…’397  The logic behind this is 
coloured by Neoplatonism insofar as Augustine seems to imagine creation, although 
created out of nothing, afterwards emanating from God towards nothingness.  Unless 
‘incomplete’ and ‘imperfect’ creation (the original formless material) had been called 
back and turned towards God, it would have continued on its trajectory towards 
nothingness.  This is clearly what lies behind Augustine’s statement about the basic 
material that was ‘tending by its very want of form toward nothing’.398  Why is this?  
Augustine explains: 
Rather, it is when it turns, everything in the way suited to its kind, to that 
which truly and always is, to the creator that is to say of its own being, that it 
really imitates the form of the Word which always and unchangingly adheres 
to the Father, and receives its own form, and becomes a perfect, complete 
creature.  Accordingly, where scripture states, God said, Let it be made, we 
should understand an incorporeal utterance in the substance of his co-eternal 
Word, calling back to himself the imperfection of the creation, so that it 
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should not be formless, but should be formed, each element on the particular 
lines which follow in due order.399 
The role of the Word here is integral to the whole scheme and, as will be shown, 
securely links participatory existence to participatory redemption.  Augustine 
explains the Word’s role fully at the end of this section: the Word is himself ‘the 
beginning’ in which heaven and earth were created.  He is the Form by and through 
whom all else achieves form.  This formation is accomplished by imitating the Word, 
‘the form which adheres eternally and unchangingly to the Father…’400  Thus, 
conversion becomes imitation.401  Creation as the changeable and temporal utterance 
of God echoes away into silence unless it becomes as the eternal Word himself; it is 
by an imitative participation in the Word that uttered creation is formed and abides. 
This final point provides a context to a passage in Gn. litt. imp.16.57-59, 
where Augustine addresses why the terms ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ are used in Genesis.  
In Gn.  adv. man., he had discussed only humanity’s creation in the image of God.402  
But here we discover an argument very much like that found in q. 23 of De diversis 
quaestionibus 83, one in which the language of participation finally makes its debut 
in his commentaries on Genesis.  To answer the question about ‘image’ and ‘likeness’ 
in De gn. litt. imp., Augustine appears to draw directly from q. 23, even beginning, as 
there, with the idea of chastity:  ‘Now chastity is chaste without being so by 
participation in something, while it is by participation in her [chastity] that any chaste 
                                               
399
  Gn. litt. 1.4.9. 
400
  Gn. litt. 1.4.9. 
401
  See Vannier, ‘Creatio’, ‘Conversio’, Formatio’, 74.  See also Rowan Williams, ‘”Good for 
Nothing”: Augustine on Creation’, Augustinian Studies 25 (1994) 9-24 on the ramifications of 
Augustine’s approach to creation.  In particular, he points out that creation and formation are 
due to their participation in God’s life rather than obedience to arbitrary rules.   
402
  Gn. adu. man. 1.23.40. See below for a discussion of the role of the imago Dei within 
Augustine’s discussion of humanity’s participation in God. 
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things are chaste’.403  He then demonstrates that this truism obtains for other 
characteristics such as wisdom and beauty.  Only God is each of these in himself 
while everything else enjoys each virtue by its participation in him.  Obviously, the 
assumption that lies behind this argument is the same as the one we saw in De 
moribus Manichaeorum: each trait within the world—chastity, wisdom, and beauty—
only enjoys a participatory existence, deriving its manifestation from its ideal (ratio) 
within the mind of God.    
 This argument permits Augustine to show how the entire universe shares in 
the divine likeness.  He begins by exclaiming, ‘How far…the likeness of God, 
through whom all things were made, extends to the imposing of specific form on 
things, is indeed something that soars astronomically beyond human thought…’404  
But he posits that the shared likeness of various objects and species of existence must 
reveal a higher ideal that provides that likeness: ‘…if the universe consists of things 
that are like another among themselves, in order that each may be whatever it is, and 
all of them together may complete the universe, which God both established and 
governs, it is assuredly through the over-arching and unchangeable and undefilable 
likeness of the one who created all things, that they were made such to be beautiful 
with their mutually similar parts…’405  Reading Conf. 13.3.4 and Gn. litt. imp. 16.57-
59 in light of each other reveals how Augustine’s scheme works: contingent beings 
participate in the Being of God by heeding his call and by turning towards him 
through their imitation of the form of the Word, each in the way most appropriate for 
                                               
403
  Gn. litt. imp. 16.57. 
404
  Gn. litt. imp. 16.59.  
405
  Gn. litt. imp. 16.59. Missing in Gn. litt. imp., however, is any direct mention of the Word as in 
Gn. litt.  This is strange as the obvious inspiration for this passage, diu qu. 83 23 (entitled, it 
may be recalled, ‘On the Father and the Son’) clearly states that everything that participates in 
God achieves its form through Christ, the perfect form.   
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its kind.  All three actions—creatio, conversio, and formatio—occur simultaneously 
with the creation of time itself.406   
In a sense, Augustine’s scheme is a metaphysical adaption of Cicero’s De 
inventione.  There, as has already been discussed, Cicero presents a scattered 
(dispersos) mass of humanity living like beasts without a ratio until a wise orator 
compels and gathers them together (compulit...et congregavit) and forms them into a 
civilisation.407  Likewise, Augustine presents a formless creation unable to achieve 
form on its own until it is called back by God’s utterance, the eternal Word, who 
shapes it into a formed creation.  In both cases, although the capacity is there in the 
subject, form itself cannot be achieved except through the intervention of speech.  In 
the hands of Augustine, Cicero’s myth of the proto-orator’s persuasion of human 
chaos towards the formation of civilisation has become the Word’s conversion of 
chaos itself into formed existence.  This is not to suggest that Augustine had De 
inventione explicitly in mind, but only to recognise the parallel, governing logic: in 
both, speech is generative.  Cicero makes wise eloquence the basis for civilisation; 
Augustine makes the Word, who is also Wisdom, the basis for formed existence. 
 
Permaneo 
The only difficulty with the now familiar pattern of creatio-conversio-
formatio as discussed by scholars such as Vannier or Zum Brunn is that it stops short 
of Augustine’s full scheme.  Augustine is so convinced that everything mutable falls 
                                               
406
  Gn. adu. man., 1.3.2; conf. 12.12.15; Gn. litt.., 1.15.29-30, 5.5.12.  See also Gerhart B. 
Ladner, ‘St. Augustine’s Conception of the Reformation of Man to the Image of God,’ in 
Augustinus Magister (1954) vol. 2, 871-872.  Ladner makes the additional important point 
that creatio ex nihilo means that in Augustine formatio cannot be reformatio (as in Plotinus).  
Vannier, ‘Creatio’, ‘Conversio’, Formatio’, 73 agrees with this point.  In a sense, Augustine’s 
insistence that creatio, conversio, formatio occurs simultaneously with the inception of time 
means that the entire scheme is only conceptual and theoretical.  This is one of the reasons 
why later, medieval theologians rejected the whole notion of formless or ‘potential’ existence. 
407
  Cicero, De inv. 1.2 (LCL 4, 6). 
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away into nothingness that he cannot conceive of a contingent existence that is not 
continually supported by God.  Thus, as important as the creatio-conversio-formatio 
scheme is, it amounts to little unless formed creation is also sustained in its formed 
esse.  Formatio requires more than a merely formative conversio; it needs something 
to maintain that conversio permanently.  It is here that Augustine finds a role within 
participatory existence for the Holy Spirit. 
Augustine’s approach to the Holy Spirit’s role vis-à-vis participatory existence 
is complex.  He includes the Holy Spirit in various ways that can at first seem 
muddled and poorly conceived.  Thus, one finds Augustine speaking of the Holy 
Spirit as the true pattern for formatio (like the Word), as the one primarily involved in 
conversio, as the one who sustains formatio and conversio, and even as one who 
incubates creation as a bird does her eggs.  What connects each of these roles, 
however, is Augustine’s identification of the Holy Spirit with love; each role is 
fundamentally an expression of love, even of a kind of maternal love.   
At first Augustine discusses the Holy Spirit’s role in the act of creation only in 
terms of formatio.  Drawing from Gen. 1.2b, Augustine explains the enigmatic 
reference to the Spirit being borne over the water by employing the analogy of a 
craftsman—an analogy borrowed from Plato that recurs in his writings408—working 
and shaping an unformed material.  In this case, Augustine interprets the Spirit as 
God’s Spirit and the water as the ‘workable material’.409  He writes:  
Again we must beware of supposing that the Spirit of God was being borne 
over the basic material as though covering a spatial distance, but rather as 
exercising a skill in making and fashioning things, in the way that the 
intention (voluntas) of a craftsman is ‘borne over’ the wood or whatever it is 
                                               
408
  See, for example, Plato, Timaeus 27c-34a. 
409
  At this point, Augustine shows some reluctance to identify the ‘Spirit’ of Gn. 1.2b with the 
Holy Spirit.  By the composition of conf. 13, however, he has put all such concern behind 
him. 
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he is working on, of even over the parts of his body, which he applies to the 
work….This however is said if ‘the spirit of God’ in this place is taken to be 
the Holy Spirit, whom we venerate in the inexpressible and unchangeable 
Trinity.410 
Clearly then, Augustine articulates a role for the Holy Spirit within the scheme of 
creatio-conversio-formatio.  But in this passage, the role of the Holy Spirit differs 
little from that of the Word.  While the Word provides the immutable forma by which 
creation obtains its own form, the Holy Spirit provides the ‘intention’ (voluntas) for 
that formation.   
Returning to the same passage in De Genesi ad litteram, Augustine pursues a 
more evocative approach by comparing the Holy Spirit’s formative role in relation to 
a mother bird:  
For what is said here in the Greek and Latin versions about the Spirit of God, 
that it was being borne over the water, according to the Syriac which is a 
language closely related to Hebrew…is reported to mean not was being borne 
over but was brooding (fovebat) over the water in the way birds brood over 
their eggs, where that warmth of the mother’s body in some way also supports 
(adminiculator) the forming of the chicks through a kind of influence of her 
own kind of love.411   
Here, the Holy Spirit is the incubator in which existence achieves form rather than the 
‘intention’ for that form.   His is a supporting role now, providing through his ‘own 
kind of love’ the warmth and support for formation.  As will be shown, the image of 
the Holy Spirit as providing a warm, supportive love is one that Augustine 
increasingly favours. 
The idea of the Holy Spirit as involved in the support or sustaining of 
contingent existence is one that caught Augustine’s fancy early.  In De vera religione, 
                                               
410
  Gen. litt. imp. 4.16 (CSEL 28.1.469). 
411
  Gn. litt. 1.18.36 (CSEL 28.1.26-27). See chapter two of Robert J. O’Connell, Soundings in St 
Augustine’s Imagination, (New York: Fordham University Press, 1994) for an imaginative 
discussion of the term ‘foveo’ as it appears in this passage and elsewhere. 
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he writes: ‘God, the immutable Trinity, made them through his supreme wisdom and 
preserves (conservat) them by his supreme loving-kindness (benignitate).’412 Though 
not nearly as suggestive as that of a mother bird, the presentation of the Holy Spirit as 
preserving creation in his capacity as divine ‘courtesy’ or ‘loving-kindness’ 
(benignitate) accords well with that image.  In both, Augustine speaks of the Holy 
Spirit’s involvement in preserving and ties this to love.  A similar division of labour 
among the persons of the Trinity appears in De fide et symbolo 9.19: ‘Hence those 
who read with close attention seem to recognise the Trinity in the passage where it is 
written: “Of him and through him and in him are all things”.  “Of him” points to him 
who owes existence to none; “through him” points to the Mediator; and “in him” 
points to him who contains all things and binds them together (qui continet, id est, 
copulatione conjungit)’.413  This passage clarifies how Augustine imagines the Holy 
Spirit sustaining existence: namely, by containing and joining all things together.  Is it 
any wonder that the image of a mother bird should later spring to mind? 
We find further development along these lines in De Genesi ad litteram.  
Returning again to the image of the Spirit being borne over the water, Augustine 
writes: 
In either case, to be sure, the Spirit of God was being borne over it, because 
whichever it was that he had initiated, ready to be formed and perfected, it 
was subject to the good will of the creator.  That means that when God said in 
his Word, Let light be made, and so on, what was made would abide in his 
good will, that is, would meet with his approval according to the measure of 
its kind.414 
                                               
412
  ver. rel. 18.35 (CCL 32.208). 
413
  fid. et sym. 9.19 (CSEL 41.25). The use of the term copulatione is an interesting one.  As will 
be discussed later, Augustine’s pneumatology may have been influenced by Marius 
Victorinus who refers to the Holy Spirit as the copula of the Father and the Son.  See Lewis 
Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 371. 
414
  Gn. litt. 1.5.11. 
136 
 
The Holy Spirit enables contingent existence to abide in God’s good will, which is 
necessary for continued existence.  Formatio becomes an on-going process rather 
than merely a single moment.   
Finally, in De Trinitate Augustine grounds the maintenance of contingent 
existence in the life of the Trinity itself in a way that takes us far in the direction of 
delight.  There, he refers to the Holy Spirit as ‘the sweetness (suavitas) of begetter 
and begotten pervading all creatures according to their capacity with its vast 
generosity and fruitfulness, that they might all keep their right order and rest in their 
right places’.415  The Holy Spirit is here portrayed as the ‘sweetness’ of the Father 
and the Son, and it is this shared love between Father and Son that pervades and 
sustains creation.  The Holy Spirit thus upholds and provides order to creation by 
bringing it into a relationship within the Trinity.  Participatio is grounded in 
communio.  We will see later how Augustine develops this idea within his approach 
to both participatory redemption and delight. 
Before we turn our attention to participatory redemption, however, we must 
examine one last role for the Holy Spirit in creation.  In Conf. 13.4.5, Augustine 
argues that creation is a free and generous act of God by discussing the role of the 
Holy Spirit in Gn. 1.2b.: 
But your incorruptible and immutable will, sufficient to itself and in itself, 
was ‘borne above’ the life which you had made, a life for which to live is not 
the same as living in perfect happiness, because even while in a fluid state in 
darkness it had life.  It remains for it to be converted to him by which it was 
made, more and more to live by the fount of life, to see light in his light, and 
to become perfect, radiant with light, and in complete happiness. 
Here Augustine finds a role for the Holy Spirit at the moment of conversio, when the 
‘fluid state in darkness’ is turned towards the path of bliss, which he equates with a 
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  trin. 6.11 (CCL 50.241). 
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fullness of life.  He reiterates this a few chapters later when he writes, ‘Happy is the 
created realm which has known nothing other than bliss.  Yet the story would have 
been different unless, by your gift which is “borne above” all that is mutable, 
immediately upon its creation was elevated with no interval of time by that call ‘Let 
there be light,’ and it became light’.416  Both passages suggest that Augustine 
conceived of conversio itself as linked closely to the Holy Spirit, and his connection 
of conversio here to a movement towards bliss perhaps explains why.  Ultimately, the 
Holy Spirit as the ‘sweetness’ of the union of Father and Son calls out to creation to 
turn back towards God and experience blissful formatio. 
The scheme of creatio-conversio-formatio-permaneo provides the framework 
and rationale for Augustine’s conception of contingent existence.  Such existence 
only endures insofar as it participates in God’s own Being.  Creatures are, therefore, 
absolutely unable to stand on their own two feet and relate as an ‘other’ to their 
Creator.  Instead, all of creation is ‘of him and through him and in him’,417 and 
therefore created, formed, and sustained by and through and in God.  The contingent 
nature of creation explains the need for participatory existence since just as the 
individual derives existence from God so too does every good and virtuous quality 
and act.  For example, as we have seen, Augustine holds that humans are only chaste 
insofar as they participate in chastity, wise insofar as they participate in wisdom, and 
beautiful insofar as they participate in beauty.  There is, as it were, no other place 
from which these goods may come.  They are of God and can be grasped only in and 
through God.  In the end, God is both the source and the pattern of all that exists. 
Augustine’s conviction that humankind depends absolutely on God is often 
not sufficiently appreciated by those who wish to distinguish between an old and a 
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  fid. et sym. 9.19. 
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new Augustine.  For example, in his influential book, The Development of 
Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace, J. Partout Burns argues that the early 
Augustine retained in his thought a strong view of ‘human autonomy’, only slowly 
yielding to a more pessimistic view of human dependence of God later in life (in 
418).418  But as we have seen, all indications are that Augustine would have found the 
phrase ‘human autonomy’ absurd.  How can that which derives everything from God, 
brought about through the scheme of creatio-conversio-formatio-permaneo through 
participation in God, ever be autonomous?  Does not the term ‘autonomy’ assume a 
clear and modern disconnect between God and humanity, as though humanity could 
stand independently from God?  As has been demonstrated, from his earliest 
discussion of human existence Augustine gives no indication that such a suggestion 
ever occurred to him.  Neither his reading of Scripture nor his Neoplatonic 
presuppositions would have led him to such a view.  To the contrary, his only word 
for ‘human autonomy’ is an entirely negative one—superbia—and for Augustine it is 
not the source of human freedom but of bondage to nequitia.  Certainly Augustine 
struggled to articulate the full dimension of human dependence of God in relation to 
salvation (as will be shown), but ultimately that struggle was not about reconciling a 
supposed autonomy and dependence but the paradox of liberty and contingency.  To 
put it another way, Augustine strove to answer the question: how can humanity, 
whose existence is entirely contingent, enjoy freedom?  As will be shown, his answer 
to that question is a simple one: delight. 
 
                                               
418
  J. Partout Burns, The Development of Augustine’s Doctrine of Operative Grace (Paris: Études 
Augustiniennes, 1980), 18-22.  See Carol Harrison (2006), 273-276 for a good critique of 
Burns’ thesis. 
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Participatory Redemption 
Before we begin to examine how Augustine’s concept of participatory 
redemption developed, we should first recognise two important implications of his 
approach to participatory existence.  First, his discussion, which we encountered in 
De vera religione, of the etymological relationship between wickedness (nequitia) 
and nothingness (ne quiquam) provides a moral element to his wider discussion of 
participation. 419  For human beings (and angels for that matter), a descent towards 
nothingness is synonymous with a descent into wickedness.  Since a creature’s being 
and goodness derives from God, the decline of one means the decline of the other.  
This shows that from the start Augustine recognised that human beings, as rational 
and moral agents, participate in God in a way different from non-rational creation.  
As will be shown, his development of this point provided the rich soil from which to 
cultivate his approach to salvation.  Second, his placement of the Word at the centre 
of formatio as the perfect and eternal image and likeness of the Father provides a 
vehicle whereby reformatio may also be achieved.  That creation received its initial 
form through imitation of the Word suggested to Augustine that some form of 
participation or imitation must be involved in human redemption.  In the former he 
uses the images of a formless earth and an abyss to retain Plato’s initial material 
emanation, in the latter he discovered that Plotinus’ reintegration could be realised in 
a Christian reformatio.420  In short, Augustine believed that human redemption must 
involve a moral participation (beyond an existential one) and formation in the Word.  
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  This is actually a repeat of his assertion in b.vita 2.8.  See Zum Brunn, Le dilemme de l'être, 
21-22 for a discussion of this point. 
420
  Vannier, ‘Creatio’, ‘Conversio’, Formatio’, 75 discusses the connection between formatio 
and the renewal of the human image.  According to her, Augustine’s preferred words for this 
reformation are renovare, reformare, and efficere.  Vannier does not note, however, the 
similarities between Augustine’s reformative participation and Plotinus’s reintegration into 
the One. 
140 
 
With this underlying conviction in mind, let us now turn to the texts to see how 
Augustine’s thought matured. 
 
Earliest Texts 
 Near the end of the leisurely conversation Augustine shares with friends and 
family in De beata vita, he dwells on the idea of divine wisdom.421  Earlier, he had 
betrayed his Ciceronian influences by asking his friends the rhetorical question, ‘”Do 
you not concede that the souls of wise men are far richer and greater, in their way, 
than the souls of the uneducated?”’  Not only do the others find this an obvious 
statement, but they go even further in condemning the uneducated as possessing souls 
‘full of faults and worthlessness’.422  Such high-flown convictions are readily 
understood within the Neoplatonic spectrum of existence.  If by the contemplation of 
the higher and ultimately of the first principle one moves away from nothingness 
towards reintegration with the One, then it follows that those people such as 
Augustine and his friends who seek wisdom will become better than those who do 
not.   
 Augustine explains this paradigm after his son proposes that happiness can 
only be enjoyed by devoting one’s life to divine wisdom.  He proposes a fundamental 
choice: either the soul beholds and devotes itself to wisdom or it is ‘seduced to the 
treachery of images, weighed down in whose embrace it generally deserts God and 
finds a pernicious end…'423  The reason for wisdom’s exalted role is that it really is 
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  b. vita 5.34. 
422
  b. vita 2.8.  This is reminiscent not only of Cicero but also of one of the last great Roman, 
pagan orators, Symmachus, who described his peers and himself as ‘the better part of 
humankind’.  See Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 66-72.  For a wider discussion of the late 
imperial senatorial class, see Peter Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, 15-22.  De beata 
vita shows how easily Christianity could be moulded to the assumptions of late antique 
aristocratic life. 
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  b. vita 5.33. 
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the ‘wisdom of God’, which, according to Scripture, is none other than the Son of 
God.  Thus, to possess wisdom is to be indwelt by God, who is the only reliable 
source of happiness.424  As Zum Brunn points out, ‘la participation de l’âme à Dieu 
est une participation béatifiante parce qu’elle est rassasiante “fruitive”’.425 This 
effectively provides a context for his description of the connection between 
wickedness and nothingness.  By becoming enamoured with that which is not God, 
one sinks towards a ‘pernicious end’, somewhere on the brink of nothingness. 
 Thus far, however, there is little with which a Neoplatonist would disagree.  
Plotinus’s fundamental landscape—the lower participating in the higher—is left 
intact.  There also seems to be no definition of sin or wickedness beyond a fixation on 
the temporal.  Sin remains only a sort of blindness or error that can be corrected by 
the pursuit of wisdom, best performed in an environment similar to the setting for De 
beata vita: the scholarly leisure (otium) of aristocratic life.426   
 This feature may explain Augustine’s use of the term ‘deificari’ in his ep. 10, 
written around 391.  In providing for his friend Nebridius an excuse for not visiting, 
Augustine writes: 
…for in leisure both of them would be permitted to become godlike (deificari 
enim utrisque in otio licebat).  Or, if this is not true, I am, if not the most 
stupid, certain the laziest of all men, for I cannot taste and love the pure good 
unless I enjoy a certain carefree repose.  Believe me, there is a need of a great 
withdrawal from the tumult of perishing things in order to produce in a human 
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  b. vita 5.34. 
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  Zum Brunn, Le dilemme de l'être, 23-24.  Zum Brunn (p. 19-20) argues that Augustine uses 
the language of fruition in b. vita to convey the idea of participatory redemption over and 
above participatory existence or, to use her term, participation sui generis. Thus, while all 
creatures in a sense possess God, not all creatures are fruitfully possessed by God.  The latter 
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  Dennis E. Trout ‘Augustine at Cassiciacum: Otium Honestum and the Social Dimensions of 
Conversion’, Vigiliae Christinae 42:2 (1988) 132-146.  This seems to be how Augustine 
imagined the paradisiacal life of Adam.  Again betraying his background, he portrays Adam 
as the sort of gentleman farmer who would not have been unfamiliar to the likes of Thomas 
Jefferson (Gn. litt. 8.8.15).  See also Carol Harrison, ‘Augustine and the Art of Gardening’ in 
R.N. Swanson (ed.) The Use and Abuse of Time in Christian History, (Bury St. Edmunds: 
Boydell and Brewer, 2002), 37: 13-33. 
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being a freedom from fear that is not due to insensitivity, boldness, the desire 
for vainglory, or superstitious credulity.  This also produces that solid joy that 
is absolutely not to be compared with any delight in the smallest degree.427 
This passage is much discussed by those attempting to come to terms with 
Augustine’s idea of deification in relation to the Eastern concept of theosis.428  For 
our purposes, it is sufficient simply to mention that the letter squares neatly with the 
viewpoint Augustine expresses in De Beata vita.  Deification, which seems at this 
point to be simply a term used to describe the ‘fruitful’ advancement towards God, is 
achieved through the pursuit of ‘what is really good’ (i.e., God) in the comfort of 
leisurely withdrawal.  Other than the identification of wisdom with God, Augustine 
expresses little here that he would not have found in Cicero’s Hortensius. 
 Thus, passages such as these tempt one to conclude that early Augustine 
understood unaided humankind as entirely capable of ascending towards God and 
away from nothingness.  If it is by a willing devotion to wisdom that God enters the 
soul (as in De beata vita), then is there really any need for the Incarnation or for 
grace?  Beginning with Peter Brown, scholars have been tempted to view and even to 
lament Augustine’s extended letter to his friend Simplicianus as a watershed moment 
when he realised, within the context of the story of Jacob and Esau, the need to be 
overwhelmed by grace in order to be saved.429 
 This temptation needs to be resisted.  Although not always well articulated, 
Augustine’s approach to the Incarnation and grace are fundamental to understanding 
his approach to participation even in his earlier works.  As Carol Harrison argues in 
her book, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, the role of grace is present, both 
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  ep.10.2 (PL 33.74). 
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  For example, see Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 372 and Père Georges 
Folliet, ‘Deificare in otio. Augustin, Epistula 10.2’ Recherches Augustiniennes 2 (1962) 225-
236.  Folliet highlights the Neoplatonic underpinning to this phrase. 
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  Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 146-157. 
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implicitly and explicitly, from the very beginning of Augustine’s theological 
musings.430  One way in which he articulates the idea of grace is with the word 
admonitio.  In rhetoric, admonitio describes an oratorical reminder.   For example, in 
De oratore, Cicero includes admonitio among those vital duties of an orator (along 
with exhortation, consolation, and moral instruction) that the hackneyed rhetorical 
handbooks ‘pass over in silence’.431  Unfortunately, Cicero does little better himself.  
But by examining how he employs admonitio in De oratore, one can see the 
rhetorical purpose of an admonition.  For example, in the midst of addressing the 
topic of inventio, Cicero’s interlocutor Antonius is about to discuss the role of ethos 
and pathos in persuasion when another interlocutor, Catulus, interrupts him with a 
question about the best order of arrangement.  Antonius responds, ‘Look how much 
of a god I am at that sort of thing...I swear, if it hadn’t been for your reminder 
(admonito), that thought wouldn’t have crossed my mind’.432  Later, Cicero calls 
admonitio ‘a gentler reproach’, which is among the ‘cures’ an orator can use to regain 
an audience’s attention.433  Admonition therefore serves the purpose of drawing 
someone’s attention, through a reminder or a gentle reproach, to what would 
otherwise be neglected. 
Similarly, Augustine uses admonitio to describe the ‘nudging’ God provides 
to divert the human gaze away from the temporal towards the eternal, from 
nothingness towards God.434  Thus, even in a work as early as De beata vita, 
Augustine writes, ‘A certain admonition (admonitio), flowing from the very fountain 
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  Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006) 242-244.  See also Carol Harrison, ‘”The Most Intimate Feeling of My Mind”: The 
Permanence of Grace in Augustine’s Early Theological Practice’, Augustinian Studies 36:1 
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  Cicero, De orat. 2.64. 
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  Cicero, De orat. 2.180 (LCL 326). 
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  Cicero, De orat. 2.339 (LCL 454): ‘ ...admonitio quasi lenior obiurgatio’. 
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  Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 56. 
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of truth urges us to remember God, to seek Him, and thirst after him tirelessly’.435  
This statement immediately follows the section, discussed earlier, in which he equates 
a devotion to wisdom with the entry of God into the soul.  Plainly, that entry depends 
on the Holy Spirit’s admonition.  The initiating activity of God is made even clearer 
in his Soliloquies when, in a section redolent with the participative language of being 
and non-being, he prays to God, ‘…whom no man seeks unless he has been 
admonished…’436  These and similar passages actually conform remarkably well with 
the scheme of creatio-conversio-formatio.  Just as God’s call (vocatus) caused 
formless creation to turn towards him and be formed, so God’s call causes fallen 
humanity to turn towards him and be reformed.   For example, in his De diversis 
quaestionibus 83, Augustine argues that ‘no one can will unless urged on (admonitus) 
and called (vocatus), whether inside where no man sees, or outside through the sound 
of the spoken word or through some visible signs, it follows that God produces in us 
even the willing itself’.437   
 Thus, the turn towards God is (again not unlike Cicero’s proto-orator) in 
response to his urgent call just as the initial formation of heaven and earth was a 
response by the formless material to God’s call.438  Both formatio and reformatio are 
responses to God’s vocatus.  Also, it is noteworthy that the Scriptural passage (Phil. 
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2.13) from which Augustine draws his thought and language comes immediately after 
the hymn in praise of Jesus’ kenosis (Phil. 2.4-8) and is dependent on the example 
established by Christ’s willingness to become incarnate and suffer death upon the 
cross.  Both the Incarnation and the crucifixion, therefore, appear to have been 
uppermost in Augustine’s mind at the time. 
 In fact, Augustine seems to have been most forcefully struck by the divine 
humility revealed by the Incarnation.  His first true consideration of the Incarnation, 
found in De ordine 2.5.16, dwells particularly on the humility demonstrated by the 
Incarnation in contrast to the pride of the philosophers: ‘…indeed, though it be that so 
great a God has for our sake deigned (dignatus est) to take up and dwell in this body 
of our own kind, yet, the more lowly (vilius) it appears, so much more is it replete 
with clemency and the farther and wider remote from a certain characteristic pride of 
ingenious men’.439  We encounter this theme again in 2.24.37 of De moribus 
Manichaeorum where, in the midst of arguing that the Incarnation does not require a 
change on the part of God, Augustine underscores the humble nature of Christ’s self-
emptying, again drawing upon Philippians.  Similarly, in De libero arbitrio, he 
contrasts the pride of the fallen angels with the humility of the Son, which showed to 
us the ‘door of humility’ by which we can approach God.440  Finally, from De 
diversis quaestionibus 83 (q. 71), Augustine draws upon Christ’s humility (this time 
quoting Phil. 2.4-8 in its entirety) to argue that we should, ‘in imitation of him, 
willingly bear one another’s burdens.’441 
 In all these passages, what appears essential to Augustine is the capacity of 
the Incarnation to overcome human pride.  Just as creatures obtain their form by 
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imitating the form of the Word so too are proud humans converted away from 
wickedness towards righteousness by imitating his humility.442  While one cannot but 
note how forcefully the exemplary nature of the Incarnation struck Augustine, one 
must also question whether this represents the full extent, at this time, of Augustine’s 
soteriology.  Was the young Augustine a proto-Abelard, viewing Christ’s actions as 
primarily exemplary in nature? 
 If this can be established, what would it mean in terms of this paper?  As has 
been demonstrated in part one, Augustine understood all existence to be a 
participation in God’s Goodness and Being.  It has also been shown that he believed 
that creation tends towards nothingness—either in its prototypical formlessness or 
subsequently through wickedness—unless it is called back towards God.  Within this 
scheme, it is possible to understand Augustine’s initial approach to the Incarnation as 
one in which Christ becomes the supreme admonition.  By becoming human, Jesus 
provides proud humanity with a visible example by which it can turn towards God 
and be saved.  In a sense, the Incarnation itself becomes God’s vocatus, or urgent call, 
of humanity back to himself.  This fits well within a Neoplatonic scheme in which 
Christ is identified with the divine intellect.  Is it possible that what initially drew 
Augustine to Christianity was the shocking idea that Plotinus’s divine intellect 
converts us by becoming one of us? 
  To answer this question, we can begin with a terminus ante quem for a 
developed approach to the Incarnation.  In his catechism, De fide et symbolo, 
Augustine writes about the Incarnation in a way that draws together the elements we 
have already seen and adds to them the nascent idea of participation: 
We cannot return except through humility.  Now our restorer deigned to show 
in his own person an example of his humility, i.e., of the way by which we 
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must return.  ‘For he thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied 
himself, taking the form of a servant’....According to his nature as the only-
begotten, he has no brothers.  But according to his nature as first-born, he has 
deigned to call brethren all who, after him and by means of his headship, are 
born again into the grace of God by adoption as sons, as the apostolic teaching 
proclaims.443 
Here, we have both the focus on Christ’s humility (along with the usual citation of 
Phil. 2.4-8) and the additional understanding that the fruits of the Incarnation are 
made effective by adoption through regeneration.  Similarly, in speaking of the 
resurrection, Augustine refers to believers, ‘whom he called into the adoption of the 
sons of God and deigned to make his co-heirs and co-partners’ (comparticipes et 
cohaeredes).444  While this scheme will be developed further by Augustine in later 
works, all the fundamental aspects of his incarnational theology are articulated in 
these two passages.  Thus, A.D. 393 can be taken as the latest point at which 
Augustine might have understood the Incarnation exclusively in an exemplary 
fashion.445 
 Prior to that date, it does appear that what mattered most to Augustine about 
the Incarnation (and the crucifixion, for that matter446) is its exemplary nature.  It is, 
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however, important not to misunderstand Augustine.  He was not, in fact, a proto-
Abelard or, even more ironically, a proto-Pelagian.  He did not conceive of 
humankind as capable of conversion towards God by its own power in need of only a 
model, however powerful, for guidance.  Recall his use of the word admonitio by 
which human beings are nudged away from their dehumanising movement back 
towards their Creator.  Without that nudging, people are absolutely incapable of 
ascending towards God.  Really, they are like savage humanity in the prologue of De 
inventione: incapable of betterment without first hearing and responding to the 
eloquence of the proto-orator.  Similarly, for Augustine, the movement of humanity 
away from nothingness requires God’s call.  And how does that call come except as 
grace in the power of the Holy Spirit?  Admonitio is itself an activity of the Holy 
Spirit drawing the wayward back towards God.   
Augustine’s obvious fascination with the idea of humility suggests that he 
realised the impotence of human nature on its own to move inexorably towards God.  
Without a doubt, one of his bedrock beliefs was that to believe otherwise invariably 
leads to pride.  Seen in this light, the Incarnation functions as the supreme admonitio 
necessary for overcoming human pride and achieving the renovatio of humanity.  
Externally it provides the intellect with a forceful sign of God’s love and humility; 
internally it opens the way for the Holy Spirit to draw the faithful towards God.447  
Further, once nudged, human beings must continue to imitate the humility expressed 
in the Incarnation.  This is not so much a moral imitation as it is an ontological one 
analogous to the imitation of the Word that gave form to formlessness in the first 
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place.448  Indeed, imitation (similitudo) within Platonic thought involves the lower 
participating in the higher.449   
Finally, the Holy Spirit is involved in and is necessary for this process of 
imitation.  We have already seen how the Holy Spirit is involved in God’s vocatus, 
both internally and externally, of the faithful back towards him.450  But as early as ep. 
11, Augustine shows that he has already begun to conceive of the Holy Spirit as the 
one whereby we can retain our knowledge of God by his granting to us a ‘certain 
inward and ineffable charm and sweetness of remaining in that knowledge…’451  
Augustine explains this most clearly, however, in De fide et symbolo when he writes 
that the faithful are ‘reconciled and recalled’ (reconciliati et…revocati) by the gift of 
the Holy Spirit, which is love.452  He concludes, ‘Now to enjoy the wisdom of God is 
nothing but to adhere (cohaerere) to it in love.  And one remains (permanet) in what 
one perceives only if it is with love’.453  Thus, already Augustine has begun to 
conceive of a role for the Holy Spirit within participatory redemption that reflects his 
role within participatory existence.   
 
Expositio epistulae ad Galatas and Confessiones 
 So, by the composition of De fide et symbolo, at the latest, Augustine has 
begun to articulate a theology of the Incarnation beyond merely an example of 
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humility and to incorporate some explicit idea of participation.  What apparently led 
him to this express this idea more explicitly was his grappling with Romans and 
Galatians, particularly the Pauline language of adoption.  It is here that the language 
of participation becomes more apparent.  Central to that understanding of 
participatory redemption is the identity of Christ as mediator.  1 Tim. 2.5,454 which 
becomes for Augustine a Christology text of great importance, is cited for the first 
time in Expositio epistulae ad Galatas 24 where he argues that as there is no need for 
a mediator between God and God, Christ must be a mediator between God and 
humankind.455  Here he recalls his earlier language in a manner that suggests a 
rhetorical contest: ‘It remains, therefore, that anyone who was cast down by the 
Devil, the proud mediator, persuading (persuadente) him to pride, is raised up by 
Christ, the humble mediator, persuading (persuadente) him to humility’.456   But, just 
as it seems that the Incarnation will again be described in exemplary terms, Augustine 
adds a new element: 
And so God’s only Son became a mediator between God and human beings 
when the Word of God, God with God, both laid down his own majesty to the 
level of the human and exalted human lowliness to the level of the divine, in 
order that he—a human being who through God was beyond human beings—
might be the mediator between God and human beings.457 
It is significant how similar the flow of this passage is to that of De fide et symbolo 
4.6: both begin by noting Christ’s humility and conclude with his transformation of 
humanity.  But here for the first time Augustine explicitly articulates how Christ’s 
humility functions to redeem humankind: by laying down his majesty (again, an echo 
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of Phil. 2.4-8) to the level of humanity, Christ elevates human lowliness to the ‘level 
of the divine’.  This is effectively an echo of Athanasius: ‘For he was made man that 
we might be made God’.458  As Gerald Bonner points out, this is really only 
explicable in terms of participation.459  It is by both Christ’s participation in human 
lowliness and humanity’s subsequent participation in Christ’s divinity that human 
redemption can be achieved.460 
 Any doubt about the participative nature of the Incarnation is laid to rest a 
little later in Augustine’s commentary on Galatians.  He writes: 
But the clause that we might receive the adoption as sons refers to the earlier 
phrase: made of a woman.  For we receive adoption because the only Son did 
not scorn participation in our nature—he was made of a woman so as to be not 
only the only-begotten, without any brothers, but also the first-born among 
many brothers.461  
Notice what Augustine has now done.  Within the Neoplatonic scheme, the only 
means for ascent is for the lower to participate in the higher.  At no point does the 
higher descend in order to elevate the lower.  That is in fact anathema to Plotinus’s 
whole scheme.  Augustine has now (and, it is safe to say that this dates to at least 
393) broken entirely with Plotinus in this respect.  Now, for the lower (humankind) to 
be able to participate in the higher (God), Christ (the higher) first participates in 
human nature (the lower).  Apparently, this is why humility was of such importance 
to Augustine.  He came to understand the paradox that ascent can only come about 
through an a priori descent.   
 The place one first encounters participatory redemption as found in ex. Gal. 
side by side with participatory existence is in the seventh chapter of Confessiones: 
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interestingly, in the midst of Augustine’s discussion of the merits of the ‘books of the 
Platonists’.  In 7.9.14, Augustine confesses that while he discovered the eternal nature 
of the Word in these books, he did not find anything about that same Word becoming 
incarnate.462  He continues by explaining that he learned from Neoplatonism that the 
Word ‘immutably abides’ with the Father and ‘that souls receive his fullness to be 
blessed, and that they are renewed to be wise by participation in wisdom abiding in 
them’.  Again, we are reminded of Augustine’s language, surveyed earlier, about the 
need for humankind to participate in God in order to have being and virtues.  Indeed, 
this is precisely the same notion expressed in q. 23 of De diversis quaestionibus 83 
and 16.57 of De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber.  It is also classical 
Neoplatonism: the lower enjoys what it has by participating in the higher. 
 David Meconi makes much of this in his article, ‘The Incarnation and the 
Role of Participation in St. Augustine’s Confessions’, arguing that this is the last time 
that a purely Platonic approach to participation appears in Augustine.463  According to 
him, at this point, Augustine only conceives of participatio in the traditional 
Neoplatonic sense of the lower deriving its goodness and being from the higher.  He 
suggests that the use of participatio in 7.18.24, where Augustine stresses Christ’s 
participation in human nature, marks a significant development in Augustine’s 
thought.464    
 What Meconi fails to recognise is that Augustine has both participatory 
existence and redemption in mind in 7.9.14.  Indeed, the logic of the passage only 
works if one accepts that Augustine is describing both participatory existence and 
redemption.  Just as Augustine found in Plotinus a teaching about the eternal 
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immutability of the Word but not about his Incarnation, or entry into human 
existence, he likewise found a teaching about participatory existence (that our being 
and goods derive from God) but not about mediation by participatory redemption (in 
which Christ participates in the human condition).  Augustine’s point is precisely that 
Platonism fails (and becomes proud) by its inability to accept the humility involved in 
the Word’s participation in the human condition and even in the nadir of Platonic 
scale: death. 
 What Meconi does rightly highlight is the unusual nature of 7.18.24.  This 
passage, however, is not so much a change or a development in Augustine’s thought 
as it is an almost poetic encomium on participatory redemption: 
Your Word, eternal truth, higher than the superior parts of your creation, 
raises those submissive to him to himself.  In the inferior parts he built for 
himself a humble house (humilis domus) of our clay.  By this he detaches from 
themselves those who are willing to be made his subjects and carries them 
across to himself, healing their swelling and nourishing their love.  They are 
no longer to place confidence in themselves, but rather are to become weak.  
They see at their feet divinity become weak by his sharing in our ‘coat of 
skin’.  In their weakness they fall prostrate before this divine weakness which 
rises and lifts them up.465 
It can be safely said that Augustine is now in command of his scheme.  He begins 
here with a Neoplatonic statement of ascent away from pride/wickedness 
/nothingness.  Humankind is helpless, unable to ascend by its own means.  It must be 
raised and this can only happen by submission to the Word.  Humility is the gateway.  
Gone now, however, is any suggestion of the Incarnation as primarily an exemplary 
admonition; now humanity is redeemed by the Word’s construction of a ‘humble 
cottage’ for himself out of human nature.  In other words, it is by the Word’s humble 
participation in humanity that humanity is raised towards God.  The result is that 
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those who believe in Christ learn humility rather than pride, weakness rather than 
confidence, and receive both healing and nourishment. In actuality, nothing has been 
added here that has not been seen before.  What is different is the confidence with 
which it is expressed.  Augustine’s initial attraction to the humility of Christ has 
deepened into a fully articulated notion of participatory redemption.   
 
Participatory Redemption in Augustine’s Sermons: 
Turning now to examine how this scheme presents itself in one particular 
genre of Augustine’s writings, namely, his sermons, we can see how he explained 
participatory redemption to his congregations.  As will be shown, his preference in 
his homilies was to focus on the happiness that is obtained through the healing of a 
believer’s participatory existence through participatory redemption. 
 The tone of this line of thought presents itself forcefully in one of Augustine’s 
sermons on the Gospel according to St John.  Preaching on Jn. 5.19-40, Augustine 
considers how we can achieve true happiness: 
He [Jesus] intimated to us that the human soul and rational mind which is in 
the human being and is not in the brute animal, are not enlivened, are not 
made happy, are not enlightened except by the very substance of God….its 
happiness, by which the soul itself is made happy, only comes about by 
participation in that life of an always living, unchangeable, and eternal 
substance which is God, so that, just as the soul which is inferior to God 
causes that which is inferior to it, that is, the body, to live, so only that which 
is superior to the soul itself causes the same soul to live happily.466 
Human beatitude comes through participation in the ‘living, unchangeable, and 
eternal substance which is God’.  To his mind, this is the essence of the Christian 
faith: ‘that one God be worshipped, not many gods, because only the one God makes 
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the soul happy. It becomes happy by participation in God’.467 Earlier in the sermon, 
Augustine preached that participation enlightens the faithful like a lamp fuelled by 
the oil of God’s mercy and draws them away from the weight of temporality and from 
the many towards the eternal and the immutable.468  This ascent can only be achieved 
through a mediator and so the Word emptied himself and became a human being: 
‘Let Christ raise you up through the fact that he is man, let him lead you through the 
fact that he is God-man; let him bring you to that which is God’.469 
 Augustine’s sermons on the Psalms, however, provide some of his strongest 
rhetoric about participation.  For example, in his homily on Ps. 49, Augustine uses 
language highly suggestive of theosis to describe the believer’s participation in God: 
It is quite obvious that God called human beings ‘gods’ in the sense that they 
were deified by his grace, not because they were born of his own substance…. 
If we have been made children of God, we have been made into gods; but we 
are such by the grace of him who adopts us, not because we are of the same 
nature as the one who begets. Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ is the unique 
Son of God; he is God, one God with the Father, the Word who was in the 
beginning, the Word who was with God, the Word who is God.  Others, who 
become gods, become so by his grace.  They are not born of God’s very being 
in such a way that they are what he is; it is through a gracious gift that they 
come to him and become with Christ his coheirs.  So intense is the Heir’s 
charity that he wanted to have fellow-heirs.470   
Besides defining the limits of human participation, Augustine reiterates that grace is 
the compelling force behind redemptive participation.  Participatory redemption is a 
‘gracious gift’—suggesting the involvement of the Holy Spirit—that is a sign of 
Christ’s charity.  This passage underscores how far away Augustine has moved from 
Plotinus.  Neoplatonists understood deification, if one is to use that term, as the 
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contemplative’s ultimate reintegration into the One.  Augustine, on the other hand, 
stops short of a goal of absolute reintegration and states clearly that the journey itself 
is only made possible by grace.  It is interesting to note how similar his language is to 
that of the passage from De fide et symbolo examined earlier.   In both, he stresses 
that while Christ is the only-begotten Son, he was glad to have brothers and sisters as 
‘coheirs’. 
 Augustine’s homily on Ps. 58, however, returns us to more familiar ground.  
In the midst of excoriating those who believed themselves to be strong—either 
through wealth, ‘their robust physique’, superior rank, or righteousness—Augustine 
upholds Christ as the supreme exemplar: ‘But the Teacher of humility became a 
participant (particeps) in our infirmity to enable us to share in his divinity; he came 
down to us both to teach us the way and to become the way, and he graciously willed 
to make his own humility above all a lesson to us’.471  This succinctly contains all the 
elements of Augustine’s incarnational theology: Christ’s participation in humanity, 
humanity’s subsequent and dependent participation in his divinity, and the example 
of humility provided as an antidote to human pride.  This passage might be described 
as participatory admonition in which Christ is both co-heir and teacher, both the 
teacher of the way and the way itself to God. 
 One final sermon will suffice to provide a taste of Augustine’s use of 
participatory redemption in his homilies: sermo 166.472  Although, the sermon is 
ostensibly against lying, the subject evokes from Augustine one of his clearest 
explanations of participatory redemption.  This is not as strange as it sounds.  If 
Christ is, as Augustine dearly believed, the eternal Truth, a sermon against lying 
would provide an easy avenue into the topic of participation: only by participating in 
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Truth can one be truthful.  Towards the end of the homily and in response to the 
excuse, ‘I am only human’, Augustine says something that shocks his congregation: 
‘Don’t be a man, so that you won’t have to tell lies’.  He then explains: 
You see, it is in order not to be a man that you have been called by the one 
who became man for your sake.  Don’t take umbrage.  I mean, you are not 
being told not to be a man, in the sense that you are to be a beast, but rather 
that you are to be among those to whom he gave the right to become children 
of God.  God, you see, wants to make you a god; not by nature, of course, like 
the one whom he begot; but by his gift and by adoption.  For just as he 
through being humbled came to share your mortality; so through lifting you 
up he brings you to share his immortality.473 
By and large this is a reiteration of all the elements of Augustine’s concept of 
participatory redemption that we have seen before.  What is noteworthy here is that 
the whole scheme can be subordinated to a moral goal.  Augustine’s concept of 
participation is so central to his thought that it embraces even his moral theology.  
The whole approach of sermo 166 is that one ceases to be a liar not through some 
exertion of the will or submission to a rule (there is not a drop of either the self-help 
practitioner or of the Puritan in Augustine) but through participation in Christ the 
Truth.  Moral reformation only comes through participation: ‘So, putting aside lying, 
speak the truth, in order that this mortal flesh too, which you still have from Adam, 
may itself earn renewal and transformation at the time of its resurrection, having been 
preceded by newness of spirit; and thus the whole man being deified and made divine 
may cleave forever to the everlasting and unchangeable truth’.474   
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Book IV of De Trinitate 
De Trinitate provides Augustine’s most complete and mature thought on his 
theory of participation.  A close reading of book four reveals both the full extent of 
Augustine’s thought and how central his theory of participation was to his entire 
theological edifice.  The book begins with him dwelling on his favourite topic: the 
inner life.  Self-knowledge, he claims, is the best form of knowledge, better than even 
the knowledge of the stars, because it is through such knowledge that a person 
becomes aware of his or her own weakness. Better still is one who, armed with self-
knowledge, is ‘roused by the warmth of the Holy Spirit’ and subsequently is filled 
with humble compunction.  Such a person is not puffed up with knowledge like the 
Platonists because he is ‘built up by charity’.  And this has brought into him ‘the 
sorrow of exile stirred by longing for his true country and its founder, his blissful 
God.’ Augustine then goes on to describe the journey back towards the ‘blissful God’ 
as conducted ‘by the road he has made in the humanity of the divinity of his only 
Son’. 475  Here we have in a coherent and developed approach to the question 
Augustine had been addressing near the start of his Christian vocation.  He has 
retained all the features of his earlier conclusions: the primary role of the Holy Spirit 
made effective through the Incarnation, the necessity of humility, and the inspired 
desire for God.   
 Yet in De Trinitate, Augustine dwells more deeply on the features of his 
overall scheme.  He explains why humility and compunction are necessary and why 
we must rely on God’s unmerited grace to achieve the ascent to him.476  Then he 
describes the role of the Word both within participatory existence and redemption.  
Through the Word not only were all things made but they also continue to be united 
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in one common life: a life that is the Word himself.  Augustine states that the same 
Word is also the light of rational minds, thereby stressing the utter dependence of all 
creatures, and in particular humanity, on the eternal, unchanging Word.  It is by 
participation in the Word that creatures have life and, in the case of humanity, rational 
minds.477   
 The Incarnation occurred so that humanity could be ‘cured and made well’.  
‘Our enlightenment is to participate in the Word, that is, in that life which is the light 
of men’.  This could not be accomplished through humanity’s own efforts since it 
lacks both the power and the purity:   
Yet we were absolutely incapable of such participation (participationi) and 
quite unfit for it, so unclean were we through sin, so we had to be cleansed.  
Furthermore, the only thing to cleanse the wicked and the proud is the blood 
of the just man and the humility of God; to contemplate God, which by nature 
we are not, we would have to be cleansed by him who became what by nature 
we are and what by sin we are not.  By nature we are not God; by nature we 
are men; by sin we are not just.  So God became a just man to intercede with 
God for sinful man.  The sinner did not match the just, but man did match the 
man.  So he applied to us the similarity of his humanity to take away the 
dissimilarity of our iniquity, and becoming a partaker (particeps) of our 
mortality he made us partakers (participes) of his divinity.478   
The Incarnation’s role in opening up the way for people to participate in God is itself 
the cure of the human soul.  There is no salvation without participation.  The 
wickedness that leads humanity towards nothingness is fundamentally pride: a pride 
so powerful that only the unfathomable humility of the Word in becoming human can 
overthrow it.  And the result of this is the gracious deification of humanity, the ‘royal 
exchange’ of human corruption for Christ’s divinity.479 
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 Finally, Augustine stresses that participatory redemption is not an 
individualistic state.  Rather, it is only through participation in Christ that a true and 
lasting fellowship may arise.  The reason for this is the Fall when, ‘with a crashing 
discord we had bounced away, and flowed and faded away from the one supreme true 
God into the many, divided by the many, clinging to the many’.480  By becoming our 
mediator, Christ reconciled the many to the one so that ‘we may be able to cling to 
the one, enjoy the one, and remain forever one.’481  But now that Christ is the head 
and the Church his body, Christians are in a sense one body, ‘since head and body 
make one Christ.’  So, Augustine concludes, Christ wants his disciples to be one in 
him because they cannot be one in themselves, split as they are by ‘clashing wills and 
desires’ and sinfulness.  To this end, Christ cleanses them to make them one, ‘not 
only by virtue of the same nature whereby all of them from the ranks of mortal men 
are made equal to the angels, but even more by virtue of one and the same wholly 
harmonious will reaching out in concert to the same ultimate happiness, and fused 
somehow into one spirit in the furnace of charity.’482 
 
Participatory Life 
At the heart of Augustine’s answer to the questions of both existence and 
salvation is life, or rather, Life.  When, as we saw earlier in De vera religione, he 
refers to God as Life he uses a metaphor that is particularly appropriate.  As 
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  See R.A Markus, ‘Alienatio. Philosophy and Eschatology in the Development of an 
Augustinian Idea,’ Studia Patristica 9:3 (Berlin, 1966) 447 for a discussion of one aspect of 
Augustine’s view of humankind’s ‘self-dissipation’ (447) towards the many. 
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  trin. 4.2.11. 
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here to pursue this thought, ver. rel. 6.10—‘To all it [the Catholic Church] gives power to 
participate in the grace of God, whether they are as yet formed or reformed, admitted for the 
first time or gathered in anew’—shows that Augustine always had the Church in mind when 
thinking about participatory redemption. 
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Augustine understands God, he is the source not only of creaturely existence but also 
of human redemption.  He is both the one who begets and the one who heals, the one 
who forms and the one who reforms.  Both are achieved through participation. 
 Much of this, of course, would not have been unpalatable to a pagan 
Neoplatonist.  Indeed, every fundamental aspect of Neoplatonic reintegration is 
retained, if reinterpreted.  God still produces life, gives that life form by calling it 
back to him from nothingness, and even provides a path for reintegration through 
grace for the pure-hearted contemplative.  Of course, life is now spoken into 
existence out of nothing, formation given through the Word who also reforms by 
becoming man himself, and reintegration is not absorption into the nature of the One 
but rather the gracious adoption into a divine status.  Each of these is such a departure 
that one must speak of a theology that has, for all its dependency on Neoplatonism, 
moved beyond Plotinus into a theology wholly new. 
 What is particularly striking about Augustine’s concept of creation is how 
integral speech itself is to existence.  God utters creation, calls it back through the 
eternally spoken Word from nothingness to take on form, and finally recalls sinners 
from wickedness into the fullness of participatory life through that same Word 
becoming part of the creation.  In a real sense, before we can speak about God’s 
redemptive oratory, we must acknowledge his creative oratory; God is both an author 
and an orator.  And at the very heart of creation and redemption stands the Word: 
We then rejoice with joy because of the voice of the bridegroom, and give 
ourselves to the source whence we have our being.  And in this way he is the 
Beginning because, unless he were constant, there would be no fixed point to 
which we could return.  But when we return from error, it is by knowing that 
we return.  He teaches us so that we may know; for he is the Beginning, and 
he speaks to us.483 
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Augustine found in Christ the theological answer to the age old debate between 
philosophers and orators: in the Word, both wisdom and eloquence meet as one.  
Better still, he discovered that Cicero was in fact wrong: ultimately Wisdom is not 
mute; he is eternally spoken.  And in that eternally spoken Wisdom is the beginning 
and end of all life.  What could be more satisfying to a converted rhetor than that? 
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5 
Worldly Delights 
 
Introduction – Delectatio 
For Augustine, temporal life is movement: all created essence progresses 
either towards or away from God.  In this belief, he was not alone.  As has been seen, 
Neoplatonists understood being in terms of its distance from the First Principle, and 
understood everything outside of the First Principle itself to be either moving through 
contemplation towards its source or collapsing into nothingness.  Because of his 
fundamental belief in participatory existence, therefore, Augustine could only 
conceive of redemption in existential terms: he believed that every step towards 
heaven or hell influenced the very being (esse) of the individual.  Such an existence 
cannot but be precarious.  Life hangs on the edge of nothingness, unable on its own to 
secure a foothold, to continue its existence by its own will or power.  People are not 
even capable of moving by their own volition; every step towards salvation and rest is 
due to God’s call and grace and every step towards damnation and hell is due to the 
seduction of sin and the weight of human corruption.   
  But what is it that actually propels the movement?  Augustine’s familiar 
answer is love: ‘My weight is my love.  Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying 
me’.484  He conceives of this ‘weight’ in terms of natural philosophy, with love acting 
on the individual as gravity acts on an object:  
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A body by its weight tends to move towards its proper place.  The weight’s 
movement is not necessarily downwards, but to its appropriate position: fire 
tends to move upwards, a stone downwards....They are acted on by their 
respective densities, they seek their own place.  Things which are not in their 
intended position are restless.485 
Augustine’s ‘restless heart’ therefore speaks to the soul’s relentless search for rest in 
either God’s changeless Being or nothingness.  Apart from God, the soul will 
inevitably search for rest in oblivion; ‘stirred’ by God however it will seek that rest in 
praising God, in participating by grace in his Being: ‘You stir man to delight in 
praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it 
rests in you’.486   
But it is important to recognise that the soul is not the active agent in this 
search.  Rather it is acted upon, stirred by an external force, carried by its love.  Part 
of Augustine’s explanation for this passivity seems to be that for him love itself is 
beyond human control.  People are carried by a love they never invoked.  Instead, 
they are drawn to love by delight.  This view is clearly expressed, for example, in 
sermo 159, preached around 417. There, Augustine asks his congregation whether 
they love justice and then goes on to assert that they will only reply ‘I do’ truthfully if 
justice delights them: one ‘only loves, after all what delights one’.487  This connection 
of love with delight establishes both the whole motivational force behind virtue and 
vice and defines the contest for the individual soul.  Augustine writes: 
Your flesh...is delighted even by unlawful pleasures; let your mind take 
delight in the invisible, beautiful, chaste, holy melodious, sweet thing that is 
justice, so that you won’t be forced to it out of fear.  After all, if you are 
forced to it out of fear, you don’t yet take delight in it.  You ought to refrain 
from sinning, not out of fear of punishment, but out of love for justice.488 
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Augustine takes great pains to convince his congregation that they must not seek God 
out of fear, as though pleasure itself is sinful.  He is keenly aware of the danger, often 
implicit in Christian moral teaching, of suggesting that sin conquers through pleasure 
while God conquers through fear.489  He asks his congregation dismissively, 
When you were sinning, you used to take delight in your sins; was fear 
dragging you into sinning, or the deliciousness of sin?  You will answer, of 
course, its deliciousness.  So you are led into sin because it’s delicious, 
prodded toward justice because you’re frightened?490   
Christians ought therefore to pursue justice not because they fear punishment but 
because justice ‘shines more brilliantly, gleams more brightly, tastes more delicious, 
is much, much sweeter’ than anything earthly or temporal.  Ultimately for Augustine, 
the alternative is not between hedonism and Puritanism but between two opposing 
delights: one that carries believers towards God, the other which weighs them down 
towards wickedness and oblivion.  As will be shown, this places delight at the heart 
of participatory existence. 
 Again, this delight is not something over which people have control.  In his 
endlessly discussed letter to Simplicianus, Augustine asks, ‘Who can welcome in his 
mind something that does not give him delight?  But who has it in his power to ensure 
that something that will delight him will turn up, or that he will take delight in what 
turns up?’491  Thus, just as love is beyond human control so too is delight.492  This is 
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  Augustine’s argument here is also influenced by his anti-Pelagian polemic: he understood the 
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not surprising as delight and love are so closely connected for Augustine.  Indeed, he 
seems to suggest here that delight is the vehicle whereby something enters the mind, 
which is the necessary first step for love.  Augustine’s statement comes immediately 
after he asks who can believe unless they have been called by truth and who can 
‘have such a motive present’ in their mind so as to be ‘influenced’ to believe?  What 
Augustine seems to suggest is that delight is a necessary part of receiving and 
accepting truth.  Unless people delight in truth, they cannot even bring it to mind; 
they are, in effect, unaware of it.  Here perhaps we hear an echo here of Cicero and 
Victorinus: wisdom/truth presenting itself through eloquence/delight. 
 As we have seen, Peter Brown makes much of this passage, arguing that in 
analysing the story of Jacob and Esau, Augustine ‘came to see man as utterly 
dependent on God, even for his first initiative of believing in Him’.493  According to 
Brown’s interpretation, Augustine began to believe that delight is the sole source of 
action, as the only thing that can move the will.  Brown concludes: ‘Therefore, a man 
can act only if he can mobilise his feelings, only if he is ‘affected’ by an object of 
delight’.  This is, of course, the language of persuasion, in which Augustine as a 
rhetor was well-versed, and its logic brings us back to the language of Cicero.   The 
art of persuasion itself is the ability to move people to action through eloquent 
speech.  Thus, for Cicero, an orator must sway the emotions of his audience in order 
to achieve victory.494  In De oratore, as we have seen, he writes, ‘I think nothing is 
more admirable than being able, through speech, to lure people’s minds, to win over 
their inclinations, to drive them at will in one direction, to draw them at will from 
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another’.495  This is precisely the same logic Augustine uses in Ad Simplicianum.  
God is in control because through delight he takes hold of people’s minds and drives 
them towards himself.   
  It is helpful at this time to quote again Margaret Boyle’s distinction between 
rhetoric and dialectic as it sheds light on Augustine’s argument: ‘Dialectic seeks an 
act of the intellect (judgment) through compulsion of reason, and it secures its 
religious end in contemplation.  Rhetoric seeks an act of the will (assent) through 
persuasion of feeling, and it secures its religious end in conversion.” 496   At one level 
this is also Augustine’s contention: one cannot make progress towards God unless the 
will is affected and moved by a delight of the heart that results in conversion.  But 
what is even more striking is that he envisions a divine persuasion that compels a 
movement towards contemplation; he effectively combines Boyle’s two goals by 
making conversion the middle point in a process that ultimately ends in the eternal 
contemplation of God.  To achieve that persuasive goal, God uses his eloquence, 
which Augustine conceives principally in terms of delectatio.   
 The first mention in Ad Simplicianum of the idea that people must be 
‘affected’ appears during Augustine’s discussion of the verse, ‘Many are called but 
few are chosen’.  Considering all that we have learned about the importance of God’s 
oratory in both participatory existence and redemption it should not be surprising that 
Augustine develops this rhetorical approach in the midst of discussing God’s vocatus.  
In Ad Simplicianum, Augustine the rhetor explains how God’s redemptive call 
actually works.  God’s vocatus is a persuasive call and just as an orator cannot 
persuade unless he conquers the audience’s will through pathos, so too God only 
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‘chooses’ those called by conquering their hearts through delight.  Far from being a 
new idea, as Brown contends, this is exactly the logic one would expect by one 
deeply formed by Ciceronian rhetoric.  So, Brown is partly right when he points out 
that in his letter Augustine describes delight as no longer a ‘spontaneous reaction, the 
natural thrill of the refined soul when confronted with beauty.  For it is just this vital 
capacity to engage one’s feelings on a course of action, to take “delight” in it, that 
escapes our powers of self-determination: the processes that prepare a man’s heart to 
take “delight” in his God are not only hidden, but actually unconscious and beyond 
his control’.497  But Brown is mistaken in describing this as something innovative.  
Augustine has simply approached the question of conversion by marshalling the 
insights about persuasion he has acquired as a rhetor.  Who better to understand the 
dynamic of conversion than one deeply versed in the dynamic of persuasion?  In both 
Augustine and Cicero, the audience is passive, the orator is in control, action is 
achieved through persuasion, and the will is conquered through emotion. 
 The question now arises as to why God acts in this way: why must God 
overwhelm the will of individuals in order for them to turn away from wickedness 
and oblivion towards the fullness of redeemed, participatory life?  Augustine’s 
answer to that question is an ironic one: just as delight draws individuals towards 
God, so also it draws them towards death.  In fact, he believed that not only could 
delight move people towards death but it already has done so; the bondage of 
humankind to death came about through a misguided delight.  Because Brown is 
focused on Ad Simplicianum, where Augustine’s interest is about why some respond 
to God’s call while others do not, he fails to note that Augustine conceives of the 
devil or sin working in the same manner as God.  The question for the individual is 
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not, as Brown implies, a matter of self-determination but an alternative between two 
forms of delightful bondage: one to God, the other to death.  Augustine understands 
humankind as already in bondage to the devil through temporal and carnal delight.  
Because the human will has been overwhelmed by a diabolical oratory, God must 
now overcome it with his own oratory.  In order to understand how God conquers 
through delight, we must first establish how Augustine conceives of the human 
condition under the bondage to sin. 
 
Worldly Delight 
In distinguishing between the different types of delight, Augustine at times 
appends a qualifying adjective such as ‘eternal’ or ‘spiritual’ on the one hand, and 
‘worldly’, ‘terrestrial’, or ‘carnal’ on the other.498  Most often, however, he allows the 
context to determine whether or not the delight is commendable.  The same 
observations hold for the various other words he uses in place of delecto or delectatio.  
So, gaudeo and placeo are both used to describe the pleasure derived from both 
virtuous and wicked sources.499  This is in marked contrast to his approach to human 
desire, in which he typically reserves words like concupiscentia, cupiditas, and libido 
to describe sinful lusts.500  A possible explanation as to why Augustine does not use a 
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special word to describe ‘carnal’ or ‘worldly’ delight is that he seems to have 
considered all pleasure to be from God.501 The experience of delectatio, therefore, is a 
good; how one obtains or responds to the delightful experience, however, is the 
difference between heaven and hell. 
 By Augustine’s way of thinking, carnal delight manifests itself in two ways: 
as illicit delight, when one actively enjoys what one knows to be sinful, and as 
temporal or corporeal delight, when one enjoys only or primarily what can be 
perceived by the five senses.  He understands the first of these to be a delight in 
actual wickedness and thus inherently evil.  In order to understand why people do 
what they know to be wrong, he universalises Genesis’ account of the Fall to 
construct a scheme wherein the serpent represents temptation, Eve the delight that 
comes from the temptation, and Adam the consent given when temptation turns into 
action.  In developing this scheme of temptation-delight-consent, Augustine draws 
upon his own rhetorical education, reading the story of the Fall in light of Cicero’s 
rhetorical imperative to speak so as to prove, please, and persuade.  As for temporal 
delights, the sinfulness lies less in the source of delight itself and more in idolising 
the temporal delight rather than using it as means for delighting in eternal truths and 
ultimately in God.  Unlike illicit delight, temporal delight begins as a natural instinct 
that can only be outgrown with the approach of adulthood.  So, an infant’s delight in 
its mother’s milk is natural and good as the child has not yet the rationality necessary 
for spiritual growth.502  Augustine’s typical way of discussing temporal delight is by 
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distinguishing usus from frui. Only God is to be enjoyed (frui) while created goods 
are to be used (usus) in order to enjoy God.  Augustine believes that sin arises when a 
person seeks to enjoy temporal delights propter se ipsum.   
 When not resisted, both forms of carnal delight—the illicit and the temporal—
result in an affective bondage (consuetudo) that makes resistance increasingly 
difficult and further shackles the individual to the mutable, temporal, and in due 
course to death itself.  As will be shown, carnal delight is for all intents and purposes 
the experience of wickedness (nequitia), and as such involves pain: either the actual 
pain of divine punishment or, at the very least, the pain of an increasingly restless 
heart.  Augustine’s idea of bondage to death or nequitia through carnal delight gives 
substance to the Pauline concept of slavery or bondage to sin (Rm. 6.17-23).  Finally, 
carnal delight wages war against spiritual or eternal delight.503  According to 
Augustine, due to original sin, humanity on its own always becomes enthralled to 
carnal delight and tends towards nequitia and non-being.  This is why, although 
everyone yearns for the happy life, those who have not come to faith end up 
embracing those delights that move them farther away from realising their desires.  
 
Illicit Delight 
Augustine’s understanding of what constitutes illicit delight is relatively 
unproblematic: essentially, it is the ‘delight in doing an evil deed’.504  He illustrates 
what this actually means most vividly in the Confessiones.  In Book 2, he explains 
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that in his youth the ‘single desire that dominated my search for delight was simply to 
love and to be loved’.505  On its face, this would seem to be a straightforward 
impulse; indeed, from what we have discovered from Augustine thus far in our study 
we could even say that his desire was entirely natural.  But he qualifies his desire for 
delight by explaining that ‘Clouds of muddy carnal concupiscence filled the air.  The 
bubbling impulses of puberty befogged and obscured my heart so that it could not see 
the difference between love’s serenity and lust’s darkness’.  ‘Lust’s darkness’ leads to 
a string of evocative phrases: Augustine describes how he was swept through the 
‘precipitous rocks’ and became ‘submerged in a whirlpool of vice’ and ‘deafened by 
the clanking chain of [his] mortal condition’ which led him away from God.  He was 
‘tossed about and spilt, scattered and boiled dry’ in his fornications.  The images here 
suggest helplessness, even evoking the image of Odysseus’s ship being swept 
between Scylla and Charybdis.  The desire for delight is violently all-consuming.  
 Augustine greatly regrets that no one tried to ‘impose restraint’ on his 
overweening desire by marrying him off to some unsuspecting woman.506  Because 
this did not happen—and he doubts that he would have been satisfied with merely 
procreating—he instead continued his downward spiral into sexual immorality until 
he had reached a level of ‘unbridled dissoluteness in many different directions’ that 
resulted in a ‘thick mist’ that hid God’s face from him.507  For Augustine, the 
emblematic act of his wickedness was his participation in the theft of a pear.  While 
in comparison to his other indiscretions this may strike us as a somewhat minor 
offence, for Augustine the episode serves to illustrate how illicit delight occurs.  And 
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the way he demonstrates this is by recourse to forensic rhetoric to examine the 
episode. 
 In his treatment of Augustine’s use of rhetoric in the Confessiones, James 
Farrell writes, ‘As Augustine investigates his own motives for stealing pears he turns 
to the method of classical forensic invention outlined by Cicero, and by the 
anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium’.508 He does so not to exonerate 
himself of the crime (as one would normally expect from a lawyer setting out his 
case), but to accuse himself as one beyond mercy.509  Augustine plays the role of both 
mute defendant and hostile prosecutor before God the judge.  He therefore omits the 
‘direct opening’ that Rhetorica ad Herennium recommends for cases where the cause 
is honourable because he believes he lacked ‘any sense of, or feeling for, justice’.510 
Instead, Augustine advances to a brief and clear statement of the facts by telling the 
story of the theft.  Farrell writes, ‘His narration lasts but one paragraph, and 
(following the theoretical advice of Rhetorica ad Herennium) he neither tries “to 
recount from the remotest beginning,” nor to “carry forward” beyond “the point at 
which we need to go”’.511  Augustine has turned his rhetorical training against 
himself. 
He begins by claiming that he and his compatriots actually enjoyed the 
‘excitement of thieving and the doing of what is wrong’.512  Their ‘enjoyment’ lay in 
doing what was not allowed.  Augustine positively wallows in his former iniquity:  
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I had no motive for my wickedness except wickedness itself.  It was foul, 
and I loved it.  I loved the self-destruction, I loved my fall, not the object for 
which I had fallen but my fall itself.  My depraved soul leaped down from 
your firmament to ruin.513 
From the vantage we have gained by studying Augustine’s concept of participation 
and delight, such language should not be unexpected.  Augustine at that stage in his 
life was actually enjoying his own descent from God into nequitia.  Wickedness itself 
delighted him such that he loved his own ‘self-destruction’ and ‘fall’.  Later, 
Augustine concludes that the theft ‘has nothing lovely about it, none of the loveliness 
found in equity and prudence, or in the human mind whether in the memory or in the 
senses or in physical vitality.  Nor was it beautiful in the way the stars are, noble in 
their courses, or earth and sea full of newborn creatures which, as they are born, take 
the place of those which die, not even in the way that specious vices have a flawed 
reflection of beauty’.514  And yet, as he states repeatedly, he derived pleasure from the 
crime itself.515 He plays the ruthless self-inquisitor in this passage, denying himself 
all other excuses for the crime.  He mentions and casts aside the possibility that what 
he really loved was the beauty or taste of the fruit or the company of his friends.  
Relentlessly, Augustine compels all other lines of thought back to the same 
conclusion: he delighted in the crime itself. 
 According to Farrell, this is precisely the approach forensic rhetoric suggested 
when one wishes to employ a ‘Plea for Mercy’.516  The author of Rhetorica ad 
Herennium writes, ‘We shall use the Plea for Mercy when we confess the crime 
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without attributing it to ignorance, chance, or necessity, and yet beg for pardon’.517  
But contrary to rhetorical advice, Augustine does not even invoke his own virtues, 
good deeds, or any other merits for his defence.  He mercilessly dismisses any 
possible extenuating circumstances.  His delight in wickedness placed him beyond 
normal mercy; only through a complete confession of his sin and acceptance of his 
guilt can Augustine beg for God’s mercy.  His use of forensic rhetoric to examine his 
theft of the pears has unequivocally demonstrated the final state of one who had 
delighted in wickedness: he became far removed from God. 
 Augustine, however, never explains why he reached this state of sinfulness 
other than that he desired the delight of loving and being loved.  In other words, in the 
Confessiones we are presented with the beginning of his descent (his disordered 
desire for love) and the end (his delight in wickedness), but no description of the 
mechanics of that descent away from God. For this we must turn to two earlier 
works—De Genesi adversus Manicheos and De sermone Domini in monte—in which 
Augustine presents his theory on how humankind ends up taking pleasure in its sinful 
transgressions.  His approach to the psychology of sin in these two works not only 
sheds further light on his concept of delight but also reveals how central rhetorical 
theory was to that concept. 
 In book two of De Genesi adversus Manicheos, Augustine uses the account of 
the Fall as a window into the psychology of sin.  He writes: 
Even now, when any of us slide down into sin, nothing else takes place but 
what then occurred with those three, the serpent, the woman and the man.  
First of all, you see, comes the suggestion, either in the thoughts, or through 
the body’s senses, by seeing or touching or hearing or tasting or smelling 
something.  If, when the suggestion has taken shape, our desire or greed is 
not roused (movebitur) to sin, the serpent’s cunning will be blocked; if it 
roused (mota fuerit), though, it’s as if the woman has already been persuaded 
(persuasum).  But sometimes the reason valiantly puts the brake on greed 
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even when it has been roused, and brings it to a halt.  When this happens, we 
don’t slide into sin, but win the prize with a certain amount of struggle.  If 
however the reason does consent and decide that what lust or greed is urging 
(commoverit) on it should be done, then the man is expelled from the entire 
life of bliss (vita beata), as from paradise.518 
For Augustine, therefore, the descent into sin comes about by a) the suggestion 
entering the mind either through thoughts or the senses, b) an emotional response to 
the sin that rouses desire, and c) reason, upon failing to resist the appeal, 
consequently consenting to the suggestion.  In other words, sin occurs after the 
presentation of the sinful idea pleases one enough to enact it.  Everything here 
depends on persuasion, and it is interesting to note how often variants on moveo or 
persuadeo occur in the passage.  Augustine goes on to explain that the sinful 
suggestion itself is the refusal to live as a contingent being: ‘what else is to be 
understood but a suggestion that they should refuse to be under God any longer, but 
should be their own masters instead without the Lord…’519  Non-being, in effect, 
entices the individual to move away from God towards nothingness, and this 
constitutes pride (superbia).  As a result, the sinner is cast away from the happy life.  
Just as wholesome delight can lead one towards the happy life so too can misdirected 
delight lead one towards misery. 
 Augustine returns to this image a few years later in his De sermone Domini in 
monte (393/394) where he gives an even clearer account of delight’s role in sin: 
For, there are three steps toward the complete commission of a sin: 
suggestion, pleasure (delectatione), and consent.  The suggestion is made 
either through the memory or through the bodily sense—when we are seeing 
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or hearing or smelling or tasting or touching something.  If we take pleasure 
in the enjoyment of this, it must be repressed if the pleasure is sinful (Quo si 
frui delectaverit, delectatio illicita refrenanda est)….if consent is given, then 
a sin is fully committed in the heart, and it is known to God…520 
The cupiditas of De Genesi adversus Manicheos has now become delectatione.  The 
sinful suggestion causes delight and this delight must be repressed lest it lead to 
consent.  If consent is given and the sin is enacted then a ‘more intense pleasure is 
enkindled (major accenditur delectatio) when the suggestion is repeated 
afterwards’.521  Illicit delight, therefore, leads to a thirst for greater delight, and 
through this a habit is formed.  The habit itself is ‘very difficult to overcome’, 
requiring, in fact, the ‘aid’ of Christ.  The habit of illicit delight becomes the chain 
that keeps fallen humanity in bondage to sin. 
 A passage from Augustine’s sermon on Ps. 9 sheds further light on the 
mechanics of suggestion, delight and consent.  Commenting on the verse, ‘Their own 
foot has been caught in the very mousetrap which they set’, Augustine explains: 
‘Love moves a thing in the direction toward which it tends.  But the dwelling-place of 
the soul is not in any physical space which the form of the body occupies, but in 
delight (delectatione), where it rejoices to have arrived through love.  Destructive 
pleasure (delectatio...perniciosa) follows greed, fruitful delight (fructuosa) follows 
love.  This is why greed is called a root’.522  This is a remarkable assertion by 
Augustine: delectatio is the actual place in which the soul dwells and is the ground in 
which love (amor)—both true love (dilectio or caritas) and false love (cupiditas or 
libido)—is rooted.523  Thus, to delight in something is to place one’s very soul there, 
which explains why the habit of illicit delight results in bondage.  The soul of the 
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sinner becomes imprisoned in the unfulfilled cupiditas, which moves the soul in the 
direction towards which it tends: death.   Augustine explains this in the same passage:  
The foot of sinners, that is their love, is caught in the trap which they 
themselves hide.  This is because when pleasure (delectatio) has followed 
deceitful action, when God has handed them over into the lusts of their heart, 
the pleasure (delectatio) already binds them in such a way that they do not 
dare to tear their love from it and apply it to useful objects.524   
These passages shed light on Augustine’s own descent into sin as narrated in book 
two of Confessiones.  The desire for the delight of loving and being loved was, in 
effect, the desire of his soul to find its home, through love, in delight.  Because that 
desire was disordered, he succumbed to the suggestion of sinful action, of living as 
though he were his own creator, and took delight in the thought and performance of 
those actions.  The episode of the pear theft illustrates what happens when one 
consents to the delight found in a sinful suggestion.  Augustine was persuaded to 
derive pleasure from deliberately sinning and ended up trapped in his own cupiditas. 
 Clearly, delight and persuasion are central to how Augustine understands the 
psychology of sin.  But how and why did he develop this threefold psychological 
scheme of sinful action?  A clue lies in the scheme itself: generally speaking, the 
threefold process of suggestione, delectione, and consensione conforms to Cicero’s 
officia oratoris, or the three functions of the orator: proving, pleasing, and 
persuading.  Just as a jury is presented with an argument, charmed by the orator’s 
delivery, and thereby persuaded to act in accordance with his will, so too are people 
presented with a sinful idea, charmed by the devil’s delivery and thereby moved to 
enact the sin.  Augustine has taken the story of the Fall and universalised it by 
bringing it into conformity with Ciceronian rhetoric.  In theory, those tempted can 
make use of reason to resist the delight and withhold consent; but Augustine’s view 
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of the human condition is that this, apart from God’s grace, never actually happens.  
And so, the pull to commit sin occurs through the art of persuasion: delight is what 
empowers the temptation and compels the commission.  As he explains elsewhere, 
people commit sins because they are drawn by sin’s ‘sweetness’ (suavitas).525 
 Augustine’s illicit delight can be compared to Cicero’s, ‘babbling stupidity’.  
Recall that in De inventione, Cicero argues that eloquence without wisdom is always 
harmful.  The person who can charm with his or her words but fails to convey 
wisdom harms the state.  In his myth about the origin of civilisation, he conjectures 
that in the course of events, men ‘who were accustomed to stand on the side of 
falsehood against truth’ employed fluency of speech to woo the people into believing 
them fit to govern.526  Similarly, as we have now seen, Augustine conceives of a 
diabolical charm that uses delight and falsehood to beguile people into surrendering 
to sin the governance of their own will.  He has transformed the devil into Cicero’s 
anti-orator: his charm and false wisdom cause reason to act in a way inimical to the 
soul. Though Cicero’s republic has been supplanted by an individual’s reason and 
will, his original logic remains in place.  Sin therefore presents itself as a kind of 
rhetoric, tempting people with its sweetness and eloquence to surrender their will to 
cupiditas and act in a manner that removes them farther from God.  Like Augustine’s 
preacher in Book Four of De doctrina Christiana, Sin is persuasive rather than 
coercive; people progress towards nequitia through being gripped by delight and 
compelled to action.  That pleasure is a necessary component of non-coercive 
persuasion explains why Augustine focuses sharply on it.  He recognises that pleasure 
is the greatest weapon in sin’s arsenal.  Without it, people would not engage in illicit 
activities.  As will be shown in the next chapter, Augustine’s approach to sin sets the 
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stage for the quintessential rhetorical contest wherein God contends with sin to 
persuade the soul towards the beata vita and away from a descent towards 
nothingness.  
 
Temporal Delight 
Illicit delight, however, is not the only form of worldly delight for Augustine.  
Indeed, he is arguably much more concerned with terrestrial delights—those 
pleasures mediated through the five senses of the body—that may distract us from 
seeking God’s delight.  Such delights differ from illicit ones in that they are not 
inherently wicked.  Because God created these sensual delights, giving them form 
and beauty, they are good.  But, Augustine warns that they cannot be enjoyed for 
their own sake.  In book four of the Confessiones, he describes the proper role of 
temporal delights: ‘If physical objects give you pleasure (placent), praise God for 
them and return love to their Maker lest, in the things that please you, you displease 
him….For he did not create and then depart; the things derived from him have their 
being in him’.527  Such pleasures are in a sense sacramental insofar as they express to 
the five senses what, to Augustine’s way of thinking, most truly exists spiritually and 
invisibly.528 
 But lawful delights can distract; they can become the objects of our attention 
instead of windows through which we observe God’s beauty and glory.  Augustine 
writes, ‘Yet sin is committed for the sake of all these things and others of this kind 
when, in consequence of an immoderate urge towards those things which are at the 
bottom end of the scale of good, we abandon the higher and supreme goods, that is 
you, Lord God, and your truth and your law.  These inferior goods have their delights, 
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but not comparable to my God who made them all’.529  These inferior objects are not 
evil or sinful in themselves, but they can become the occasion for sin by drawing 
people’s attention away from God in whom both they and the objects participate and 
obtain their being. 
Unfortunately, inferior and mutable objects are bound to distract because 
people derive knowledge through their senses.  In q. 64 of De diversis quaestionibus 
83, Augustine allegorically interprets the five husbands of the Samaritan woman at 
the well as the five senses of the body.530  He writes, ‘the first stage of man is steeped 
in these five senses of flesh by the necessity of a mortal nature whereby we are 
begotten in such a state after the sin of the first man that, the light of the mind not yet 
restored, we are subject to senses of the flesh, and we spend life engrossed in the 
flesh without any understanding of the truth’.531  This is a similar idea to that we 
encountered in Victorinus’s commentary on De inventione, and a commonplace in 
Neoplatonic philosophy: the mind is trapped in flesh, unaware of divine and human 
wisdom, until it has been aided by something transcendent:  for Victorinus, 
philosophical wisdom and for Augustine, participatory redemption.  But Augustine 
also describes this state as the ‘first stage’, and adds that it is necessarily ‘the 
condition of infants and small children, who are not yet capable of reason’.532  During 
childhood, this sensory knowledge is legitimate, granted by God the creator, and 
allegorically represented by the Samaritan woman’s first five husbands.  Augustine 
probably stressed the initial goodness of a life bound by the senses to counter 
Manichaeism. 
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 But knowledge delimited by the senses is only legitimate in children who 
have yet to reach the age of reason.  After that, the mind must not ‘use those senses as 
guides’.  Rather it must be subjected to the ‘rational spirit’ and take the ‘divine Word 
as its lawful husband’.  Augustine then introduces participative language: ‘Clinging 
in union to this Word (since man’s spirit itself will cling to Christ, because Christ is 
the head of the husband), the soul enjoys through spiritual embrace eternal life 
without any fear of separation’.533  Freedom from sensory knowledge is a sign of 
growing participation in God through the Word.  But Augustine thinks that this is 
clearly not the state of most people.  He writes, ‘...that woman was in the grip of an 
error which signified the mass of people in the world subjected to empty superstitions 
following the era of the five senses of the flesh which ruled the first age’ and this 
‘mass of people’ are caught in a diabolical ‘embrace’.  They are trapped in the 
temporal and mutable because they have not outgrown sensory knowledge to perceive 
the deeper, eternal delight of God. 
While addressing the question of grace in his letter to Honoratus (411/412), 
Augustine takes up again this idea of the need to outgrow dependency on the five 
senses in adulthood.  But he does this in a way that more clearly connects this growth 
with the problem of temporal delights:  
There is a certain life of a human being wrapped up in the senses of the 
flesh, given over to carnal enjoyment (gaudiis carnalibus), shunning carnal 
injury and pursuing carnal pleasure (voluptatem).  The happiness of this life 
is temporal.  It is a matter of necessity to begin with in this life, but a matter 
of will to continue it.  An infant is, of course, poured into this life from the 
womb of the mother; it flees as much as it can the injuries of this life; it 
desires pleasures; it can do no more.  But after a child has come to the age at 
which the use of reason awakens in it, the youngster can, when the will is 
helped by God, choose another life whose enjoyment lies in the mind, whose 
happiness is internal and eternal.534 
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People are born with an innate desire for sensory pleasure.  Again, this is perfectly 
good and natural in children, but in adults it is sinful if the enjoyment is not oriented 
towards God.  Augustine stresses this point when he writes, ‘The rational soul, 
therefore, can make good use of temporal and bodily happiness (temporali et 
corporali felicitate) if it does not devote itself to the creature while neglecting the 
creator, but makes that happiness rather serve the creator who has also given it out of 
the most abundant generosity of his goodness’.535  The way one does this is by 
‘distinguishing, choosing, and weighing’ the created goods so that God’s order is 
preserved and the lesser goods are subordinated to the greater.  Otherwise, one will 
become turned (convertat) towards what is worse and become disordered.  This gives 
us an insight into the mechanics of participative existence.  The movement towards 
God involves a delight that is oriented towards God, either directly or through the 
ordered enjoyment of created goods.  On the other hand, enjoying created goods for 
their own sake or in a disordered way causes people to tend towards wickedness and 
their own disorder. 
 Augustine is also concerned that temporal delights can captivate an un-
illumined mind.  He discusses the mechanics of how this works in De Triniate 10.5.7.  
There he explains that the mens is commanded to know itself so that it ‘should want 
to be placed according to its nature…under him it should be ruled by, over all that it 
ought to rule’.  In other words, the mens enjoys pre-eminence with Augustine’s 
conception of a well-ordered, hierarchical creation.  Instead, of keeping to this 
supreme position within creation, however, the mens becomes fixated with external 
beauty and wants to possess them for itself.  It undergoes its own fall by turning away 
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from God towards the inferior.  Augustine’s explanation of this fall takes us with 
rhetorical flourish into his understanding of participatory existence: 
So it turns away from him and slithers and slides down into less and less 
which is imagined to be more and more, it can find satisfaction neither in 
itself nor in anything else as it gets further away from him who alone can 
satisfy it.  So it is that in its destitution and distress it becomes excessively 
intent on its own actions and the disturbing pleasures (inquietas 
delectationes) it culls from them…536 
The enjoyment of the temporal leads to a Gollum-like existence at the edge of 
nothingness.  In this way, De Trinitate  10.7 echoes the passage from De vera 
religione discussed in the last chapter: ‘A life, therefore, which by voluntary defect 
falls away from him who made it, whose essence it enjoyed, and, contrary to the law 
of God, seeks to enjoy bodily objects which God made to be inferior to it, tends to 
nothingness’.537  Augustine makes the connection between temporal delight and death 
even clearer at the end of next chapter of De vera religione: ‘Life which delights in 
material joys and neglects God tends to nothingness and is thereby iniquity’.538  The 
descent towards nequitia is due to the power of love.  When people delight in 
anything they become stuck to it like glue.  In the case of temporal, mutable objects, 
their love binds them to the objects, drags them down and keeps them from returning 
to their own selves and to God.  People become alienated from God and the mind, 
glued to a fragmented and fragmenting world, succumbs, in the words of R.A. 
Markus, to ‘self-dissipation’.539 
 The way in which Augustine works out the problem of temporal versus 
spiritual delights is through his familiar distinction between those things which ought 
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only to be used (usus), those which ought to be enjoyed (fruitio), and those which can 
be both used and enjoyed.  The distinction itself is neatly stated in book one of De 
doctrina Christiana: ‘There are some things which are to be enjoyed, some which are 
to be used, and some whose function is both to enjoy and use’.540  Next, he explains 
that only God himself should be enjoyed while all else, including our neighbours, 
must only be ‘used’.  The only distinction he makes between objects and human 
beings (both classified as res) is that the latter should be ‘used’ with love.541  But 
even then, the love one has for one’s neighbour should be directed towards God; one 
does not love neighbours for their own sake but for God’s sake.   
Unsurprisingly, Augustine’s approach here has caused not a little disquiet 
among scholars.  For example, Anders Nygren describes Augustine’s approach as 
‘acquisitive’ and exploitive, seeking to utilise others, including God, merely for the 
single-minded ascent from the temporal towards the eternal bliss.542  Although others, 
such as Ragnar Holte, have developed more creative explanations for Augustine’s 
distinctions, no one appears comfortable with Augustine’s scheme.  Oliver 
O’Donovan in his landmark essay, ‘Usus and Fruitio in Augustine, De Doctrina 
Christiana 1’ examines the development of Augustine’s distinction from the 
Cassiciacum texts through his later works, focusing primarily on De doctrina 
Christiana, and concludes that Augustine never entirely mastered the division.543 He 
argues that Augustine himself was not comfortable with the idea of our ‘using’ our 
neighbours, and so avoided the term in his later writings.544  What is one to make of 
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Augustine’s distinction in light of what we have discovered about participatory 
existence and delight? 
 First, that Augustine makes such a distinction should not be at all surprising.  
Really, he is doing no more than thinking through, in terms of human love, how one 
relates to God and to the rest of creation.  As we have seen, the distinction between 
God as pure esse and all else as contingent esse is a fundamental one for Augustine.  
With such a conception, how one relates to God will necessarily be of a different 
order than how one relates to objects (res) of creation.  At one level, therefore, 
Augustine’s division of that which should be enjoyed and that which should only be 
used (with or without love) is merely a restatement of his concept of what it means to 
be contingent.  One might rephrase his division as the love of Supreme Being versus 
the love of contingent beings. 
 Second, one ought not to become too fixated on the word ‘use’.  In many 
ways, it is unfortunate that the Latin word usus should have come down into English 
as ‘use’ with its distinctive utilitarian overtones.  De Trinitate 6.11 should alert us to 
the possibility that usus has a different connotation in Latin than in English.  There, 
Augustine attempts to explain what Hilary means when he describes the Trinity as 
‘Eternity in the Father, form in the image, use in the gift’.545   It is here where he 
explains that what Hilary means by usus is that the Holy Spirit is the ‘love, delight, 
felicity, or blessedness’ of the Trinity.  Obviously, these are not images that come to 
mind in our own concept of ‘use’, and so Augustine probably has something less 
exploitive in mind when he employs usus to describe our relation to res.  In fact, usus 
in Latin can mean ‘use, application, practice, exercise, social intercourse, 
                                               
545
  trin. 6.11. 
187 
 
familiarity’.546  In the note to his translation of De Trinitate 6.11, Edmund Hill admits 
that he was tempted to translate usus as ‘intimacy’ as in his view it expresses 
Augustine’s mind better.547  In fact, usus recurs often in rhetorical theory to describe 
the sought after state in which the rhetor has grown so familiar with technique and 
style that they come naturally and automatically in the midst of an oration.548  In the 
end, there is no perfect equivalent in English to usus.  This does not, however, matter 
because if one focuses more on what Augustine is attempting to describe by the term 
usus instead of on the term itself, his intent becomes much clearer.  As will be shown, 
he is simply speaking of a different order of love than the one reserved for God: 
fruitio is a love that terminates in the beloved (seipsum) while usus is a love that 
relates to God through the beloved creature. 
 The division between the two types of love is evident when Augustine writes, 
‘To enjoy something is to hold fast (inhaerere) to it in love for its own sake 
(seipsam).  To use something is to apply whatever it may be to the purpose of 
obtaining what you love—if indeed it is something that ought to be loved (the 
improper use of something should be termed abuse)’.549  What Augustine has in mind 
here is not altogether different from participation.  As has been seen, inhaero is one 
of Augustine’s typical terms for participation.  Christ inheres human nature enabling 
the faithful to inhere God.  Accordingly, to enjoy something is to participate in or 
share a communion with it.  But what are we to make of his definition of usus? 
Certainly at face value it would seem exploitive since the res appears to be merely the 
means for obtaining what one loves.  Such an understanding is further bolstered by 
Augustine’s subsequent Platonic parable in which he compares our earthly pilgrimage 
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to a journey back to one’s homeland.   In order to accomplish this journey ‘we would 
need transport by land or sea which we could use to travel to our homeland, the object 
of our enjoyment’.550  He concludes from this analogy that ‘if we wish to return to the 
homeland where we can be happy we must use this world, not enjoy it, in order to 
discern “the invisible attributes of God, which are understood through what has been 
made” or, in other words, to derive eternal and spiritual value from corporeal and 
temporal things’.551 
 First, one ought to note that at this point Augustine is speaking broadly about 
that which may be enjoyed and that which ought to be used: that is, about God and 
the world.  One’s neighbour has yet to enter the discussion.  In this respect, Augustine 
is merely restating his view of temporal versus spiritual delights.  If people seek to 
enjoy the temporal, they will become distracted from God (conceived here as their 
homeland) and ‘reluctant to finish our journey quickly, being ensnared in the wrong 
kind of pleasure and estranged from the homeland whose pleasures could make us 
happy’.  Really, this claim is no different from what we discovered in De vera 
religione 11.21 or De Trinitate 10.5.7.  In fact, Augustine’s definition of fruitio as 
involving inherence explains why in De Trinitate (and elsewhere) he can say that the 
love of the temporal acts as a glue: the love itself acts as a bond that can only be 
broken with difficulty; thus, enjoyment of, or inherence in the temporal leads to 
bondage and ruin.  What De doctrina Christiana adds, however, is a theory about 
why a fixation on the temporal leads to such bondage and ruin: true enjoyment of the 
temporal is an attempt to find ultimate delight in that which is finite.552 
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Second, Augustine defines both fruitio and usus in terms of happiness.  His 
introduction to this section of De doctrina Christiana makes this clear: 
There are some things which are to be enjoyed, some which are to be used, 
and some whose function is both to enjoy and use.  Those which are to be 
enjoyed make us happy; those which are to be used assist us and give us a 
boost, so to speak, as we press on towards our happiness, so that we may 
reach and hold fast (inhaerere) to the things which make us happy. And we, 
placed as we are among things of both kinds, both enjoy and use them; but if 
we choose to enjoy things that are to be used, our advance is impeded and 
sometimes even diverted, and we are held back, or even put off, from attaining 
things which are to be enjoyed, because we are hamstrung by our love of 
lower things.553 
Although Nygren interprets happiness here as subjective, O’Donovan correctly notes 
that this is not how Augustine understood the concept.554  As we will examine further 
in the next chapter, beata vita for Augustine is synonymous with God and so is 
objective: ‘When I seek for you, my God, my quest is for the happy life’.555  In other 
words, he is not arguing that people choose what makes them happy and then employ 
the world to achieve that subjective joy.  Instead, because the happy life is God, one 
can only derive happiness from him.  To attempt to base happiness on anything else is 
futile or worse because it will ultimately do no more than ensnare people in ‘perverse 
sweetness’ (perversa suavitate) and alienate them from God.556  Augustine explains 
the difference: ‘For when the object of love is present, it inevitably brings with it 
delight (delectationem) as well.  If you go beyond this delight and relate it to your 
permanent goal, you are using it, and are said to enjoy it not in the literal sense but in 
a transferred sense.  But if you hold fast (inhaeseris) and go no further, making it the 
goal of your joy (laetitiae), then you should be described as enjoying it in the true and 
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literal sense of the word’.557  Only God is up to task of fulfilling such joy.  The 
implication of Augustine’s approach is really the opposite of what Nygren contends.  
To seek fulfilment in the contingent is exploitive because one seeks from the created 
object what it cannot deliver. 
Finally, the division between the enjoyment of God and the use of the 
temporal world is not entirely negative.  Things that can be used to ‘assist’ as if 
propping someone up (quasi adminiculamur).  Indeed, people depend on these 
temporal props in order to discern the ‘invisible attributes of God’ and to ‘grasp the 
eternal and spiritual from corporeal and temporal things’.  This description should not 
be surprising as it develops Augustine’s thesis in De doctrina Christiana that the 
world is divided between things (res) and signs (signa).  God is supremely res, indeed 
is beyond res, of whom all else is a signum.558  As Rowan Williams argues, God 
gives meaning to creation—it is ‘uttered’ and ‘meant’ by God—and so creation lacks 
its own meaning.559  Created beings are oriented towards God, pointing towards the 
one from whom they have their existence.  Such language is sacramental and suggests 
that enjoyment comes through the aid of temporal goods: fruitio and usus are, thus, 
closely connected.   
Understood in this way, Augustine’s choice of usus to describe our relation to 
our neighbour and, indeed, to ourselves becomes less problematic.  Williams explains 
why very clearly, ‘The language of uti is designed to warn against an attitude towards 
any finite person or object that terminates their meaning in their capacity to satisfy 
my desire, that treats them as the end of desire, conceiving my meaning in terms of 
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them and theirs in terms of me’.560  In effect, to enjoy someone on their own account 
is to abuse them since they are incapable of giving rest to the restless heart.   As 
Augustine writes, ‘if we enjoy one another in ourselves, we remain as it were on the 
road and put our hopes of happiness on a human being or an angel’.561  Augustine’s 
painful recollection of the loss of a dear friend in Confessiones 4.9-14 explains why 
this is so.  After speaking of all the shared pleasure of friendship—involving a 
‘thousand gestures of delight’—Augustine explains that one may not find ultimate 
solace in friendship because when a friend dies, one is plunged into ‘the darkness of 
grief, and as the sweetness is turned into bitterness the heart is flooded with tears’.562  
From the agony of loss, Augustine concludes, ‘wherever the human soul turns itself, 
other than to you, it is fixed in sorrows, even if it is fixed upon beautiful things 
external to you and external to itself, which would nevertheless be nothing if they did 
not have their being from you.  Things rise and set: in their emerging they begin as it 
were to be, and grow to perfection; having reached perfection, they grow old and 
die’.563  Augustine felt acutely the fleeting nature of the temporal; for him it could 
never be the source of true happiness or of fruitful enjoyment. 
Because love is involved in the use of our neighbours, however, Augustine 
admits that utilitarian love is practically enjoyment.  Enjoying God in our neighbour 
is to enjoy that person ‘in the Lord’.564  O’Donovan argues that this qualification of 
usus suggests that Augustine is uncomfortable with his absolute distinction between 
usus and fruitio and grudgingly provides for a third option by introducing a ‘looser’ 
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meaning of enjoyment.565  Perhaps another reason for this qualification is that 
Augustine recognises the special status of human beings: unlike other creatures, they 
rationally participate, however poorly, in God’s Being.  It logically follows then that 
human love should also be ‘in the Lord’.  In fact, Augustine’s very language suggests 
participation: to enjoy God in a neighbour one must enjoy that neighbour in God.  
Mutual human love, even defined as usus, is one facet of humanity’s shared 
participation. It is also worth noting that Augustine states that enjoying someone in 
the Lord ‘is very close to that of using someone or something together with delight 
(cum delectatione uti)’.566  That delight or pleasure must be directed towards God for 
it truly to be sweet just as the traces of God in creation must lead towards God in 
order to be signs. 
The enjoyment of others in the Lord is therefore a corporate activity, which 
may explain why Augustine makes a further distinction about usus. He writes, ‘a 
person who loves his neighbour properly should, in concert with him, aim to love 
God with all his heart, all his soul, and all his mind’.567   Later, he adds, ‘another 
human being should be loved more than our own bodies, because all these things are 
to be loved on account of God whereas another person can enjoy God together with 
us in a way which a body cannot…’568  The journey towards the homeland is not a 
lonely one.  Indeed, it requires the help of others on the same journey.  He writes, ‘Of 
all those who are capable of enjoying God together with us, we love (diligimus) some 
whom we are helping, and some who are helping us; some whose help we need and 
some whose needs we are meeting; some to whom we give no benefit and some by 
whom we do not expect any benefit to be given to us.  But it should be our desire that 
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they all love (diligant) God together with us…’569  Here Augustine presents his 
clearest expression of cum delectatione uti: far from being exploitation, it represents a 
fellowship in which amor is not an end in itself but part of the means whereby the 
faithful transcend the world to enjoy God.  Ultimately for Augustine, amor is 
grounded in and sanctified by dilectus/caritas. 
 
Consuetudo 
One reason why Augustine is so concerned about people enjoying the 
temporal is that delight impacts upon the memoria in such a way as to form a habit 
(consuetudo).  We have already encountered this aspect of Augustine’s thought in his 
discussion of the mechanics of sin in De sermone Domini in monte.  There, he points 
out that after someone consents to the delight experienced from an illicit suggestion 
the delight grows more palpable the next time one encounters the suggestion: 
If he then goes so far as to perform the corresponding act, the craving seems to 
be satisfied and extinguished, but a more intense pleasure is enkindled when 
the suggestion is repeated afterwards.  The pleasure, however, is far less than 
that which has turned into a habit (consuetudinem) by continuous acts, for it is 
very difficult to overcome this habit (consuetudinem).570 
This is a remarkably modern statement of the ‘law of diminishing returns’ whereby 
an addiction is formed.  This passage demonstrates that Augustine was acutely aware 
of the ‘addictive’ quality of pleasure, and this psychological awareness allowed him 
to conceive of how the Pauline image of bondage to sin works within human 
experience. 
 In fact, the habit-forming nature of delight and pleasure is an integral feature 
of Augustine’s theology and is central to his scheme of participatory existence.  
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Because the consent to delight—whether holy or carnal—creates a bond, both 
salvation and damnation are forms of bondage.  The question for Augustine, then, is 
not between autonomy and bondage but between a bondage to God, which is also 
paradoxically freedom, and the bondage to sin, which is death.  In both cases, the 
experience of delight and its influence over the will are what create the bond.  In the 
next chapter, we will examine how Augustine conceives of the bondage to God.  
Here, we will conclude the discussion of worldly delight by studying how the 
bondage to worldly delights works. 
 According to J.G. Prendiville, Augustine likely developed his idea of 
consuetudo from three sources: Aristotle’s Categories, the Enneads, and through his 
rhetorical training.571  In the Categories, which Augustine knew in its Latin 
translation (probably through Marius Victorinus572), Aristotle defines habit as a 
quality of a substance, not a substance itself: 
One sort of quality let us call ‘habit’ or ‘disposition’. Habit differs from 
disposition in being more lasting and more firmly established. The various 
kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits, for knowledge, even when 
acquired only in a moderate degree, is, it is agreed, abiding in its character and 
difficult to displace, unless some great mental upheaval takes place, through 
disease or any such cause. The virtues, also, such as justice, self-restraint, and 
so on, are not easily dislodged or dismissed, so as to give place to vice.573 
Habits (consuetudine) differ from dispositions (affectio) in that they are enduring and 
changed only with great difficulty.  Dispositions are ‘volatile’ and fickle, though they 
can become ‘inveterate’ and thus habits.  Aristotle concludes, ‘It is evident that men 
incline to call those conditions habits which are of a more or less permanent type and 
difficult to displace; for those who are not retentive of knowledge, but volatile, are 
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not said to have such and such a habit as regards knowledge, yet they are disposed, 
we may say, either better or worse, towards knowledge. Thus habit differs from 
disposition in this, that while the latter is ephemeral, the former is permanent and 
difficult to alter’.574  
According to Prendiville, Aristotle’s definition of habit became a 
commonplace in the ancient world.  One of clearest examples that Aristotle’s 
definition of habit informs Augustine’s own is found in De quantitate animae (387-
8): ‘Through habit (consuetudine) it becomes linked to the habitat and environment of 
the body, and from these it undergoes separation with reluctance as though they were 
parts of the body; this force of habit (consuetudinis vis) is called memory when the 
link with those places is not dissevered even by separation and the lapse of time’.575  
Aristotle also describes habit as a ‘second nature’ (consuetudo secunda natura), a 
term which Prendiville traces from ‘Aristotle through Cicero to Macrobius, Basil, and 
Augustine’.576  What Aristotle means by this is that the habit becomes so ingrained 
that it is acted upon instinctively without the need for prior deliberation.577    
Such a theory would obviously be important to rhetorical training, with its 
emphasis on inculcating theory through repetitive exercises.  In De oratore, Cicero 
speaks of the importance of habit while discussing the role of memory in public 
speaking.  According to him, memory offers ‘great usefulness’ and ‘great power’ by 
allowing the orator to retain what he learned in accepting a case, his own reflections 
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on the case, and his arrangement of arguments’.578  But almost no one has a memory 
keen enough to perform all these tasks without useful mnemonic devices and regular 
practice (consuetudine).579  He recommends, therefore, engaging the five senses 
(particularly sight) in the process of memorisation: by forming mental images, 
‘conveyed and imprinted...by one of the senses’, one can form mnemonic devices.580  
He concludes, ‘Practice, the starting point for developing a habit (consuetudo), will 
provide the requisite skill’.581  By habitually employing the senses, even in an 
imaginative way, a mental link is created between the memory and the object of 
memorisation.582  Clearly, Augustine’s own rhetorical training would have conformed 
to Cicero’s recommendation and would have provided him with the deeper awareness 
of how powerful habits can be. 
Augustine’s own reading and experience therefore led him to understand habit 
as a quasi-permanent state that develops through practice and, because of its enduring 
nature, can only be overcome with great difficulty.  The passage from his 
commentary on the Sermon on the Mount suggests that by then he had further 
analysed Aristotle’s definition to include the mechanics by which practice becomes 
habit.  The experience of pleasure creates the affective glue that entraps people and 
makes them unable to change their ways.  In the case of sin, habit ties sinners 
intimately to death.  Augustine takes up this very idea immediately following his 
analysis of the mechanics of sin and habit.  He writes, ‘just as sin is reached through 
the three successive stages of suggestion, pleasure (delectatione), and consent, so also 
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there are three distinct degrees of the same sin, accordingly as it is in the heart, in a 
deed, or in a habit (consuetudine)’.583  He likens these three degrees to kinds of death.  
The first is compared to death at home, the second to the corpse being carried outside, 
and the third, ‘when, by the weight of a bad habit (consuetudinis malae), the mind is 
pressed down as by a mound of earth—to the dead body rotting in the grave’.584 
Augustine returns to this image in a sermon preached shortly before 418 on 
Luke 7.11-15.585  He begins by distinguishing between bodily and spiritual death.586  
The first is visible and lamented, the second invisible and unnoticed.  Then, as in his 
commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, he gives three examples of people restored 
to life from the Gospels: Jairus’ daughter, the widow’s son in Luke 7, and Lazarus.  
These, he continues, represent the three types of sinners, ‘whom today too Christ is 
still restoring to life’.587  Jairus’ daughter signifies those who ‘have sin inside in their 
hearts, but don’t yet have it in actual deed’.  In other words, the sinful suggestion has 
been made, but they have yet to consent to or be persuaded by it.  The widow’s son 
represents those who, ‘after consenting to the wicked thought, proceed to put it into 
practice, like people carrying out the dead man’ and so the sin becomes public.  
Finally, Lazarus represents ‘people, who by doing what is wrong also tie themselves 
up in evil habits (mala consuetudine), become defenders of their own evil deeds’.588  
Augustine concludes vividly: 
So habituated (consuetudo erat) were they to their unspeakable vileness, that 
now wickedness (nequitia) sets the standard of justice....Such people, weighed 
                                               
583
  s. Dom. mon. 1.12.35 (CSEL 35.38). 
584
  s. Dom. mon. 1.12.35 (CSEL 35.38).  Augustine then compares restoration to Jesus’ raising of 
Jairus’ daughter, the second to the young man in Lk 7.14, and the last to the raising of 
Lazarus. 
585
  Edmund Hill, O.P., Sermons, III/4 (Brooklyn: New City Press, 1992), 43. 
586
  s. 98.2 (PL38.591): ‘Ille quidem mortuus erat corpore; illi autem mente’. 
587
  s. 98.5. 
588
  s. 98.5 (PL 38.594). 
198 
 
down by malignant habit (consuetudine maligna), are as it were not only dead 
but buried.  But what must I say, brothers and sisters? Not only buried, but as 
was said about Lazarus, He’s already stinking.  That massive stone placed 
against the tomb, that is the hard force of habit which weighs on the soul and 
doesn’t allow it either to rise or to breathe.589 
Augustine finally concludes by connecting the development of sinful habits to his 
threefold scheme of sin: ‘First, you see, there is the tingle of pleasure in the heart 
(delectationis in corde); second consent (consensio); third, the deed; and fourth, 
addiction, habit (consuetudo)’.590  Interestingly, in the first two stages of sin, death is 
not final; the chain of habit, however, binds one so powerfully to death (Augustine 
again brings up the image of Lazarus’s stench) that without Christ’s intervention 
freedom is impossible.   
Moreover, from his earliest writings, Augustine argues that consuetudo also 
binds people powerfully to the temporal.  Unlike ‘evil habits’, these habits do not 
arise from the consent to and enactment of actual sin.  Instead, such habits arise from 
an improper use, enjoyment or consideration of created goods, including the body.  In 
De moribus, Augustine describes the body as a person’s ‘heaviest bond’ 
(gravissimum vinculum) that is granted power over the soul by the soul’s fear of pain 
and death.591  The reason for this is that the soul loves the body ‘from the force of 
habit’ (vi consuetudinis), and does not realise that through ordered use and God’s 
grace its resurrection and reformation can be effected.592   
De vera religione provides an even clearer description of the bondage that 
comes through temporal habits; interestingly, this appears during Augustine’s 
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discussion of the persuasive power of classical philosophy.593  He begins his work by 
defining the ‘good and blessed life’ as the ‘true religion wherein one God is 
worshipped and acknowledged with purest piety to be the beginning of all existing 
things, originating, perfecting, and containing the universe’.594  Against this true 
religion, he sets those who prefer to worship many gods.  Socrates, however, 
demonstrated the falsehood of polytheism by mockingly swearing ‘by a dog or a 
stone or any other object that happened to be near at hand’ in order to show others 
how ‘sunk in superstition’ they were.595  Although Socrates’ insights were written 
down by Plato, ‘making it pleasant to read rather than potent to persuade’, the 
philosophers were not fit to change minds because they publicly shared in the 
‘idolatrous superstitions and worldly vanity’.   
People need to be persuaded because they have developed worldly habits that 
bind them to the visible world.  According to Augustine, so long as the rational soul 
‘is weakened by love of things that come to be and pass away, or the pain at losing 
them, so long as it is devoted to the custom of this life (consuetudo huius uitae) and 
to the bodily senses, and becomes vain among vain images, it laughs at those who say 
that there is something which cannot be seen by the eyes, or conjured up by any 
phantasm, but can be beheld by the mind alone, by the intelligence’.596  Such habits 
ground people in contingent existence, separating them from the God who, as De vera 
religione states in its first line, is the source and sustainer of all life.  Later, Augustine 
asks rhetorically for someone to present him with anyone who has truly resisted 
earthly bondage.  He demands, ‘Give me a man who can resist the carnal senses and 
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the impressions which they impose on the mind; one who can resist human custom 
(consuetudo hominum) and human praise...’597  Finally, he calls the attachment to the 
world consuetudo carnalis, which the Holy Spirit bids people to resist and from 
which God calls them.598  As Prendiville notes, in De vera religione Augustine shows 
how consuetudo corporum ‘tightens its hold’ on humanity, leading it to neglect God 
and prefer created goods to the Creator.599 
As with illicit delight, Augustine portrays the experience of consuetudo most 
vividly in the Confessiones, in this case in his discussion of his final conversion to 
Christianity.  Book 8 opens with Augustine having accepted the spiritual nature of 
God and dealt with the problem of evil.  He has accepted the truths of Nicene 
Christianity.  Now, he claims to God that his desire is ‘not to be more certain of you 
but to be more stable in you’.600 The difficulty for him at this time is that although he 
is ‘attracted’ by Christian belief, he is still ‘reluctant to go along its narrow paths’.601  
In actuality, as he proceeds to explain, his difficulty is that he believes he is called to 
celibacy, but has not yet the inclination to embrace it.602  And so he finds himself 
praying, ‘Grant me chastity and abstinence, but not yet’.603 
One possible way to look at Augustine’s situation is in terms of Ciceronian 
rhetoric.  He has been presented with the truth or the argument of Christianity.  He 
has even gone so far as to accept it.  But he has not yet been persuaded; the mental 
acceptance has not yet compelled an active response.  The argument—that ‘by the 
                                               
597
  ver. rel. 64 (CCL 32.229). 
598
  ver. rel. 88 (CCL 32.245). 
599
  Prendiville, ‘The Development of the Idea of Habit’, 32. 
600
  conf. 8.1.1.  For an insightful discussion of consuetudo in book 8 of the Confessiones in its 
wider context, see Prendiville (1972), 57-83. 
601
  conf. 8.1.1. 
602
  conf. 8.1.2.  ‘But I was firmly tied by woman.  The apostle did not forbid me to marry, though 
he exhorted me to something better and very much wished that all men were as unattached as 
he himself’. 
603
  conf. 8.7.17. 
201 
 
witness of all creation I had found you our Creator and your Word who is God beside 
you and with you is one God, by whom you created all things’604—has not yet caused 
him to live as he believes he ought; his affections have yet to be converted.  
Considering the rhetorical paradigm that lies behind this part of his confession, it 
should not be surprising that in the midst of this discussion Augustine should dwell 
on the two rhetors who most influenced him: Victorinus and Cicero.   
First, Simplicianus, whom Augustine is visiting, presents the memory of 
Victorinus to ‘exhort’ Augustine to the ‘humility of Christ’.605  Augustine recounts 
the story of Victorinus’s conversion from paganism to Christianity, dwelling at length 
on the delight and joy his conversion caused,606 and concludes by claiming that the 
story caused him to be ‘ardent to follow his example’.607  But the example is not 
sufficient: 
I sighed after such freedom, but was bound not by an iron imposed by anyone 
else but by the iron of my own choice.  The enemy had a grip on my will and 
so made a chain for me to hold me a prisoner.  The consequence of a distorted 
will is passion.  By servitude to passion, habit is formed (facta est 
consuetudo), and habit to which there is no resistance becomes necessity.  By 
these links, as it were, connect one to another...a harsh bondage held me under 
restraint.608 
As in De vera religione, Augustine is bound by a ‘carnal’ will, ‘harsh bondage’ that 
restrained him from actually converting.  The power of habit makes persuasion more 
difficult; not even the power of imitation—so important in classical philosophy and 
rhetoric—is sufficient to give Augustine freedom. 
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Next, Augustine recalls how Cicero, through his Hortensius, had ‘stirred’ 
him to a ‘zeal for wisdom’.609  He quotes or paraphrases Hortensius to indicate that 
the search for wisdom alone should have caused him to prefer wisdom above worldly 
fame and fortune.  But though he had reached a point in which he was convinced of 
truth, the repercussions of his embracing the faith remained unattractive.  He yearns 
to be like those whose souls had been healed, but his heart remains fixed to his old 
self.  At this point, he no longer fears conversion, only that it will come too quickly 
and suddenly.  Bound therefore by his carnal habits, Augustine’s heart remains 
unpersuaded; truth has not yet compelled action. 
The result for Augustine is a state not dissimilar to an audience caught 
between two contending arguments.  He presents the conflict as one between two 
wills operating within a single body: one that seeks to rise towards God, the other 
‘weighed down by habit’ (consuetudine praegravatus).610  At this point, it occurs to 
Augustine that this might be interpreted in a Manichean vein to suggest that two 
autonomous wills—one good, the other evil—existed in his soul.  He guards against 
this by arguing that one can have two competing wills compelling one to evil (such as 
deciding whether to murder by poison or a dagger) or to good (such as deciding to 
read the Gospels or a psalm).  His discussion of this latter point reveals how delight 
operates at the heart of the indecision.  Delight pulls the will, and at this moment the 
delight of Augustine’s old self, seen as his carnal habit, resists the persuasive voice of 
truth and the delight of the new self.  What he says about the choice between two 
goods holds for the choice between the old will and the new: ‘If all these offer equal 
delight (pariter delectent) at one and the same time, surely the divergent wills pull 
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apart the human heart while we are deliberating which is the most attractive option to 
take?’611 
Again, this state is like one in the process of committing a sin.  Christian 
truth has presented its suggestion just as the devil presents the suggestion of a sinful 
action.  But truth has not yet wholly delighted Augustine’s heart so that he will 
consent to it.  And so the old habit continues to hold him in bondage, though only 
barely.  In desperation, his old self seeks to persuade him to turn back: 
Vain trifles and the triviality of the empty-headed, my old loves, held me 
back.  They tugged at the garment of my flesh and whispered: ‘Are you 
getting rid of us?’ And ‘from this moment we will never be with you again, 
not for ever and ever’.  And ‘from this moment this and that are forbidden to 
you for ever and ever’.  What they were suggesting in what I have called ‘this 
and that’—what they were suggesting, my God, my God, may your mercy 
avert from the soul of your servant!  What filth, what disgraceful things they 
were suggesting....They were not frankly confronting me face to face on the 
road, but as it were whispering behind my back, as if they were tugging at me 
as I was going away, trying to persuade me to look back.  Nevertheless they 
held me back.  I hesitated to detach myself, to be rid of them, to make the leap 
to where I was being called.  Meanwhile the overwhelming force of habit 
(violenta consuetudo) was saying to me: ‘Do you think you can live without 
them?’612 
So, the habit of worldly delights whispers, calls, and seeks to persuade Augustine to 
turn away from God’s call, to continue his servitude to wickedness, his trajectory 
towards death and damnation.  The end of Book 8 of the Confessiones presents the 
reader with a vivid portrayal of what the oratorical battle between God and the devil 
feels like to the individual caught in the contest.  It divides the heart, pulls the soul in 
two opposite directions, and leaves the partly penitent sinner in a state of abjection 
and misery.   
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 At the start of this chapter, we saw how Augustine’s concept of conversion 
was informed by his training in persuasion.  He had a clear concept of human 
motivation, the helplessness of the human will, and the need to engage the heart in 
order to persuade people to act.  His conversion to Christianity deepened those 
insights so that he became convinced that what for Cicero meant the good of the 
Republic now meant the salvation of the individual.  Humanity had been created to 
heed God’s call, indeed had heeded that call in its formation, but had been persuaded 
to turn away from God towards nothingness.  As a former rhetor, Augustine could not 
but conceive of how that happened in terms of rhetoric.  The persuasive power of 
illicit and temporal delights had overwhelmed the human will, glued it to itself 
through love and delight, and caused it to enact sinful acts that became the links of an 
oppressive chain that bound it to death.  His self-analysis of his theft of the pears in 
book two of the Confessiones demonstrates what this process is like and where it 
leads.  Similarly, his analysis of motivation in terms of Ciceronian oratory—the 
suggestion, delight, and consent to sinful action—explains the mechanics of this 
bondage, leaving the individual helpless in the chain of carnal habits.   
 Recall once more Cicero’s goal of oratory: ‘I think nothing is more admirable 
than being able, through speech, to have hold of people’s minds, to win over their 
inclinations, to drive them at will in one direction, to draw them at will from 
another’.613  This is precisely the dynamic at work in Book 8 of the Confessiones: the 
persuasive power of illicit and temporal delights has taken hold of Augustine’s mind 
and driven him helplessly in whatever direction it wills.  Really, the constraining 
habit that lays hold of him merely speaks to the enormous power of the devil’s 
persuasive speech.  That beguiling oratory is never silent, continuing to whisper, 
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suggest, and call Augustine back from God even at the very moment of his 
conversion.  That persuasive whispering comes not as an actual voice, but as the 
presentation of all the forbidden delights Augustine will have to forsake.  The 
‘deliciousness’ and ‘sweetness’ of sin and temporal delights are what give the devil’s 
oratory its persuasive force so that Augustine’s movement towards self-destruction is, 
ironically, one filled with pleasure, albeit a pleasure that never satisfies.  To save him, 
to effect for him the participatory redemption begun by Christ’s incarnation, God 
must overwhelm his enslaved will, take hold of his mind, and persuade him to move 
towards eternal bliss. 
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6 
Delectatio Domini 
 
As has now been seen, Augustine had a keen sense of the power of worldly 
delight to beguile and entrap people in a love that would, apart from God’s grace, 
lead to damnation.  His awareness came as much through self- reflection and his 
rhetorical training and experience as through any particular doctrine.  Indeed, that 
experience and training enabled him to enrich orthodox moral teaching by showing 
(in what might be called psychological terms) how individuals succumb to sin and 
damnation.  Before his conversion, his life had been devoted to the art of persuasion 
and that experience had imparted a profound insight into how people come into 
bondage to death.  But his insights into God’s own oratory, the nature of divine 
delight and eloquence, present an even richer theological vision that expresses 
something of the nature of God, humanity, and creation.  Yet, that very richness 
makes Augustine’s concept all the more difficult to grasp.  God’s oratory and 
spiritual delight are not just more powerful than the devil’s oratory and worldly 
delight; they are of an entirely different nature and order.  Satan may suggest or 
delight, but such appeals are the extent of his oratory.  God’s oratory, on the other 
hand, is none other than himself and spiritual delight an expression of himself.  
Because of this, the experience of that oratory and delight is actually the experience 
of redemption and the fruitful, divinising participation in God’s own nature and 
goodness.   
In order to understand how Augustine’s conception of God’s oratory works, I 
will begin by examining one of his favourite images: the contemplation of the Lord’s 
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delight.  Drawing from Psalm 27.4 (26.4), Augustine presents God’s own delight as 
the object of Christian contemplation.  This divine delight is actually God himself 
which Augustine identifies even more precisely with God’s goodness.  The 
connection between delight and goodness will lead to the next point of my argument: 
Augustine’s contention that everything that partakes of God’s goodness—i.e. all of 
creation—partakes also of God’s delight; delight is, therefore, woven into every 
particle of creation and imbues everything with beauty.  Augustine develops his 
thought on beauty in De ordine and De musica, describing creation as God’s poem 
that is fundamentally a collection of numerical or rhythmic relationships.  Humankind 
is naturally attuned to these rhythms; indeed, each individual’s very being reveals 
those rhythms.  Next, I will further consider Augustine’s understanding of beauty by 
examining his terms of ‘measure’, ‘number’ and ‘order’ (mensura, numerus and 
pondus or ordo) and their relation in his thought to the Trinity; God is the true and 
eternal beauty behind all created beauty.  The beauty of creation therefore proclaims 
the Creator, and the delight this beauty elicits summons humanity to praise God also.  
Creation thereby participates through its beauty in God’s redemptive oratory.  I will 
conclude by surveying the beata vita, or the life that, according to Augustine, 
responds and shares in the delight of God’s goodness.  Like delight, the happy life is 
simply God himself and to be fully happy is to participate fully in God.  Ultimately, 
the conversion towards the happiness of participative life comes through delight.  
 
‘...to contemplate the Lord’s delight’ 
On 23 December 406, Augustine preached a sermon in his cathedral church 
on John 1.15-18 in which he addresses the old dichotomy between grace and law by 
arguing that though Christians continue to be bound by the Old Testament law (more 
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explicitly the Decalogue) they now enjoy the promise of eternal life through grace.614  
He suggests that the ‘grace upon grace’ of John 1.16 refers to the promise of eternal 
life, which he interprets through the lens of John 17.3 to imply direct knowledge of 
God.  Now Christians only believe, but in heaven they will see God.  To illustrate his 
point, Augustine asks his flock to consider a ‘certain lover’ in the Psalms who seeks 
longingly for only one thing.615  He wonders aloud about the nature of this ‘one thing’ 
and suggests that one might reasonably suppose it to be the land of milk and honey, 
the subjection of foes, or the gain of worldly power and resources: all powerful 
desires expressed in the Psalms.   But he dismisses these as ‘carnal’ and returns to 
musing about the nature of the ‘one thing’ as he builds rhetorically towards his 
answer.  Again he refers to the ‘lover’ in the psalms: ‘After all he is on fire with love, 
he never stops sighing and sweating and panting.  Let us see what he is asking for?’  
Finally, he provides his answer by citing part of Ps. 27.4 (26.4): the lover seeks to 
dwell in the house of the Lord.  He concludes, ‘And supposing you do dwell in the 
house of the Lord, where will your joy come from?  That I may gaze, he says, upon 
the delight of the Lord’.616  Augustine must have had his congregation on the edge of 
their seats by this point, because his mention of the Lord’s delight provokes excited 
cheers.617  But he is not done yet.  He next asks his cheering congregation what this 
delight might be: ‘Can it be seen with the eyes?  Can it be touched?  Is it a sort of 
beauty that delights the eyes?’618  He answers these questions by presenting two 
contrasting images: a comely thief who delights the eyes but repels the spirit, and a 
just, ‘bent old man’ who repels the eyes but delights the spirit.  From these images, he 
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draws the lesson that God’s delight is invisible to the eyes and it is this kind of delight 
people should long to see.  This invisible delight is none other than God himself, who 
should be desired for himself and not for any reward.  And so, Augustine concludes 
as last,  
Let your soul say, One thing have I asked of the Lord, this will I seek; that I 
may dwell in the house of the Lord throughout all the days of my life, that I 
may gaze on the delight of the Lord....Such will be the beauty of this delight 
that it will always be present to you, and you will never be satisfied—or 
rather, you will always be satisfied and never be satisfied.  You see, if I say 
you will not be satisfied, it will imply hunger; if I say you will be satisfied, I 
fear boredom; where there will be neither boredom nor hunger, I do not 
know what to say; but God has something to give to those who find no 
words to say it, and something to give to the believer that they will be 
welcome.619 
Thus, Augustine presents his congregation with his vision of heaven: an eternally 
satisfying gaze upon God’s own delight.  The idea of looking at or contemplating the 
delight of the Lord is one to which he returns time and again.620 
 One of the first places one encounters this reference to Ps. 27.4 is in the 
Confessiones.  In Book Eleven Augustine turns to prayer for help in understanding 
the nature of time.  He speaks about this desire to grow in knowledge in terms of 
love: ‘Grant what I love.  For I love, and this love was your gift’.621  Augustine hopes 
that his attempt both to understand time and to know God will ultimately permit him 
so to live that he might ‘contemplate the delight of the Lord’.  As in his sermon on 
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John, eternal life, knowledge, and the contemplation of God’s delight are closely 
connected.   
That same connection appears, for example, in Book One of De Trinitate.  
There, Augustine begins by suggesting that contemplation ‘is the reward of faith’ that 
comes through the cleansing of the heart through faith.622  Later, he explains that this 
will be a ‘direct contemplation of God, in which all good actions have their end, and 
there is everlasting rest and joy (gaudium) that shall not be taken away from you’.623  
In his view, the story of Mary and Martha offers a ‘sort of picture’ of what that joy 
will be like.  Mary sits contentedly, gazing upon her Lord, completely intent on truth.  
Augustine suggests this is a taste of that which the Psalmist seeks: to contemplate the 
Lord.  While here it is the contemplation itself that brings joy, in 1.4.31 he refers to 
the joy of God manifesting himself to one who ‘sighs’ and seeks only to ‘dwell in the 
house of the Lord...to behold the delight of the Lord’ (ut contempler delectationem 
Domini).624 
Mary of Bethany, a standard model for contemplatives, reappears in 
connection with the ‘delight of the Lord’ in sermo 169, preached around A.D. 416.  
Augustine begins, however, with Paul, musing aloud how the Apostle fell short of 
perfection: ‘He had faith, he had virtue, he had hope, he was aflame with charity, he 
worked miracles, he was an unsurpassable preacher, he bore with all kinds of 
persecution, patient in all circumstances, loving the Church, carrying in his heart the 
concern for the Churches’.625 Yet, continues Augustine, by his own admission, Paul 
lacked something.  He suggests that ‘to contemplate the delight of the Lord’ was the 
object of Paul’s quest: until he had grasped that delight, he remained imperfect.  Mary 
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and Martha give the same lesson.  Mary’s choice is the better because she 
contemplated her Lord: ‘That was the one and only life, to contemplate the delight of 
the Lord.  This we cannot do, though, in the dark night of this world’.626 
Augustine also uses Ps. 27.4 to speak about a divine delight that is utterly 
secure and entirely free from fear of loss.  This sense, of course, is apparent at the end 
of his sermon on John’s Gospel examined above where he attempts to express how 
the Lord’s delight can be eternally satisfying without becoming interminably boring.  
Likewise, in Book Twelve of Confessiones, Augustine describes the ‘heaven of 
heavens’ as the place where God’s ‘delight is contemplated without any failure or 
wandering away to something else’.627  The delight is completely and eternally 
satisfying and secure.  As with Mary’s contemplation, such delight can only be tasted 
fleetingly in this life; full vision and full delight must await heaven.   
Augustine speaks most poignantly about the dependability of God’s delight in 
a letter written to a wealthy Roman widow named Proba who had fled with her 
widowed daughter-in-law to North Africa after the sack of Rome in 410.628  Much of 
the letter is about the happy life and in particular the search for secure happiness 
through prayer.629  This search naturally brings Ps. 27.4 to Augustine’s mind: 
But whoever asks this one thing from the Lord and seeks it, asks for it with 
certainty and security and does not fear that it may be harmful when he has 
received it, for without it nothing is of benefit, whatever else one might 
receive as he ought.  It is, after all, the one true and only happy life, namely, 
that, immortal and incorruptible in body and spirit, we contemplate the 
delight of the Lord for eternity....There, of course, is found the fountain of 
life, for which we must thirst in prayer as long as we live in hope and do not 
yet see what we hope for, under the protection of his wings before whom is 
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all our desire, in order that we may be inebriated by the richness of his house 
and may drink of the torrent of his pleasure (torrente voluptatis).630   
This is among Augustine’s most evocative language about the ‘Lord’s delight’, 
conveying the experience of that delight in terms of a fountain that inebriates.  
Clearly, the eternal contemplation of the ‘delight of the Lord’ is Augustine’s image of 
heaven.  Although, in the present life such delight can only be tasted, it remains the 
one thing that the faithful seek.  The reason for this is that the ‘Lord’s delight’ and 
God are synonymous.  He is the ‘fountain of life’ and ‘eternal delight’ (immortalium 
deliciarum)’.631  To seek eternal delight is to seek God.  He states this clearly not only 
in his Jo. eu. tr. 3.21 but also in his sermon on Psalm 77: ‘A heart is right with God 
when it seeks God for God’s own sake.  It has truly desired only one thing of the 
Lord, and that it seeks, to live in the Lord’s house always and contemplate his joy 
(contempletur ejus delectationem)’.632  
 What is one to make of these references to the ‘delight of the Lord’?  First, it 
should be recognized that the syntax of the psalm governs Augustine’s own language.  
Thus, in many of these passages it is possible to understand him as merely using Ps. 
27.4 to express a scripturally evocative image for the joy of everlasting life.  Indeed, 
in some passages he refers instead to the delight of contemplating the Lord, which 
describes much more the experience of contemplation rather than the object of that 
contemplation.633  Undoubtedly, this is at least part of his intention and there is a 
danger in taking his language too literally.   
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One of Augustine’s sermons on Ps. 27 (26), however, begins to clarify his 
image of the Lord’s delight.  In commenting on verse four, he starts by contrasting 
the fleeting nature of this world with the enduring nature of heaven: this world is like 
a tent whereas heaven is a true and lasting home.634  Next, he contrasts the type of 
happiness obtained in each place.  Within the earthly tabernacle, people tend to seek 
happiness in various things, many of which are unworthy of human love.635  God 
justly either takes away such inappropriate objects of love (which is an act of 
kindness) or grants the desire (which is an act of anger).636  As we saw in the previous 
chapter, such ephemeral happiness merely binds people to death and leads them 
towards damnation.  But the faithful will seek to love only that which is worthy of 
love and above all else to ‘dwell in the Lord’s house all the days’ of their life.  This 
reference to Ps. 27.4 then sets the stage for an extended reflection on the Lord’s 
delight. 
Augustine first considers the type of luxury people desire in this life: ‘In our 
earthly dwellings men and women like to have different sorts of luxuries and 
comforts, and each one wants to live in a house where the mind will find nothing to 
offend it, and many things to give it pleasure (habeat multa quae delectent)’.637  He 
then asks what the equivalent of this would be in God’s house.  His answer is the 
contemplation of the Lord’s delight: ‘Now you can see what I love, now you can see 
why I want to dwell in the Lord’s house all my days.  It offers something wonderful, 
the chance to contemplate the Lord’s own delight (delectationem ipsius Domini)’.638  
As before, the Lord’s own delight can only be tasted briefly in the present; Augustine 
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admits that he cannot truly contemplate God because he is ‘fallen over’, but in heaven 
he ‘shall stand up and gaze’.  The image of having fallen over flows naturally into 
Augustine’s now familiar language about participatory redemption.  Because the 
human race has fallen and needs to be raised up to God, Christ became incarnate:  
We fell, he came down.  He ascended, we are lifted up, because no one has 
gone up to heaven except for the one who descended...We should not lose 
hope because he ascended alone, for he raises us up, even us, to whom he 
descended as we were falling.  We shall stand before him and contemplate, 
and this great delight will be ours to enjoy fully (et magna delectatione 
perfruemur).639  
After calling for his congregation to seek to turn their gaze beyond visible beauty (as 
in Jo. eu. tr. 3.21) so that they will desire something good, he writes, ‘But there is  a 
simple good, sheer Goodness-Itself, in virtue of which all things are good, the Good 
itself from which all good things derive their goodness.  This is the delight of the 
Lord, this is what we shall contemplate’.640  Here, we see the close link Augustine 
makes between delight and goodness.  The ‘Lord’s delight’ which the faithful will 
contemplate in heaven is actually God’s goodness from which all others goods flow.  
This effectively connects delight with participatory existence since to participate 
actively in God’s goodness is to contemplate his delight.641  Because goodness and 
delight are effectively united, Augustine can then conclude that in heaven the faithful 
will be able to ‘enjoy that bliss to the full with no worries, the bliss (deliciis) that is 
the Lord my God himself’.642   
 From all these passages we can gather several crucial points about 
Augustine’s concept of divine delight.  First, the ‘delight of the Lord’ is itself an 
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object of contemplation.  Augustine, of course, believes that the heavenly experience 
of contemplation will itself be delightful, but the phrasing of the psalm pushes him to 
think of the object of that contemplation as delight.  In other words, the redeemed will 
experience the delight of contemplating eternally and securely God’s own delight.  
But, second, this eternal delight can only be tasted in this life.  In every instance, the 
‘delight of the Lord’ refers more specifically to the object of a heavenly 
contemplation; it is, for all intents and purposes, the Beatific Vision. Third and most 
importantly, the ‘Lord’s delight’ is God himself.  Thus, in the Confessiones, 
Augustine can proclaim to God, ‘You are eternal to yourself, you are your own joy 
(gaudium)’.643  In this way, God’s delight is just like God’s love or wisdom: Deus est 
quidquid in se habet.  Finally, Augustine connects the ‘Lord’s delight’ most closely to 
God’s goodness, which introduces delight into the scheme of participatory existence 
and redemption. 
 Before proceeding any further, therefore, we can discern one crucial way in 
which spiritual delight differs from worldly delight.  In his discussion of worldly or 
carnal delight, Augustine presents that harmful pleasure as something mediated 
through sensory experience.  Delight is situated in the subject, who experiences 
pleasure through his or her various senses and becomes beguiled by sin, the world or 
the devil.  Thus, the devil uses delight, like an accomplished orator, to lead the 
subject away from God.  Spiritual delight, on the other hand, exists most fully in God: 
indeed, is God.  God does not use delight but is delight.  Whereas the experience of 
worldly delight is simply an experience of pleasure, the experience of spiritual delight 
is an experience of God himself.  The former is only appreciated through the 
mediation of the senses, the latter most perfectly in the act of contemplation.  Perhaps 
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the most telling way in which Augustine expresses the difference between God and 
the devil is that while he is happy to speak of God delighting (in his creation, the 
faithful, good deeds) not once (so far as I can tell) does he ever suggest that the devil 
himself delights.   
 
Delight and Creation 
By uniting goodness and delight, Augustine ensures that the Lord’s delight 
does not exist merely in the intelligible realm.  Divine delight is not like wisdom, 
inaccessible without the healing of the spirit.644  Rather, God’s delight is woven into 
the warp and woof of creation and is revealed to everyone in the form of beauty.  
Delight and beauty are also objective and transcend the creaturely experience of it.  
Indeed, God delights in his own creation.  This can be seen, for example, in De 
Genesi adversus Manicheos where Augustine pokes fun at the Manicheans for being 
unable to understand Genesis 1.3 and compares God to a craftsman who is both 
satisfied and pleased (placuerunt) with the product of his craftsmanship.645  
Augustine takes the statement, ‘God saw the light and that it was good’ as an 
expression of pleasurable satisfaction.  Likewise, in De Genesi ad litteram, he writes: 
‘God saw that it was good; it was out of the same genial courtesy (benignitate), after 
all, that he took pleasure in (placuit) what had been made, as that it had pleased 
(placuit) him that it should be made’.646  God is such that he delights in his own 
creation; like a craftsman both the intention and the product are pleasing.  In this way, 
to be good is not just to be delightful but even more to be delightful or pleasing to 
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God.647  In other words, according to Augustine, creation was pleasing to God before 
it was ever pleasing to humankind.648  The delightfulness of creation is, therefore, 
objective rather than subjective. 
The way in which Augustine most often expresses the delightfulness of 
creation is by considering its beauty.  From what we have learned about the Lord’s 
delight, we can understand why this should be.  As we saw, for example, in Jo. eu. tr. 
3.21 and De Trinitate 1.18, Psalm 27.4 suggests that God’s delight is something that 
is gazed upon or contemplated.  The visual quality of the experience of God’s delight 
suggests beauty, as is clear from the mention of beauty in this regard in Jo. eu. tr. 
3.21.649  Furthermore, God himself recognizes the beauty of his entire creation even 
when humanity is blind to it, because God himself is the beauty by which creation is 
beautiful.650  
 
De ordine and De musica 
One of Augustine’s most striking attempts at explaining the objective nature 
of the delightful beauty of creation comes in the final and climactic book of his early 
treatise, De musica, completed not long after his conversion.  In a sense, the nature 
and scope of this work is set towards the end of his earlier work, De ordine, where he 
describes the contemplative ascent towards God.  After ascending through grammar, 
dialectic, and rhetoric,651 reason finds itself longing to be transported immediately to 
a ‘most blessed contemplation of things divine’.652  This yearning is a desire, enabled 
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by the liberal arts, to behold a true beauty that can be enjoyed contemplatively 
without recourse to the senses.  Like the image of contemplating the ‘Lord’s delight’ 
this divine enjoyment is a visual experience of divine beauty through the mind’s eye.  
But at this stage of the ascent, reason is not yet prepared for such a vision, and 
therefore it turns its gaze ‘slightly’ (paululum) towards the senses.   
At this point, Augustine could have taken a Manichaean or Neoplatonic 
approach and conveyed this inability to enjoy the divine in entirely negative terms.  
But he does not.  First, he considers aural perception, distinguishing between the 
different types of sounds that only find value if ‘arranged in fixed measure of time 
and in modulated variation of high and low pitch’.653  This realisation then leads 
reason to investigate the nature of these sounds by working through its discovery of 
long and short syllables, segments and members and the idea of reversion until finally 
discerning rhythm, which in Latin is simply number.  Augustine concludes, ‘And thus 
poets were begotten of reason’.654  For Augustine, poets essentially work with 
‘numeric proportions’, which their studies have shown to be ‘divine and eternal’ 
(divinos et sempiternos).655 These divine and eternal numbers are the reality behind 
the matter of sound.  He defines the study of these aural, numerical proportions as 
music.  Having grasped this stage of investigation, reason then advances to the visual 
and finds precisely the same pattern as with sound: ‘And scanning the earth and the 
heavens, it [reason] realized that nothing pleased it but beauty; and in beauty, design; 
and in design, dimensions; and in dimensions, number’.656  This harmonious beauty is 
true even of the heavens (for example, the motion of the stars and planets) that arouse 
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the mind to study them and observe ‘dimension and number’ governing in the ‘fixed 
and unerring courses of the stars and regulated spacing of distance’.657   
 Consequently, Augustine’s survey of sensory perception paints contingent 
existence as objectively beautiful because it is governed by dimension and number.  
Number is so fundamental to existence and determinative that even people untrained 
in music sing harmoniously and birds build ‘accurately and proportioned’ nests.658  
These numbers and dimensions are themselves divine and eternal, and they underpin 
and define the world’s beauty.  Essentially, they are the forma of contingent 
existence.  In other words, during the atemporal, creative stage of formatio, the Word 
provided forma by endowing formless primordial creation with the dimension and 
number that enable everything to enjoy both continued existence and beauty.  To 
exist within time is to have forma, or dimension and number, which provide beauty.  
Indeed, the Latin itself—forma can mean both ‘form’ and ‘beauty’—would suggest 
the connection to Augustine’s literate mind.  So, conformity to the eternal and divine 
pattern—the forma of the Word—makes all contingent existence existentially good 
and aesthetically beautiful.659   
Augustine draws out this conclusion more fully in Book Six of De musica in 
which he uses Ambrose’s hymn, Deus Creator Omnium, to investigate music in 
relation to God and the soul.660  As in De ordine, he envisages a close relationship 
between poetry and music both of which derive their beauty from rhythm and 
proportion.661  This enables Augustine to think of creation as a cosmic poem (carmini 
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universitatis) that is given shape by number and dimension in relation to God.662  In 
fact, the whole of contingent existence is really not a thing itself but a series of 
interrelated numbers.663  Catherine Pickstock notes that this implies that creation is 
‘nothing but relations ordered in certain regular and analogical proportions’ and thus 
is less like ‘one big note’ than ‘a poem or song’.664   
One of the ways in which Augustine unfolds this vision of contingent 
existence is by addressing the question of why ordered reality appears so 
disorganised.  He explains that the limited vantage point people enjoy as mere 
members of a much larger creation creates the illusion of a disordered world.  He 
compares this reduced vantage to a statue in a beautiful building or a soldier in a line 
of battle who is unable to appreciate the order and beauty of the whole.665  He finally 
invokes his earlier image of creation as a song or poem by suggesting that: ‘...if the 
syllables in some poem were to live and perceive for as long a time as they sound, 
they would in no way be delighted by the rhythmicality and beauty of the 
composition of the work, which beauty they would not be able to overlook and 
approve of in its totality, since it would be constructed and perfected by the 
individual, transient syllables themselves’.666  Ultimately, the beauty that is inherent 
not just to creation as a whole but to each of its constituent parts remains 
incomprehensible to all but God.  Contingent beings lack the luxury of standing apart 
from creation and observing it as a whole.  Consequently, creation is pleasing to God 
in a far richer and deeper way than to humankind.   
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But despite the limitations of contingent existence, humanity remains properly 
attuned to creation’s beauty.   Because we share Augustine’s assumption, it is easy to 
overlook the fact that everywhere he assumes that beauty does delight.  Nowhere 
does he need to make the case that when beauty is perceived either through the senses 
or more perfectly in contemplation the human response will always be one of delight.  
Thus, when he examines the effect of music on the soul, the often unspoken 
foundation for the movement of his argument is that no matter how fallen people 
might be they will always respond pleasurably to the beauty of numerical proportions.  
All human sinfulness really does is reduce vision: it becomes harder and harder not to 
be distracted from God by carnal rhythms or inferior beauty.   
In De musica, Augustine considers the perception of beauty by delving into 
how people apprehend rhythm and number.  He categorises these numbers into five 
groups: those found in sound (sonantes), those discerned by the soul (occursores), 
those remembered (recordabiles), those pronounced (progressores), and finally those 
that allow the soul to judge number (judiciales) even in silence.667  The last of these, 
which Augustine defines as judicial rhythms or numbers, regulate the other rhythms: 
thus, for example, when people walk, they do not walk with a random pace but with 
one that conforms to a rhythm.668  He concludes that the regulating nature of these 
judicial rhythms ‘suggests God as the creator of the living things, whom it is surely 
proper to believe to be the originator of all concord and harmony (convenientiae 
atque concordiae)’.669  
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Augustine then wonders whether judicial rhythms can themselves be 
transcended and in pursuing this line of thought explicitly relates judicial rhythms to 
delight: ‘But I for my part believe that when this verse, which we put forth, is sung, 
Deus creator omnium, we both hear it with those occurring rhythms, and recognise it 
with the memorised rhythms, and pronounce it with the progressing rhythms, and 
enjoy (delectari) it with these judicial rhythms, and evaluate it with some others...’670  
The judicial rhythms therefore are the basis for enjoying or delighting in those 
rhythms or numbers that comprise the created order.  They are what attune people to 
the beautiful chorus of God’s cosmic poem. Thus the experience of delight is ‘imbued 
with a rhythm’ that enables one to ‘approve of equal intervals and reject confused 
one...’671 But because judicial rhythms can be fooled, they require a higher or rational 
rhythm to judge the delight experienced through the perception of interval and 
rhythm.  Augustine writes, ‘...reason investigates and questions the carnal pleasure 
(carnalem...delectationem) of the soul, which claimed for itself the judicial role, as 
equality charms the soul with the rhythms of temporal spaces, whether any two short 
syllables that it has heard are really equal...’672 Judicial rhythms can mistake unequal 
rhythms for equal ones and as a result enjoy ‘...unequal rhythms as if they were 
equal’.673  Reason’s perception admonishes the soul to ‘divert our joy’ (gaudium) 
away from things that imitate equality.674  Yet, insofar as these things imitate equality 
they remain ‘beautiful in their own kind and order’.  Both judicial and rational 
appreciations of music are actions of the same soul.  Carol Harrison suggests that 
there is really no separation between the two but rather ‘a necessary warning that 
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pleasure is not the end, but the means to the end, which is to know and love God, and 
that we need to be rationally aware of this and constantly judge all else against this 
end—even what is ethically right or aesthetically pleasing’.675 
One way of understanding Augustine’s argument here is by comparing it to 
his psychology of temptation found in De sermone Domini in monte that was 
examined in the previous chapter.676  As we saw there, a sin that is first suggested to 
the mind becomes a temptation through the delight it causes and finally is either 
resisted or enacted by rational consent.  Similarly, rhythms suggest themselves to the 
soul and cause delight by their perceived equality.  Reason’s role is to investigate and 
question that experience of delight so that the soul will not have its joy diverted 
towards those rhythms that only imitate equality.  Both passages suggest that 
Augustine considered the evaluation of delight as one of the primary roles of reason.  
Indeed, Augustine often describes this role elsewhere in his works by introducing the 
idea of the ‘palate of the heart’ whereby one develops a taste that can distinguish 
between the bitterness of worldly delight and the sweetness of the Lord.677 
At this point in De musica, Augustine’s argument leads him to consider more 
fully the interplay between reason, which employs ‘higher rhythms’ to evaluate 
delight, and judicial rhythms, which through delight judges the quality of the other 
rhythms.  He has already concluded that even those things that only ‘imitate’ equality 
remain beautiful.  If they are beautiful they must be to some degree good (and vice 
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versa).  Consequently, he argues that one should not be ‘offended by what is inferior 
but delight in only what is superior’.678  Augustine’s reason for this ordered approach 
to pleasure and beauty is one that should now be familiar:  
For the pleasure (delectatio) is like the weight of the soul.  And so pleasure 
sets the soul in its place (Delectatio ergo ordinat animam).  ‘For where your 
treasure is, there your heart will be also’, where your pleasure (delectatio), 
there your treasure will be, but where your heart is, there your beatitude or 
misery will be.  But what is superior except that in which the highest, 
unshakeable, unchangeable, eternal quality exists, where there is no time, 
because there is no change, and from which the times are created and set in 
order and modified in imitation of eternity, which the celestial rotation 
returns to the same place and recalls the celestial bodies to the same place 
and through the days and months and years and lustra and the other orbits of 
the stars obeys the laws of equality and unity and order?  In this way, 
through the rhythmical succession of their times, the orbits unite the 
terrestrial things, subjected to the heavenly ones to the hymn, as it were, of 
the universe (carmini universitatis).679 
Thus, reason is able to evaluate judicial rhythms according to an even higher set of 
eternal rhythms that give harmony to the whole of creation.    
We can gather two important points from Augustine’s argument thus far.  
First, as early as De musica Augustine conceived of delight as ordering the soul 
within the hierarchy of contingent existence.  Delight is the weight of the soul, the 
gravitational force that sets the individual in his or her place within creation.  We 
encountered precisely this idea in the last chapter in Augustine’s sermon on Ps. 9 
where he writes that ‘...the dwelling-place of the soul is not in any physical space 
which the form of the body occupies, but in delight (delectatione), where it rejoices to 
have arrived through love’.680  In De musica, delight orients the soul either towards 
inferior, carnal rhythms or, through reason’s evaluation of it, towards the superior, 
eternal rhythms.  Second, reason assesses not through any subjective or created 
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rhythm but through its perception of eternal rhythms.  Beauty impinges upon every 
aspect of this evaluation: eternal beauty enables the beauty of the rational mind to 
judge the soul’s experience of created beauty.  Aesthetic taste is therefore objective; 
however dimly it may appreciate the beauty of God’s ordered creation the basis for 
that appreciation is an objective, eternal beauty. 
 Augustine’s description in De musica of creation as a cosmic poem or song 
ties in well with his understanding of the Divine utterance of creation into existence.  
Recall that in Book Eleven of the Confessiones Augustine prays to God: ‘You do not 
cause it to exist other than by speaking’.681  Creation is spoken into existence ex 
nihilo through the eternal Word.  That spoken creation is then called back from 
collapsing into nothingness through the same eternal Word and discovers shape and 
form in that conversio.  De musica suggests that God’s creative utterance is best 
understood as a carmen: a poem in which numerical proportions and relationships 
provide the goodness and beauty of all that has been created.  The Word, whom 
Augustine also describes as the ‘eternal Reason’, 682 determines the beginning and 
end of each syllable of that cosmic poem, functioning as a sort of divine poet through 
whom the carmini universitatis exists.  The order with which God provides creation 
is not therefore the imposed order of a tyrant but the creative order of an artist.  If 
God’s will manifests itself as beauty then the proper and natural response to that will 
is delight.   
 This concept of creation compels Augustine to reject his earlier Manichaeism 
and conceive of everything as beautiful not only to humankind but even more to God 
himself.  Instead, he conceives of a hierarchy of beauty stretching not (as one might 
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suppose) from the supremely ugly to a supremely beautiful God but from the least to 
the most beautiful.  As with evil, ugliness is not something positive but the absence of 
the positive: namely, beauty. He speaks therefore of ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’ beauty, 
placing in the centre the soul to which all types of carnal beauty are inferior and to 
which only God’s own splendour is superior.  As with delight, the soul must employ 
reason to detach itself from inferior examples of beauty so that it can be attached to 
the superior and eternal beauty of God.683   Because delight is the soul’s response to 
beauty, the soul’s appreciation of the inferior or the superior determines that soul’s 
position within the hierarchy of beauty.  In a sense, people become like what they 
admire.  Augustine so fuses delight with beauty, love and goodness that the three 
really cannot be separated.   
 But no matter how far down the scale the soul sinks, it remains to some 
degree beautiful to God.  Even phantasia and phantasma (the first found in the 
memory and the second produced from the ‘those movements the memory 
possesses’684) have a ‘beauty of their own’ at which God does not ‘look askance’.685  
God does not even look away from the ‘sinful and burdened soul’ since it retains 
some form of beauty by continuing to ‘activate’ and ‘be activated by rhythms’.686  
That beauty may decrease but it remains beautiful all the same.  And so ‘the 
supremely good and supremely just God does not look askance at any beauty, which 
is created either as a consequence of the damnation or the returning or the remaining 
of the soul’.687  In a sense, nothing that exists can ever escape God’s aesthetic 
appreciation, however obscure that beauty may be to humanity. 
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 Having made his case for the objective beauty of all creation, Augustine can 
now state unequivocally that everything created—be it plants, animals, elements, 
each particle of the earth and the heavens—all conform to eternal rhythms.688  He 
marks the ‘rhythmical equality’ (numerosam parilitatem) of each created order and 
concludes that all are dependent on ‘that supreme and eternal origin of rhythms and 
similarity and equality and order’ that is God.689  Take those dimensions away and the 
earth collapses into nothingness.  Ultimately, for Augustine everything is either music 
or nothingness; to be created is to be musical—informed through and through with 
the eternal music of God.  In commenting on this passage, Carol Harrison notes that 
the existence and beauty of all created things proclaim God’s ‘harmony, unity, 
equality and order; together they form a hymn of the universe, the Deus Creator 
Omnium, to whom the soul must refer the delight or love that they occasion, as to 
their source and end’.690  In a sense, therefore, all of creation is epideictic, an 
encomium to the world’s Creator and Lord. 
 De ordine and De musica present the world as God’s poetry.  Indeed, as we 
can now see from understanding the two works in the context of Augustine’s other 
writings, contingent existence is the poetic utterance of God.  The beauty which that 
creative utterance enjoys derives from an eternal beauty that reaches out through 
numerical proportions to clothe an otherwise formless creation in such a way that it 
delights both God and the human soul.  Because beauty, which in De musica 
Augustine calls harmony, equality and convenience, causes delight, every syllable of 
existence is delightful.  This is why people can be drawn to those things that are far 
inferior to the soul; no matter how far from God these things are they continue to bear 
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sufficient beauty to attract the soul through the bodily senses.  Such a conception 
could easily have led Augustine to conceive of such inferior objects as evil.  But he 
never does.  The moral agent is always the soul and more specifically the reason 
within the soul that has the duty of evaluating the delight experienced.691  
 From this vision, we can take one final point.  Because God’s creative oratory, 
conceived as harmonious rhythm, is not just beautiful but beauty itself, it is altogether 
different from the devil’s oratory.  Sin and the devil may use delight to entice, but 
they do so by using what is not theirs.  In other words, if all that exists is like a 
syllable of God’s cosmic poem, then the devil’s weapon is not really oratory but a 
twisting and corrupting of the syllables within God’s cosmic poem.  The implication 
of this is that the devil’s speech only remains effective because that which it entices 
remains somewhat good and beautiful.  Augustine has shown that goodness and 
beauty are always ordered, even if people cannot perceive that order, and so try as the 
devil might, the discordant notes are ultimately swallowed up in the beauty of the 
whole carmen and work, if only through their own damnation, to proclaim the 
delightful beauty of the Creator. 
 
‘Measure, number and order’ 
In De ordine and De musica, we have seen how Augustine contends for the 
delightfulness of contingent existence by conceiving of creation in terms of 
‘numerical proportions’.  This approach resonates happily with Wisdom 11.21—‘You 
have disposed all things by measure and number and weight'—in a way that 
obviously captured Augustine’s imagination.  His understanding of this passage in 
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terms of formed existence and beauty enables him to develop an argument wherein 
God not only makes the world beautiful by imbuing it with measure, number, and 
order, but is himself the Trinitarian standard by which they are wonderfully 
formed.692  In De Genesi ad litteram, he writes: 
…as we ordinarily understand measure in the things we measure, and 
number in the things we number or count, and weight in the things we 
weigh, no, God is not these things; but insofar as measure sets limits to 
everything, and number gives everything its specific form, and weight draws 
everything to rest and stability, he is the original, true and unique measure 
which defines for all things their bounds, the number which forms all things, 
the weight which guides all things…693 
Here we have an enrichment of his argument of Book Six of De musica.  He 
continues to think of forma in terms of number (or rhythm), but now that number is 
delimited by measure (mensura) and ordered by weight (pondus).   Thus, measure, 
number, and order give further content to the forma that comes with the conversio of 
creation away from its initial formlessness.  The imposition of these three dimensions 
results in formless creation achieving a distinctive form and place within the realm of 
creation. 
To be formed in such a way is also to be made beautiful.  In De Genesi 
adversus Manicheos, Augustine argues that there ‘is not a single living creature…in 
whose body I will not find…that its measures, numbers and order are geared in a 
harmonious unity.  Where these should all come from I cannot conceive, unless it be 
from the supreme measure and number and order which are identical with the 
unchanging and eternal sublimity (sublimitate) of God himself’.694  Again, this 
accords well with De musica; while there Augustine finds the highest numeri located 
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in God, here he finds measure, number and weight all deriving from God’s sublimity.  
In De Genesi ad litteram, he contends that these three dimensions are not created but 
existed in God before the act of creation.695   But he also realises that he must be 
careful not to suggest that God himself can be measured, numbered and ordered.  
This leads to a paradox in which God who is beyond all dimension is nevertheless the 
basis for all dimension: ‘It is a great thing, a concession granted to few, to soar 
beyond everything that can be measured and see measure without measure, soar 
beyond all number and see number without number, to soar beyond everything that 
can be weighed and see weight without weight’.696  In De Genesi ad litteram he 
provides no answer to this paradox other than to insist that God could only perceive 
measure, number and weight if they existed within himself since before creation there 
was no other in which they could have been perceived.697 
The passage from De Genesi adversus Manicheos, however, suggests that as 
early as 388, Augustine had begun to reflect upon a connection between the three 
dimensions of formed existence and the Trinity.  That connection becomes more 
explicit, as one might expect, in De Trinitate where Augustine argues that the three 
dimensions of created existence reveal the Trinitarian nature of God   In a passage to 
which we will return later, Augustine writes:  
Thus all things around us that the divine art has made reveal in themselves a 
certain unity and form and order…So then, as we direct our gaze at the 
creator by understanding the things that are made, we should understand him 
as triad, whose traces (vestigium) appear in creation in a way that is fitting.  
In that supreme triad is the source of all things, and the most perfect beauty, 
and wholly blissful delight (beatissima delectatio).698 
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The beauty of the world is, therefore, a footprint (vestigium) of God that points 
towards his sovereignty, beauty, and delight. Indeed, he speaks of the Holy Spirit, 
which he identifies as the ‘sweetness of the begetter and the begotten’, as ‘pervading 
all creatures according to their capacity with its vast generosity and fruitfulness, that 
they might keep their right order and rest in their right places’.699 The ordered beauty 
of creaturely existence therefore manifests the ‘sweetness’ of the shared Trinitarian 
love.  If Augustine most closely associates measure and unity with the Father, number 
and beauty with the Son, then he connects order and delight most closely with the 
Holy Spirit.  As will become clear in the next chapter, this is an essential point. 
 By locating the eternal source of measure, number and order within the 
Trinity, Augustine accomplishes two important things.  First, he further develops his 
understanding of how creation participates in God.  Creatures are not simply 
produced by God like goods produced from a factory.  Their continued existence, 
their unity of being, form and beauty, and place within creation are all derived and are 
constantly deriving from God.  Indeed, those dimensions exist more in God than in 
the creature; they are thus also the eternal impinging upon the ephemeral.  For 
Augustine, the created substance itself amounts to little more than dust.  Everything 
else one perceives of creation is the presence of the Trinity imprinted on the dust of 
creation. 
 Second, because God is the source, form and measure of all creation, all 
creatures must therefore by their very nature proclaim the presence of their Creator.  
This is what he means by stating that God’s footprints appear in creation.  And for 
him, God’s most visible footprint is the beauty that delights and the sweetness that 
pervades everything.  Augustine makes this point in his first homily on John’s Gospel 
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by returning to his image, probably informed by Plato’s Timaeus, of God as a master 
craftsman.  He presents his congregation with the analogy of a ‘plan for some 
building’: at first it exists only in the mind’s eye and can only be admired (mirantur) 
by the craftsman himself.700  But after the ‘finely sculpted perfection’ is completed, 
‘People notice the admirable building and admire the design of the builder; they are 
amazed at what they see and love in what they do not see, for who is there who can 
see a design?’701 He concludes that by observing with delight the splendour of heaven 
and earth one can discern ‘what the Word must be like through which it was made’.  
Again, for Augustine the beauty of the world is objective rather than subjective. 
 Delight therefore fills creation.  Because of this, humankind has permission to 
delight in the created world as long as it recognises that God is the beauty that 
engenders that delight.  In other words, if beauty is really the forma that measure, 
number and order impart, and if those three dimensions are really a sign of the 
Trinity, then a right appreciation of beauty is actually an appreciation of God.  There 
is no beauty apart from God.  For Augustine, everything that is good is delightful, 
because every good thing springs from ‘Goodness-Itself’ which is synonymous with 
the ‘Lord’s delight’.702  Because the delightfulness of the world finds its source in 
God’s own beauty, everything created reveals by its unity, form, and order the divine 
art of God.  In Book Ten of Confessiones, Augustine states that ‘heaven and earth and 
everything in them all tell me to love you’.703  Indeed, he describes this as their 
‘praise’ of God.  Although these delights of the world are not themselves the true 
object of Augustine’s love, they are good delights and they do tell us something of 
God’s delight: 
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But when I love you what do I love?  It is not physical beauty nor temporal 
glory nor the brightness of light dear to earthly eyes, nor the sweet melodies 
of all kinds of songs, nor the gentle odour of flowers and ointments and 
perfumes, nor manna or honey, nor limbs welcoming the embrace of the 
flesh; it is not these I love when I love my God.  Yet there is a light I love, 
and a food, and a kind of embrace when I love my God—a light, voice, 
odour, food, embrace of my inner man, where my soul is floodlit by light 
which space cannot contain, where there is sound that time cannot seize, 
where there is perfume which no breeze dispenses, where there is a taste for 
food no amount of eating can lesson, and where there is a bond of union no 
satiety can part.  That is what I love when I love my God.704 
We should not be surprised by this language as it depends on Augustine’s 
understanding of participatory existence.  Because created existence draws its being, 
goodness, and beauty from God, and because God himself is love (from which 
spiritual delight springs), all created delights that arouse the senses derive their power 
from God and reveal him to us.  Thus, when we seek to enjoy only the created good, 
treating it as though its delightfulness is self-oriented, it replies by urging us to look 
elsewhere.  As David Bentley Hart argues, the ‘delightfulness of created things 
expresses the delightfulness of God’s infinite distance’ in such a way that one may 
think of the relationship between worldly and divine beauty as an analogia 
delectationis.705  This is why Augustine suggests, as he does in his sermon on Psalm 
144, that our delight in the beauty of the world ought to lead to the praise of the God 
who created it.706 In beauty rightly appreciated, humanity glimpses the face of God. 
 In this respect, Augustine conceives of beauty as enjoying its own rhetorical 
power.  The beauty of heaven and earth ‘speak’ God’s praises calling humankind to 
join in their praise God (loquuntur laudes tuas).707  When Augustine turns to creation 
to discover the object of his love, it speaks to him through its beauty to turn towards 
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their Creator.  In his famous account of his interrogation of nature, everything speaks 
to him persuasively: 
And what is the object of my love?  I asked the earth and it said: ‘It is not I’.  
I asked all that is in it; they made the same confession.  I asked the sea, the 
deeps, the living creatures that creep, and they responded: ‘We are not your 
God, look beyond us’.  I asked the breezes which flow and the entire air with 
its inhabitants said: ‘Anaximenes was mistaken; I am not God’. I asked 
heaven, sun, moon, and stars; they said: ‘Nor are we the God whom you 
seek’.  And I said to all these things in my external environment; ‘Tell me of 
my God who you are not, tell me something about him’. And with a great 
voice they cried out: ‘He made us’.  My question was the attention I gave to 
them, and their response was their beauty.708 
Just as Augustine’s rhetorical confessio directs the reader towards a rightful praise of 
God, so too does creation’s confessio direct Augustine towards a rightful praise of its 
Creator.  Creation actually functions here like Cicero’s orator: it gains the audience’s 
attention through delight and then directs it towards a goal.  Here we witness the 
enfleshed, divine utterance of creation overflowing with a beauty and delight that 
shares in God’s urging call of all things back to himself.  The form and beauty that 
result from the Word’s conversion of creation back from nothingness rebound within 
creation in such a way that all creatures participate through their beauty in calling all 
to God. 
 This passage from Confessiones exhibits many facets of Augustine’s thought 
that we have seen thus far.  His questioning of creation abides by the hierarchy of 
being: he begins by questioning the lowest of lives and works his way upwards 
towards the heavens.  Just as in De musica all created things no matter how remote 
from God have beauty, so too here does each level of creation direct Augustine to 
God through its own beauty.  In fact, the passage illustrates a contemplative ascent 
driven by delight, the natural response to beauty.  The ascent continues in a 
predictable manner, culminating in the subsequent paragraph with Augustine’s 
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contemplation of himself.  Again, as in De musica, the inner soul of humankind is set 
at the highest pinnacle of creation; only God is higher and so Augustine’s self-
contemplation joins in the chorus of the rest of creation by directing him to God.  The 
entire ascent at this point falls within the purview of judicial rhythms.  It is basically 
an ascent of delight.  But just as judicial rhythms are regulated by rational rhythms in 
De musica so in the Confessiones does reason enable delight to move the soul 
upwards.  In 10.7.10, Augustine reflects on the different manner animals and people 
are aware of beauty:  
Animals both small and large see it [beauty], but they cannot put a question 
about it.  In them reason does not sit in judgement upon the deliverances of 
the senses.  But human beings can put a question so that ‘the invisible things 
of God are understood and seen through the things which are made’.709 
The soul’s response to the experience of delight engendered by beauty leads the mind 
to question the perceived beauty.  The cross-examination of beauty then invokes the 
rhetorical moment in which the ‘voice’ of creation may proclaim the existence of the 
Creator.  If the soul perceives God then it is converted and directed towards salvation. 
 Augustine’s ideal, therefore, is a world in which humankind observes God in 
the beauty of creation.  He may be a Neoplatonist insofar as he looks for an ascent 
beyond the material world towards a direct and inward vision of God, but he clearly 
believes that such a vision must await heaven.  In this life, when a direct 
contemplation of God can only be briefly enjoyed, his ideal is one in which 
humankind effectively shares in creation’s praise of God by responding to that praise 
(creation’s beauty) with the judgement of the soul.  If a person lacks judgement, the 
voice of creation falls silent.710  But by entering into a conversation with beauty, the 
soul can be directed to share actively and purposefully in creation’s hymn of praise.  
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It is interesting to note that unthinking creation does this automatically without 
variation; only fallen humanity has, as it were, struck up a discordant note by seeking 
to praise itself. 
 Augustine, in fact, provides a portrait of his imagined ideal society in which 
the world and humanity share perfectly in the beauty of God’s delight.  This is found 
in the eighth book of De Genesi ad litteram where Augustine imagines what Adam’s 
life in Eden was like before the Fall.711 Not surprisingly it describes a rather 
romanticised life of a late Roman gentleman-farmer: 
So then whatever delights (deliciarum) there are to be found in agriculture, 
they were of course far and away more complete at that time when neither 
earth nor sky was putting any difficulty in the way.  You see, there was no 
stress or wearisome toil but pure exhilaration of spirit (exhilaratio 
voluntatis), when things which God had created flourished in more luxuriant 
abundance with the help of human work.  As a result the creator himself 
would be praised more copiously…712 
Indeed, wonders Augustine, what can be more wonderful than the work of a farmer: a 
person ‘directed and governed invisibly by God’ applying his ‘work and skill’ to the 
care and nurture of life?713 Thus Augustine concludes with a question the answer to 
which strikes him as self-evident: ‘How therefore can it be abhorrent to the truth, if 
we believe that man was set up in Paradise to work at agriculture, not in servile toil, 
but with genuine pleasure (voluptate) and uplift of spirit?  What, after all, is more 
innocent than such work for our moments of leisure, and what can provide more 
material for our serious reflection?’714  Such is Augustine’s beata vita: people 
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delighting in managing the beautiful world of ‘luxuriant abundance’ in praise of and 
service to their ‘blissful God’. 
 
Beata Vita 
Such a life, however, is manifestly absent in the world we know.    The 
problem, of course, is the Fall, which requires the solution provided by participatory 
redemption.  Because of humankind’s pride, which is both the cause and legacy of the 
Fall, the beata vita remains beyond the grasp of humanity and a true and godly 
delight remains elusive.  In other words, humankind was made to share in the ‘Lord’s 
delight’ but because of the Fall it invariably turns towards the worldly delight that 
enslaves the soul to the world, the flesh and the devil.  Augustine believed, however, 
that despite the entrapment of fallen humanity to sin, the beata vita remains a 
universal desire.  Ultimately, the desire for happiness is a desire for God. 
The typical examination of what Augustine means by beata vita focuses on 
his philosophical sources.  Certainly, Augustine agrees with many of the assumptions 
of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, above all the assumption that the primary 
motivational force is the instinctive search for happiness.   Thus, Augustine is 
classified as a eudaemonist, and his reflections on the happy life are examined within 
the philosophical tradition of eudaemonism.  Eudaemonia is a word coined by 
Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics to describe the ultimate goal of humanity: the 
pursuit of happiness.  According to Aristotle, one’s own happiness is the only goal 
that cannot be disowned and this happiness is simply the highest good that is pursued 
for its own sake.715  It is, as it were, part of the make-up of humanity.  How one 
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achieves happiness was, of course, a subject of disagreement and philosophical 
conflict in the ancient world.  The Stoic who held that happiness is attainable only by 
the rational mind was just as much a eudaemonist as the Epicurean who held that 
happiness comes through physical pleasure.716  Augustine, it is assumed, walked 
comfortably within the world of eudaemonism, and so took it as read that everyone 
pursues his or her own happiness. 
In the final chapter of  The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, 
appropriately entitled, ‘Conclusions: Self-Love and Eudaemonism’, Oliver 
O’Donovan addresses Augustine’s eudaemonism by taking aim at Karl Holl’s and 
Anders Nygren’s critiques of Augustine’s theology.  According to O’Donovan, Holl 
attacked Augustine’s eudaemonist structure by arguing that Augustine should not 
have taken the quest for happiness as the model for Christian ethics because it ‘elides 
the distinction between the way of God’s requiring and all other ways which man 
may devise’.717  Holl’s critique was later taken up by Anders Nygren, who found 
Augustine’s mixture of Pauline and Platonic thought untenable.  Nygren believed that 
Augustine’s theology reduced all love, including the love of God, to a form of self-
love by making the ‘acquisitive’ pursuit of happiness the highest goal.718  O’Donovan 
counters these arguments by suggesting that within Augustine’s eudaemonism the 
‘goal is an objective reality which the subject has not chosen for himself and his 
orientation to which is a necessity of his creation’.719 
Before we even begin to look at what Augustine has to say about the beata 
vita, we can discern from our study so far that O’Donovan is largely correct.  If the 
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‘Lord’s delight’ is ‘sheer Goodness-Itself, in virtue of which all things are good’720 
then the beata vita is simply the experience of that Trinitarian delight.  In other 
words, delight is an essential part of participatory existence, and to be removed from 
that delight is somehow to be removed from the fullest attainable level of existence.  
Understood in this way, the desire for happiness is the desire for God.  And because 
no one has chosen to exist nor can influence the character of that delight which is 
God, true happiness like true delight and true beauty is objective rather than 
subjective.  In terms of De musica, happiness is to be in tune with the eternal rhythm 
of God’s poetic utterance.  This is why Augustine can speak positively of the delights 
of the world despite all his warning and concerns about the dangers of such delight; 
as long as those delights lead towards God, they are good and commendable.  Indeed, 
in reality those delights do no more than draw from and reveal the Lord’s own 
delight.  O’Donovan is, therefore, correct in his argument against Holl and Nygren: 
the pursuit of happiness is not necessarily selfish or acquisitive.  At its heart, the 
pursuit of happiness is the search for God and the perfectly participatory existence for 
which humanity was created ex nihilo.  Ultimately, Augustine’s eudaemonism is 
summed up by his most famous statement: ‘You stir man to delight (delectat) in 
praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it 
rests in you’.721 Humanity yearns for the delight from which it was made, in which it 
lives, and towards which it strives.  Thanks to pride, however, humankind is (to put it 
bluntly) utterly inept at pursuing the ‘joy of man’s desiring’.722 
For Augustine, beata vita is ultimately from one angle a life grounded 
securely in God’s delight or from another angle a life that participates fruitfully and 
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securely in God’s goodness.  The experience of spiritual delight and participation are 
so closely wrapped up with each other that one cannot enjoy one without the other.  
The happy life, therefore, is not so much the acquisition of any particularly good, not 
even of God, but a shorthand description for the joy of participating in God.  As will 
be shown in the next chapter, such an existence cannot ever be acquired; it can only 
be given through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.  In the end, Augustine’s 
description of beata vita sums up all that we have discovered in this chapter’s 
exploration of spiritual delight. 
 
Participation and the Happy Life 
Augustine concludes his treatise, De beata vita, with his definition of the 
happy life: ‘This, therefore, is the complete satisfaction of souls, that is, the happy 
life: to know precisely and perfectly Him through whom you are led into truth, the 
nature of the truth you enjoy, and the bond that connects you with the Supreme 
Measure’.723  Really, this early definition informs what Augustine means by 
contemplating the Lord’s delight: it is to know and enjoy God to the complete 
satisfaction of the soul.  Also, the journey towards full delight begins only because 
God provides ‘a certain admonition which incites us to remember God, to seek Him, 
and having banished pride, to thirst after him’.724  God initiates the search and is at 
once the one in whom the search occurs, the goal of that search, and the bond that 
keeps the searcher attached to that goal.  The return of the faithful to God is therefore 
Trinitarian in shape. 
 Augustine continued to hold basically the same view of the ‘happy life’ 
throughout his life.  In the Confessiones, he writes, ‘When I seek for you, my God, 
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my quest is for the happy life’725  God is also the ‘blessed home country which all 
desire, but not all seek in the right way’.726  As we have already seen, in ep. 130, he 
speaks of the happy life as the enjoyment of the Lord’s delight.  In that letter, 
Augustine answers Proba’s question about prayer by suggesting that she should pray 
‘for the happy life, for all human beings want this’.727  Even the wicked commit their 
misdeeds out of a desire for happiness.  What then is this happy life?  Augustine 
reminds Proba that this question has ‘consumed the minds and leisure of many 
philosophers’.  But they could not provide a satisfactory answer because they did not 
‘honour’ the source of the happy life.728  Is the happy life, he asks, living as one 
wills?  Even the pagans have recognised that this cannot be so, and he quotes Cicero, 
‘a man of great eloquence’, from Hortensius as evidence.  He therefore suggests that 
the happy life might be to have everything one wants and not to want anything that is 
improper.   
But this then poses a new problem: why are some made happy by marriage 
while others by remaining celibate?729  Both are proper desires, even if one can be 
shown to be better than the other.  Both however remained trapped by their desire for 
the ‘well-being’ of those they love.  If such is the source of their happiness without 
any deeper desire for ‘greater and better things and ones richer in usefulness and 
moral beauty’ they remain far from the happy life. Instead, Proba should seek 
happiness in that ‘one life by which one lives for God and from God’, which means to 
love God for his own sake and oneself and one’s neighbours for God’s sake.730  But 
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even this is not fully the happy life.  Augustine concludes, ‘Why do we not rather say 
with the psalm, One thing I have asked of the Lord; this I seek, that I may dwell in the 
house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may contemplate the delight of the 
Lord and visit his temple?....The true Life himself taught us to pray for the sake of 
acquiring this happy life…’731  And as we have seen already Augustine reiterates this 
by explaining that what everyone seeks is, ‘the one true and only happy life, namely, 
that immortal and incorruptible in body and in spirit, we contemplate the delight of 
the Lord for eternity’.732 The happy life, therefore, is God, ‘the fountain of life’,733 
and the pursuit of happiness is fundamentally the pursuit of God: the beata vita is 
none other than the contemplation of the Lord’s delight. This is the assumption 
behind the beginning of the Confessiones.  The restless heart longs for happiness, 
longs for God, and will search relentlessly until it rests in the delight of godly praise.   
Augustine frequently reveals that he takes it as read that everyone longs for 
happiness.  One of the best examples of this comes in his sermon preached at 
Carthage in 413/414, on the account from Acts of Paul’s address to the crowds in 
Athens.734  The biblical reference to the two poles of ancient philosophy—Stoicism 
and Epicureanism—allows Augustine to contrast Christianity with the whole 
spectrum of philosophy.  He introduces the heart of his sermon by speaking about 
what he considers to the commonality shared by all philosophies and Christianity: 
First let me tell you in general that there is one overriding concern common 
to all philosophers….all philosophers strove by dedication, investigation, 
discussion, by their way of life, to lay hold of the blessed life.  This was their 
one reason for philosophizing; but I rather think the philosophers also have 
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this in common with us….Therefore the urge for the blessed life is common 
to all philosophers and Christians.735 
Obviously, this is a classic eudemonistic statement.  The motivating force for pagan 
and Christians alike is the pursuit of happiness.  Augustine is even clearer a few lines 
later: ‘I ought to have said that it (the pursuit of happiness) is characteristic of 
everybody, absolutely everybody, good and bad alike.  People who are good, after all, 
are good in order to be happy, and those who are bad would not be bad unless they 
hoped they could thereby be made happy’.  At first sight, this statement would appear 
to support Holl and Nygren’s complaint that Augustine provides a self-serving and 
acquisitive motivation for virtuous living: one is only good in order to be happy with 
the corollary logic that one would just as well be bad if it led to true happiness.  
Augustine himself predicts this response and explains that some do seek happiness 
through vice, using the example of a thief to illustrate his point.736  He dismisses this 
as ‘shameless and mistaken’ because happiness only results from virtue: ‘goodness is 
work, happiness the reward’.737 
 But what does Augustine mean when he states that God rewards goodness 
with happiness?  In the next part of his sermon, he answers the question—‘what 
makes life happy?’738—first as an Epicurean, then as a Stoic, and finally as a 
Christian.  The Epicurean argues that bodily pleasure makes people happy, the Stoic 
that the virtuous mind is necessary.  Augustine’s Christian answer is simply that true 
happiness is a donum Dei.739  So, the pursuit of the truly happy life can only be 
successful if one receives that life as a donum Dei.  This is really a reiteration of the 
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point he makes in De beata vita.  Whatever we are to make of Augustine’s 
eudemonism, we must accept his conviction that the beata vita sought is only 
achieved by God’s grace. 
Augustine entirely rejects the Epicurean approach, calling them ‘pigs rather 
than men’.740  He is more approving of the Stoics, stating that a virtuous mind is 
praiseworthy and calling the four cardinal virtues of classical ethics—prudence, 
justice, temperance, and fortitude—admirable.  But then he asks from where they 
receive their virtues.  He concludes, ‘It is not precisely your virtuous mind that makes 
you happy, but the one who has given you virtue, who has inspired you to desire it, 
and granted you the capacity for it’.741  Thus, the desire and the capacity to be 
virtuous and the virtues themselves are all gifts of God.  Everything about the search 
for true happiness, therefore, comes from God.  Interestingly, Augustine understands 
delight to be the motivational force that compels one towards virtue: ‘Virtue delights 
you; it’s a good thing that delights you.  I know, you are thirsty for it; but you can’t 
pour yourself a drink of virtue’.742  In other words, in order to be virtuous, one must 
want to be virtuous, and to have that desire, virtue itself must be delightful enough to 
draw people towards itself.  That delight comes from God as a donum Dei.   
Everything Augustine preaches in sermo 150 is in fundamental agreement 
with his conclusion in De beata vita.  The same points are made elsewhere. In his 
letter to Macedonius (413/414) he writes,  
For only he who made human beings makes them happy.  After all, he 
bestows such great goods upon his creatures, both the good and the bad ones, 
that they exist, are human beings, are vigorous in their senses, able in their 
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strength, and abounding in riches.  He will give himself to the good in order 
that they may be happy, because it is also his gift that they are happy.743 
In the same letter, he adds, ‘‘If, then, true virtue delights us (virtus vera delectat), let 
us say to him what we read in his sacred books, I shall love you, O Lord, my virtue.  
And if we want to be truly happy, something we cannot fail to want, let us hold on 
with a believing heart to what we learned in the same books, Happy is the man for 
whom the name of the Lord is hope and who has not searched after vanities and 
insane lies (Ps. 40.5)’.744  These assertions make perfect sense within Augustine’s 
understanding of existence.  Everything humanity is and has comes from God.  That 
is what it means to be good.  If the movement towards nothingness is simultaneously 
a movement towards wickedness, then conversely the ascent towards God is an ascent 
towards happiness.  That ascent only comes through the power of delight obtained by 
participatory redemption, and thus is a gift.  Although only implied in this passage, 
there is an inkling that the ‘happy life’ and participation are deeply intertwined.745 
 The participatory aspect of the happy life becomes much clearer in 
Augustine’s long letter to Honoratus written in 411/412.  There we find happiness 
discussed very much in terms of being and non-being.  Augustine writes:  
Hence, the rational creature, whether in an angelic spirit or in the human 
soul, was made so that it cannot be for itself the good by which it becomes 
happy, but it becomes happy if its mutability is turned toward the immutable 
good.  If it turns away from it, it is wretched.  But its turning away is its 
failure, and its turning back is its virtue.746   
Again, goodness and happiness are closely interlinked (recall that in En. Ps. 26 (2), 8 
he refers to ‘Goodness-Itself’ as the ‘delight of the Lord’) with goodness understood 
                                               
743
  ep. 155.2. 
744
  ep. 155.6 (PL 33.669). 
745
  See also trin 13.10 where Augustine speaks of the virtues coming from God and ‘adding’ 
(accedant) themselves to humankind. 
746
  ep. 140.56. 
246 
 
as the means whereby one becomes happy.  The obvious reason for this is that God is 
the source of both goodness and happiness.  This time, however, the happy life is 
directly related to participatory existence.  One may approach the happy life through 
conversion (conversio) towards God, the ‘immutable good’. Conversely, turning 
away from God towards nothingness is a failure in being and leads only to 
wretchedness.  Next, Augustine identifies the gift of conversio with the gift of virtue.  
In other words, the turning towards God away from death manifests itself as virtue.   
We can understand why Augustine says this by recourse to his scheme of 
participatory redemption.  By turning towards God, the ‘immutable good’, people are 
better able to partake of that goodness, which in turn makes them happy.  This 
explains Augustine’s statement that people are ‘good in order to be happy’.  That 
goodness is not something which they themselves generate.  In other words, people 
do not suddenly of their own volition decide to be good with the expectation that such 
behaviour will lead to happiness: the soul ‘cannot be for itself the good by which it 
becomes happy’.747  Instead, in light of ep. 140, Augustine would seem to be saying 
that the goodness that people receive from God is what results in happiness.  The 
thief is his example of what happens when people seek happiness of their own accord.  
 Augustine continues in the letter to allude to the role of participation in the 
happy life.  He writes, ‘The mutability of the rational soul, therefore, is warned 
(admonetur) in order that it might know that it cannot be righteous, saved, wise, and 
blessed except through participation in the immutable good and that it cannot be by 
its own will its own good, but only its own evil’.748  In other words, the admonitio, 
which (as we saw in chapter three) is God’s nudge to turn from death towards him, 
arouses the faithful from their self-satisfaction and teaches them that only by 
                                               
747
  ep. 140.56. 
748
  ep. 140.74 (PL 33.571). 
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accepting their status as contingent beings wholly dependent on God can they begin 
to approach true happiness.  To act otherwise is literally evil, because, as Augustine 
understands that word, it is an act of privation, a step towards non-being. 
 Finally, near the conclusion of the letter, Augustine makes his clearest 
statement of all that the journey towards the happy life is really nothing other than 
participatory redemption:  ‘…he who was the Son of God became man by assuming 
our nature, not by losing his.  In this way the power was also given to us who receive 
him that we who were human beings might become children of God, changed for the 
better by participation in the immutable good, not for temporal happiness but for the 
adoption into eternal life, which is alone blessed’.749  Thus, one can enjoy the beata 
vita by clinging to God through the participation made possible by the Incarnation.   
In De Trinitate, Augustine himself clearly sums up the conclusion that true 
happiness depends on participation in a way that neatly captures the fullness of his 
theology: ‘For surely if the Son of God by nature became the son of man by mercy 
for the sake of the sons of men…how much easier it is to believe that the sons of men 
by nature can become sons of God by grace and dwell in God; for it is in him alone 
and thanks to him alone that they can be happy, by sharing (participes) in his 
immortality; it was to persuade (persuadendum) us of this that the Son of God came 
to share in our mortality’.750  Not only do we find here an explicit connection between 
beata vita and participation but we also discover that this state of being is actually the 
goal of God’s redemptive rhetoric.  The Incarnation both enables the happiness of 
participating in God’s goodness and ‘persuades’ the faithful to pursue that life.  In 
Christ, conversio becomes persuasio.  His conversion of the faithful comes through 
                                               
749
  ep. 140.82 (PL 33.575): ‘...qui Filius Dei erat, homo factus est, naturam suscipiendo nostram, 
non amittendo suam: per quod et nobis recipientibus eum potestas daretur, ut qui eramus 
homines, filii Dei fieremus participatione incommutabilis boni in melius commutati, non ad 
temporalem felicitatem, sed ad vitae aeternae, quae sola beata est, adoptionem’. 
750
  trin. 13.12 (CCL 50a.399). 
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the persuasion of his Incarnation; conversely, because the faithful have been 
persuaded they have now turned away from nothingness to begin their ascent towards 
dwelling in God.   
 Gathering together everything we have discerned about Augustine’s 
conception of the beata vita requires holding together several ideas.  First, every 
created being enjoys its existence only insofar as it participates in God.  For rational 
creatures, to participate fully in God is to be happy.751  Second, the Lord’s delight 
suffuses all created beings, so that to participate fully in God is to gaze upon his 
delight; this is again the happy life.  Because of this, the spectrum from full being to 
non-being is also a spectrum from ‘delight beyond measure’ to wretchedness and 
misery.  Third, even in their fallen state, all people retain a restless yearning for the 
happy life, which is the full participation in God for which they were created.  
Augustine notably places the source of this yearning in the memoria and compares it 
to the recollection of joy because it induces further desire.752  Indeed, he wonders 
aloud whether the desire for the happy life is not some racial memory of humanity’s 
pre-fallen condition.753  Finally, the conversion towards God, the happy life and the 
pursuit itself (each aspects of participatory redemption) are achieved by delight.  It is 
when virtues delight that people seek them and in seeking them find God.   
  
Delectatio Domini 
This chapter has taken us necessarily through a wide range of subjects and 
works since Augustine’s approach to spiritual or godly delight is so complex and 
                                               
751
  In diu. qu. 83 5, Augustine states that only rational creatures are capable of happiness. This 
agrees with Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 10.8) who argues that while animals may feel their 
own pleasure they are not capable of happiness.  It also agrees with his approach in conf. 
10.6.8-9 to the evocative power of beauty that was discussed earlier.   
752
  conf. 10.21.30. 
753
  conf. 10.20.29. 
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encompassing.  The entirety of his thinking however is more easily grasped if one 
remembers that at its heart is the idea that true delight is in fact God himself.  
Because God is self-expressive his delight is also expressed outward into creation.  
Whether someone experiences that delight in the beauty perceived by the senses or 
through a contemplative taste of God’s own unmediated delight and beauty, in reality 
such a perception is of God’s own self.  Moreover, because creation participates in 
God’s goodness, it longs to share in God’s life.  Non-rational creation does this 
simply through its own beauty: its very existence is mute praise of God the Creator.  
Fallen humanity, though now enslaved to worldly delights, continues to yearn for a 
complete and secure experience of God’s delight and Augustine most readily 
conceives of this as a thirst for the happy life.  In the end, the beata vita is an 
everlasting participation in God that is also a secure and direct contemplation of the 
delectatio Domini. 
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7 
 Beata Delectatio 
 
According to Augustine, contemplation of the delectatio Domini is the goal of 
both human existence and God’s redemptive oratory.  As we have seen in De 
Trinitate 13.12, the Incarnation seeks to persuade and to move fallen humanity 
towards a fuller participation in the divine.  God the orator not only calls humankind 
to share in his own life but is also the call itself whereby the faithful are persuaded.  
But that persuasive summons does not come to those who exist apart from God but to 
those who obtain their existence through God’s Word.  All of the created order is 
utterance, deriving life, beauty, form, delight, and salvation from the eternal utterance 
of the Word.  Worldly delight has captured humanity’s obsessive attention through a 
diabolic twisting of delights so that they point away from God either to themselves or 
towards damnation.  The bondage of sin has made people deaf both to God’s cosmic 
song of creation and to his redemptive oratory.  They are like the subjects of Cicero’s 
false orator, lulled by a deceptive eloquence to yield their will to one who will only 
bring about ruin.  In order to regain their attention and to call fallen humanity back 
into his own life and delight God must use his own eloquence: that eloquence, 
conceived as the ‘sweetness’ of the Trinity offered as a gift to the world, is none other 
than the Holy Spirit. 
 In order to understand the Holy Spirit’s role we must first come to grips with 
his identity as Augustine understood it.  That identity grows out of the interplay 
between three descriptive eponyms he typically uses for the Holy Spirit: communio, 
dilectio or caritas, and donum Dei.  These, as will be shown, are the soil out of which 
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spiritual delight grows.  First, Augustine identifies the Holy Spirit as the communio of 
the Father and the Son, most fruitfully understood as their shared love.  That ‘sweet’ 
communio shared between the Father and the Son flows into creation to nourish and 
sustain it.  Second, the shared Trinitarian dilectio is the ground for all other loves.  As 
Augustine argues in De Trinitate 8.12, the love with which we love is in fact God 
himself.  Finally, that love is also the well-spring of human redemption, pouring into 
the hearts of the faithful as a gracious gift that above all else enables them to delight 
in God.   
 Key to understanding how the Holy Spirit as love sanctifies the faithful by 
love is Augustine’s interpretation of Romans 5.5: ‘and hope does not disappoint us, 
because God’s love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has 
been given to us (RSV)’.  That verse became central to Augustine’s understanding of 
how the Holy Spirit enables the faithful to participate in the redemption opened up to 
them by the Incarnation and Resurrection.  Augustine interprets Romans 5.5 in 
connection with Romans 7.22-23754 from which he draws the conviction that an 
overwhelming and delightful love must seize and compel fallen humanity away from 
their bondage to sin so that they can freely participate in God.  The Holy Spirit 
provides the ‘eternal’ or ‘spiritual’ delight that draws the faithful towards God by 
overwhelming the ‘carnal’ delight that entices fallen humanity towards death.    
Conceived in rhetorical terms, the Holy Spirit therefore is the Eloquence of God that 
overcomes the false fluency of the devil by gaining the attention of the individual and 
making him or her receptive to the truth that converts and restores. 
 
 
                                               
754
  ‘For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost being, but I see in my members another law at 
war with the law of my mind and making me captive to the law of sin that dwells in my 
members (RSV)’ 
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The Holy Spirit 
Communio 
Central to Augustine’s pneumatology is his belief that the Holy Spirit is the 
communion of the Father and the Son.  This facet of the Holy Spirit’s identity is 
found in one of Augustine’s earlier works, De fide et symbolo, written in 393: 
Some have even dared to believe that the Holy Spirit is the communion or 
deity, so to speak, of the Father and the Son, their theotés as the Greeks call it.  
So, as the Father is God and the Son is God, the very deity which embraces 
both…is equated with the God by whom the Son is begotten.  This ‘deity’, by 
which they would have understood the mutual love and charity of both Father 
and Son, they say is called the Holy Spirit…755 
The peculiarity of this passage has attracted much comment.  For example, Lewis 
Ayres refers to Augustine’s equating of the Holy Spirit with the ‘deity’ of the Father 
and Son as ‘clumsy’.756  Although no one seems to know for certain where Augustine 
discovered this teaching—who are the ‘some’ to whom he refers?—most agree that 
Marius Victorinus is one of them.757  As we have already seen, Victorinus was an 
important influence on Augustine’s thought not least in his sympathetic use of 
Neoplatonism.   In line 3 of his Hymnus 1, Victorinus refers to the Holy Spirit as the 
copula, or bond, of the Father and the Son (patris et filii copula), an idea that may 
have been original to him.758  Whatever the inspiration for the image, from an early 
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  fid. et sym. 9.19. 
756
  Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 371.  See E.J. Meijerling, Augustine: De Fide et 
Symbolo (Amsterdam: J.C. Gieben Publisher, 1987), 121-123 for a good commentary on this 
passage.  Meijerling notes that ‘deitas’ is an ‘unusual and literal translation of the Greek 
theotés whilst “divinitas” would be the more appropriate Latin’. See also O. Du Roy, 
L’Intelligence de la foi en la Trinitaté selon S. Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire 
jusqu’en 391 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1966), 486-487 regarding Augustine’s possible 
sources. 
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  The term theotés, however, appears to derive from Ambrose’s On the Holy Spirit, though he 
uses the term differently.  Another possible source is Didymus the Blind’s De Spiritu Sancto, 
though Jerome’s Latin edition had only appeared just prior to Augustine’s composition of De 
fide et symbol.   See Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 371. 
758
  Victorinus, Hymnus 1.3 (CSEL 83.285). 
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date Augustine was clearly attracted to the idea of identifying the Holy Spirit with the 
shared love of the Father and the Son.  Furthermore, at this point he explicitly equates 
the shared communio with God’s deity, though qualifying this with ‘so to speak’, 
which suggests a certain hesitation. 
 We encounter a fuller discussion of this identity in Book Six of De Trinitate. 
After arguing his point that the Father and the Son are one, Augustine proceeds to 
include the Holy Spirit in the Divine ‘unity and equality of substance’.759  He begins 
by arguing: 
For whether he [the Holy Spirit] is the unity of both the others or their 
holiness or their charity, whether he is their unity because their charity, and 
their charity because their holiness, it is clear that he is not one of the two, 
since he is that by which the two are joined (conjungitur) each to the other, by 
which the begotten is loved by the one who begets him and in turn loves the 
begetter.  Thus, they keep unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace (Eph. 4.3), 
not in virtue of participation but of their own very being (sintque non 
participatione, sed essentia sua), not by gift of some superior but by their very 
own gift.760 
Here we find a restatement of the Holy Spirit as communio, or ‘that by which the two 
are joined to each other’.  Augustine is alert to the danger of his approach and thus 
stresses that Father and Son are not joined by participation (as, in fact, contingent 
existence is) but from their own Being.  Thus, the Holy Spirit as communio is 
grounded in God’s own Being and is to be understood as God ‘very own gift’ of 
himself to himself.  Augustine concludes in a way that takes us towards the Holy 
Spirit’s identification as love or charity:  ‘So the Holy Spirit is something common 
(commune) to Father and Son, whatever it is, or is their very communion (communio), 
consubstantial and coeternal.  Call this friendship, if it helps, but a better word for it is 
charity (caritas)’.761 
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  trin. 6.7. 
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  trin. 6.7 (CCL 50.235). 
761
  trin. 6.7 (CCL 50.235). 
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 Obviously, Augustine has the Holy Spirit as both communio and caritas or 
dilectio very much in mind here, and before we even begin to examine how he 
understands the Holy Spirit as love, we can discern how the two identities intertwine.  
For Augustine, communio grows out of and speaks of love.  Conversely, love requires 
communio: a lover and a beloved.  In Book Eight, Augustine dares even to use sexual 
imagery in describing love: ‘And what is love but a kind of life coupling (copulans) 
or trying to couple together two things, namely lover and what is being loved?  This 
is true even of the most external and fleshly kind of love’.762  Does one perhaps detect 
here the logic that led Augustine from Victorinus’s reference to the Holy Spirit as 
copula to his own reference to him as love? 
 Augustine returns to the image of the Holy Spirit as communio again in Book 
Fifteen, which though written between five and ten years later, retains the same 
features as found in Book Six: 
And if the charity by which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the 
Father inexpressibly shows forth the communion (communionem) of them 
both, what more suitable than he who is the common (communis) Spirit of 
them both should be distinctively called charity?....Because he is common 
(communis) to them both, he is called distinctively what they are called in 
common (communiter).763 
Here, the basis for Augustine’s logic is 1 John 4.8-16.  We will later return to 
Augustine’s interpretation of this passage and its importance to his overall scheme.  
For now, it sufficient to note only that communio is the ground for the Holy Spirit’s 
identity as love.  Augustine argues that because the Holy Spirit is the shared 
‘common Spirit’ of the Father and the Son (here, Augustine avoids the term theotés 
even though that seems to be his meaning), the best way to conceive of him is as 
caritas. 
                                               
762
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 He evokes this image of the Holy Spirit as the shared spirit of the Father and 
the Son in one of his sermons on John’s Gospel, probably preached soon after the 
completion of the first part of De Trinitate.  He is in the midst of explaining at great 
length the spiritual significance of the one hundred and fifty-three fish caught by the 
Disciples in John 21.  In dividing up the total, he assigns the number seven to the 
Spirit and in a general way invokes tradition as support before giving his own 
theological explanation: 
For certainly holiness and sanctification pertain properly to the Holy Spirit, 
and in this regard, although both the Father is spirit and the Son is spirit 
because God is a spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy, 
nevertheless by proper name the Spirit of both is called the Holy Spirit.764 
Clearly, Augustine has retained his initial view of the Holy Spirit as God’s shared 
nature, though now using the term spiritus rather than deitas.  In each of these 
passages we encounter Augustine’s commitment to understanding the Holy Spirit as 
something shared by the Father and the Son, though he seems uncertain about the 
property of that which is shared. 
 Greater clarity however is found in his sermo 71, preached around 417-420 or 
at roughly the same time as the completion of De Trinitate, on the obscure passage 
from Matthew 12.32 regarding the ‘unforgiveable sin’ against the Holy Spirit.765  
After carefully explaining how blasphemy against the Spirit ought to be understood 
(and apologising for keeping his congregation in suspense for so long!), Augustine 
turns his attention to the Holy Spirit: 
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  Jo. eu. tr. 122.8 
765
  In the notes to his translation of the sermon, Edmund Hill, O.P. refers to the ‘problem’ of the 
interpretation of this passage as the ‘one of the thorniest in biblical interpretation’ (271).  
Interestingly, after stating his opinion of the sermon (‘interminable’ and ‘long and rambling—
and eccentric in some of its exegesis’!) he finds the need to counterbalance Augustine’s 
interpretation with a quote from the Jerome Biblical Commentary.  Whether or not one agrees 
with Augustine’s interpretation, the ‘rambling’ nature that Hill laments actually demonstrates 
Augustine’s pastoral sensitivity.  He takes great pains not only to guard against uncharitable 
misinterpretations of the passage but also to limit the scope of the passage’s exhortation.  It 
also appears that Augustine had in view the possible use of this passage by Donatists. 
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…the property of the Holy Spirit is to be the communion (communitas) of the 
Father and Son…So by what is common (commune) to them [i.e. love] both 
the Father and the Son wished us to have communion (communionem) both 
with them and among ourselves; by this gift which they both possess as one 
they wished to gather us together and make us one, that is to say, by the Holy 
Spirit who is God and the gift of God. By this gift we are reconciled to the 
godhead (divinitati), and are delighted (delectamur) by him.  Just as we learn 
things by truth, we love things by love, and it enables us both to know things 
more thoroughly and to enjoy them when known more happily.766  
And a little later in the sermon, Augustine concludes: ‘So to which person of the 
Trinity would communion in this companionship (hujus communio societatis) 
properly belong, if not to that Spirit who is common (communis) to Father and 
Son?’767 Recalling what we discovered in the first chapter about participatory 
redemption, we can glimpse Augustine’s entire scheme within these two passages.  
The Holy Spirit is the shared love, the communio, of the Father and the Son.  This 
communio is the ground for our own communio rooted in love with God and each 
other.768  This recalls Augustine’s conclusion in his discussion of participation in De 
Trinitate 4 (which we examined at the end of the last chapter): Christ cleanses the 
faithful in order to unite them, ‘not only by virtue of the same nature whereby all of 
them from the ranks of mortal men are made equal to the angels, but even more by 
virtue of one and the same wholly harmonious will reaching out in concert to the 
same ultimate happiness, and fused somehow into one spirit in the furnace of 
charity’.769  The passage from sermo 71 suggests that the Holy Spirit himself is the 
‘furnace of charity’ wherein the faithful are ‘fused’ together.770  And all of this—
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  s. 71.18 (PL 38.454). 
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  s. 71.29 (PL 38.461). 
768
  This is one of the rare occasions in which Augustine speaks of the participation of the faithful 
in God as communio.  Typically, he reserves that term to describe either the relationship 
within the Trinity (as we have seen) or the fellowship of the Church. 
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  trin. 4.2.12. 
770
  The Holy Spirit is suggested by the use not only of caritas here but also of ‘furnace’.  
Augustine frequently refers to the work of the Holy Spirit in terms of heat, suggested by the 
tongues of fire at Pentecost.  See for example, conf. 13.9.10. and trin. 4.1.1. 
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participation in God and communion with each other—comes as a gift, which 
Augustine identifies with the Holy Spirit and also which not only reconciles the 
faithful to God but enables them to delight in him as well.  As we will discover later, 
there is much more that can be mined from this passage, but already it has taken us 
much closer towards understanding the source and role of spiritual delight. 
 
Dilectio et Caritas 
We have already seen from his earliest works that Augustine conceived of the 
Holy Spirit as love.  He typically uses either the word dilectio or caritas (which he 
apparently considered synonymous771) in reference to the Holy Spirit. In De fide et 
symbolo, the identification of the Holy Spirit as love is based on his conception of 
him as the communio of the Father and the Son: ‘This ‘deity’, by which they would 
have understood the mutual love (dilectionem) and charity (caritatem) of both Father 
and Son, they say is called the Holy Spirit…772  After quoting Romans 5.5, Augustine 
next refers to the Holy Spirit’s role as the gift from God (donum Dei) as ‘sufficient 
indication’ that the Holy Spirit is the love of God.  He then concludes: ‘To this is 
added another testimony given by the Apostle John, Because God is love (1 John 
4.16).  For here, too, he does not say, Love is God, but, God is love, in order that the 
deity itself may be understood as love’.773  Clearly at this point, Augustine’s 
conception of the Holy Spirit as the ‘mutual charity’ (amborum caritatem) is 
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  Roland Teske S.J., ‘Augustine’s Inversion of 1 John 4:8’, Augustinian Studies 39:1 (2008), 
52.  In trin. 15.18.32, Augustine himself states that the two terms are synonymous: ‘…dilectio 
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synonymous with his conception of the Holy Spirit as the communio of Father and 
Son.774 
 It is interesting that Augustine stresses here that although God is love, love is 
not God because later that very inversion becomes central to his understanding of the 
Holy Spirit and fertile ground for theological development.775  We encounter this 
inversion initially in his sermons on the first epistle of St John: 
How, then, could it be a short while ago, ‘Love is from God’, and now, ‘God 
is love?’  For God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit.  The Son is God from 
God; the Holy Spirit is God from God.  And these three are one God, not three 
gods.  If the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God and he loves him in whom 
the Holy Spirit dwells, then love is God, but God because it is from God.  For 
you have each one in the epistle—both Love is from God, and Love is God.776 
Love, insofar as it proceeds from God, is God.  Next, Augustine suggests that 
whenever someone hears the phrase, ‘from God’ he or she will naturally think of 
either the Son or the Holy Spirit.  He accepts this connection and suggests, in light of 
Romans 5.5, that the love from God ought to be equated most closely with the Holy 
Spirit since it is through him that love is poured into the hearts of the faithful.  As 
Roland Teske, S.J. indicates, however, this passage has caused more than a little 
trouble for translators, many of whom (such as the one above) have corrected 
Augustine’s ‘Love is God’ (dilectio Deus est) by translating it as ‘God is love’ (Deus 
dilectio est).777 Yet, both Augustine’s subsequent argument and his approach to love 
suggest that the inversion is deliberate: because dilectio always finds its source in 
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  fid. et sym. 9.19 (CSEL 41.23). 
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  See Teske, ‘Augustine’s Inversion of 1 John 4:8’, 49-60 for a discussion of Augustine’s 
inversion of 1 John 4.8. 
776
  Jo. eu. ep. 7.6. 
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  Jo. eu. ep. 7.4-6 (PL 35.2031-2032).  Teske, ‘Augustine’s Inversion of 1 John 4:8’, 49 states 
that only one of three English translations retain Augustine’s word order and that the NPNF 
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original Greek functions.  Boniface Ramsey, the translator of this quote, does note (108, n. 10) 
the change here from the normal Deus dilectio est to dilectio Deus est), but offers no 
explanation for why he translates it as though no change has been made. 
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God it can be said to be God himself.  Really, Augustine’s argument here is entirely 
consonant with the arguments made about wisdom, truth, goodness, and any other 
attribute of God.  God is what he has and so he must be love.  In fact, Augustine’s 
argument from De fide et symbolo points us in the right direction.  He can make the 
bold statement that love is God because fundamentally love is the communio of the 
Father and the Son, which is the Holy Spirit.   
 Not surprisingly, Augustine’s fullest treatment of the Holy Spirit as love 
comes in De Trinitate.  In Book Eight, he makes a forthright statement about love: 
Let no one say ‘I don’t know what to love’.  Let him love his brother, and love 
that love; after all, he knows the love he loves with better than the brother he 
loves.  There now, he can already have God better known to him than his 
brother, certainly better known because more present, better known because 
more inward to him, better known because more sure.  Embrace love which is 
God, and embrace God with love.  This is the love which unites (consociat) all 
good angels and all the servants of God in a bond of holiness, conjoins 
(conjungit) us and them together, and subjoins (subjungit) us to itself.  And 
the more we are cured of the tumour of pride, the fuller we are of love.  And if 
a man is full of love, what is he full of but God?778 
This passage demonstrates the high regard Augustine had for what he calls ‘true 
love’.  But we can see here the same logic that we have seen before; this time love is 
not identified as the love that unites the Father and the Son, but the love that unites 
‘all good angels and all the servants of God’ together and subjoins them to God.  This 
is, of course, the language of participation with love functioning as the binding 
principle both between creatures and between God and creation.   
This passage is part of Augustine’s developing argument that God is best 
understood as lover, beloved, and mutual love.  The conclusion of that argument in 
Book Eight sheds further light on the Holy Spirit: 
What then, after all that, is this love or charity which the divine scriptures 
praise and proclaim so much, but love of the good?  Now love means someone 
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  trin. 8.12 (CCL 50.286-287). Throughout this passage Augustine uses either dilectio or diligo. 
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loving, and something loved with love.  There you are with three, the lover, 
what is being loved, and love.  And what is love but a kind of life coupling or 
trying to couple together two things, namely lover and what is being 
loved….What does spirit love in a friend but spirit?  So here again there are 
three, lover and what is being loved, and love.779 
This conclusion makes clear why Augustine is comfortable inverting 1 John 4.8 and 
declaring that love is God.  As Lewis Ayres rightly suggests, Augustine does not 
consider love to be merely an analogy for understanding the Trinity780—God is not 
like love or even love like God—instead, God is love and love is God. Thus, ‘true 
love’ (vera dilectio) in the individual is the actual presence of God and makes God 
known as triune.781   Also once again, the idea of communio (here, as we saw earlier, 
expressed in terms of coupling) lurks just behind Augustine’s explanation of the 
nature of love.  In fact, it illustrates why Augustine’s connects dilectio and communio 
so closely: communio best describes the mutuality involved in the lover loving the 
beloved with love.   
 Augustine again discusses the Holy Spirit as love in Book Fifteen in a manner 
that should now be very familiar: ‘According to the holy scriptures this Holy Spirit is 
not just the Father’s alone nor the Son’s alone, but the Spirit of them both, and thus 
he suggests to us the common charity (communem…caritatem) by which the Father 
and the Son love each other’.782 This reiteration of his concept of the Holy Spirit as 
communio and caritas / dilectio (and both together) introduces Augustine’s extended 
treatise on the person of the Holy Spirit that comprises all of chapter five of Book 
Fifteen and is his longest meditation on the subject.  He continues by addressing a 
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theological conundrum: since Scripture says that ‘God is love’ as opposed to ‘the 
Holy Spirit is love’, he concedes that each member of the Trinity is, indeed, love, and 
all three together are love.783  But he then qualifies his concession by arguing that just 
as the Word is particularly designated Wisdom, even though each member is also 
wholly wisdom, so too is the Holy Spirit distinctively called love (caritas).784   
Augustine next argues that since the Father alone does not proceed from 
another, then 1 John 4.7785 logically limits ‘the love which is God in such way that it 
is from God’ to either the Son or the Holy Spirit.786  This echoes and slightly 
develops the previously discussed assertion in his sermon on John 21: Scripture 
speaks of love proceeding from God who is love and this to Augustine’s mind 
suggests the Holy Spirit.  He continues: 
But the next few lines….In this we know that we abide in him and he in us, 
because he has given us of his Spirit (1 John 4.13).  So it is the Holy Spirit of 
which he has given us that makes us abide (manere) in God and him in us.  
But this is precisely what love does.  He then is the gift of God who is 
love….So it is God the Holy Spirit proceeding from God who fires man to the 
love of God and neighbour when he has been given to him, and he himself is 
love.  Man has no capacity to love God except from God.787 
Here we encounter a slightly different approach by Augustine in his argument for 
understanding the Holy Spirit as love.  First, he uses the idea of ‘abiding’ (manere) to 
prove that the Holy Spirit is properly thought of as love.788  Love is the cause of the 
‘abiding’ or ‘remaining’ in God, echoing the Holy Spirit’s role within participatory 
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existence, where Augustine argues that the Holy Spirit sustains contingent existence.  
In this case, the Holy Spirit enables the faithful to remain or abide in redemptive 
participation in God and God in them.  Second, because the Holy Spirit as love 
enables the faithful to abide in God he is also properly called donum Dei.  Clearly, 
Augustine understands dilectio to be connected intimately to donum; if one recalls 
that his conception of love entails mutuality then it is easy to see why the connection 
exists: love to be love must be given and received.  Augustine’s conclusion 
introduces the final facet of the Holy Spirit’s identity: donum Dei: 
So the love which is from God and is God is distinctively the Holy Spirit; 
through him the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, and through it the 
whole triad dwells in us.  This is the reason why it is most apposite that the 
Holy Spirit, while being God, should also be called the gift of God.  And this 
gift, surely, is distinctively to be understood as being the charity which brings 
us through to God, without which no other gift of God at all can bring us 
through to God.789 
 
Donum Dei 
One of Augustine’s earliest allusions to the Holy Spirit as a gift comes at the 
very end of his first consideration of the Trinity in ep. 11.  There he states that the 
two fruits of the Incarnation are knowledge of God and ‘a certain inward and 
ineffable charm and sweetness of remaining in that knowledge, and of despising all 
mortal things,—a gift and work which is properly ascribed to the Holy Spirit’.  
Technically Augustine employs the term ‘gift’ here to describe the ‘inward and 
ineffable charm and sweetness’ that the Holy Spirit gives to the faithful rather than to 
the Holy Spirit himself.  But it is important to note that from his earliest discussion of 
the Holy Spirit the idea of ‘gift’ is present and is oriented towards creation: in this 
case, the enabling of the faithful to remain in the knowledge of the Father. 
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A fuller development of the Holy Spirit as gift comes in the now familiar 
nineteenth chapter of De fide et symbolo where Augustine uses the identity of the 
Holy Spirit as gift to prove that the Holy Spirit is God.  Speaking about the ‘great and 
learned commentators of the divine Scriptures’, he states: ‘they declare that he is the 
gift of God, so that we believe that he gives no gift inferior to himself’.790  In building 
up towards this conclusion, he develops why ‘some’ have taught that the Holy Spirit 
is God’s gift.  Interestingly, he begins by citing Romans 5.5 to explain why ‘they 
consider the fact that we are reconciled to God through the Holy Spirit (which is why 
He is called a gift from God) as a sufficient indication that the Holy Spirit is the love 
of God’.791  Here then Augustine explicitly links the Holy Spirit’s role as gift to the 
reconciliation of the faithful to God. 
The close connection between the Holy Spirit’s identity as gift and the 
reconciliation of humankind to God, however, gives rise to a theological conundrum.  
In his book Amor Dei, John Burnaby points out that Scripture and tradition speak of 
the Holy Spirit as gift in relation to humankind.  Thus, the Holy Spirit’s identity as 
donum Dei would seem to require the existence of humankind as recipient, which in 
turn shackles the Holy Spirit to creation in contradiction to the eternal and immutable 
nature of God.  Burnaby suggests that Augustine could have solved this problem by 
describing the Holy Spirit as the ‘self-giving’ of love between Father and Son.  But, 
according to Burnaby, Augustine only implies this in De Trinitate 5.12 before passing 
on immediately to speak of the Holy Spirit in relation to the world.792    
De Trinitate 5.12-16 contains one of Augustine’s fullest treatments of the 
Holy Spirit as gift.  He is in the midst of arguing that the names ‘proper or peculiar’ 
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to each person of the Trinity are never used ‘with reference to self but only with 
reference to each other or to creation’.793  Almost immediately he turns to the name of 
‘gift’ for the Holy Spirit: 
He is the gift of the Father and the Son, because on the one hand he proceeds 
from the Father (John 15.26)… and on the other the apostle’s, Whoever does 
not have the Spirit of Christ is not one of his (Romans 8.9), are spoken of the 
Holy Spirit.  So the Holy Spirit is a kind of inexpressible communion or 
fellowship of Father and Son, and perhaps he is given this name just because 
the same name can be applied to the Father and the Son.  He is properly called 
what they are called in common, seeing that both the Father and the Son are 
holy and both the Father and the Son are spirit.  So to signify the communion 
of them both by a name which applies to them both, the gift of both is called 
the Holy Spirit.794 
Augustine introduces here a new element to the Holy Spirit as donum Dei: he is gift 
not only because he has been given to the faithful but also because he is the 
communio of the Father and the Son.  This passage sets the stage for his discussion in 
Book Six, which we have already seen, of the Holy Spirit as the communio of the 
Father and the Son that arises, ‘not in virtue of participation but of their own very 
being, not by gift of some superior but by their very own gift’.795  The identification 
of donum with communio in 5.12 is Augustine’s attempt, alluded to by Burnaby, to 
solve the problem of binding the Holy Spirit to the temporal order.  But Augustine 
actually develops this line of thought in 5.15-16, which then provides the foundation 
for the assertion of 6.7. 
 In 5.15, Augustine distinguishes between the processions of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit, suggesting that the Father is the ‘origin not only for what he begets or 
makes, but also for what he gives’.  He then states that this distinction solves the 
problem that ‘worries many people’ of why the Holy Spirit is not also a son.  
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Augustine concludes, ‘He came forth, you see, not as being born but as being 
given…’  Thus, the Holy Spirit’s identity as gift is based in eternity on his procession 
from the Father.  The Son is eternally begotten and the Holy Spirit eternally given.  
Yet Augustine is still concerned that he has not dealt sufficiently with the problem of 
temporality and so he tries a different approach.  He asks about the Holy Spirit, ‘…if 
he only proceeds when he is given, he would surely not proceed before there was 
anyone for him to be given to?’796  Apparently, Augustine is concerned that if the 
Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as gift, then there must be a recipient of that 
gift.  His answer is to distinguish between a donum and a donatum: ‘There is a 
difference between calling something a gift, and calling it a donation; it can be a gift 
even before it is given…’  One suspects this solution would only be satisfactory to a 
rhetor! 
 Fortunately, Augustine provides a better answer in De Trinitate 6.7, which 
echoes Burnaby’s proposed solution to the problem of identifying the Holy Spirit as 
gift.  There, as we have seen, he describes the Holy Spirit as ‘that by which the two 
are joined each to the other, by which the begotten is loved by the one who begets 
him and in turn loves the begetter’.  The Holy Spirit is seen here as the Father and the 
Son’s mutual gift of ‘unity of Spirit’.797  Recalling what we discovered in our survey 
of communio and dilectio, we can safely state that love itself is the gift shared by the 
Father and the Son.  Still, Augustine is unquestionably more comfortable discussing 
the Holy Spirit as the donum Dei to the faithful than as such within the Trinity.  The 
reason for this will become more obvious as we take a closer look at his use of 
Romans 5.5.   For now we will turn again to De Trinitate 15.31-32 to observe how 
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the Holy Spirit as donum Dei interweaves with his identity as communio and dilectio.  
That observation will take us very close to the subject of delight. 
Recall that in De Trinitate 15.31 Augustine argues that the Holy Spirit’s role 
in enabling the faithful to abide in God and God in them not only proves that he is 
love but also explains why he is called donum Dei.  There Augustine concludes, ‘So it 
is the Holy Spirit of which he has given us that makes us abide in God and him in us.  
But this is precisely what love does.  He then is the gift of God who is love’.  The 
logic behind this passage suggests a tight interplay between the identities of the Holy 
Spirit as communio, dilectio, and donum Dei: 
1. The Holy Spirit is communio because he is the mutual love shared 
between Father and Son that arise from ‘their very own gift’; 
2. He is dilectio because the gift of communion is ‘precisely what love 
does’; 
3. He is donum Dei because communion springs from the love shared 
between Father and Son and between God and the faithful. 
If we now take these three points and examine them within the context of 
participatory redemption, we can begin to understand why donum Dei is such an 
important term for Augustine.  The gift of love that is the communio of the Father and 
the Son makes possible the participation of the faithful in God.  Because of that love, 
the faithful are able to ‘abide’ in God and God in them.  Thus, Augustine writes,  
Nothing is more excellent than this gift of God.  This alone is what 
distinguishes between the sons of the eternal kingdom and the sons of eternal 
perdition….Why is the Spirit distinctively called gift?  Only because of the 
love without which the man who has not got it, though he speak with the 
tongues of men and of angels, is booming bronze and a clashing cymbal…798 
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And why does love differentiate between the sons of the eternal kingdom and the 
sons of eternal perdition?  Augustine explains in a way that takes us to the heart of 
participatory redemption: 
So the love which is from God and is God is distinctively the Holy Spirit; 
through him the charity of God is poured out in our hearts, and through it the 
whole triad dwells in us.  This is the reason why it is most apposite that the 
Holy Spirit, while being God, should also be called the gift of God.  And this 
gift, surely, is distinctively to be understood as being the charity which brings 
us through to God, without which no other gift of God at all can bring us 
through to God. 
By pouring love into the hearts of the faithful, the Holy Spirit becomes the conduit 
for the indwelling of the Trinity in their hearts, which brings them ‘through to God’.  
Thus, the ‘sons of eternal kingdom’ are those who have been converted towards God 
and reformed in the image of his Son by the power of the Holy Spirit.  On the other 
hand, the ‘sons of perdition’ are those who, because of their wickedness, continue 
their trajectory towards death.  Romans 5.5 is, therefore, central to the relationship 
between the three identities of the Holy Spirit and the redemptive participation of the 
faithful in the life of God. 
 
The Rhetorical Contest 
At this point it might be helpful to return briefly to what has so far been 
established.  According to Cicero, the task that confronts an orator in any given 
contest is twofold: to gain the audience’s attention and then to persuade it of the 
orator’s position.  Delight plays a role in both phases: it draws an audience’s attention 
away from the opposing speaker through charm and it provides the ‘sweetness’ that 
makes the orator’s position more attractive.  The orator’s goal is ultimately to use 
argument and charm to induce the audience to desire what he wills: ‘I think nothing is 
more admirable than being able, through speech, to have hold of people’s minds, to 
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win over their inclinations, to drive them at will in one direction, to draw them at will 
from another’.799  As we have seen, Augustine approves of both roles in book four of 
De doctrina Christiana.  Secondly, without eloquence wisdom is mute.  According to 
Cicero, eloquent wisdom—in other words, philosophy united with rhetoric—is what 
originally gathered scattered humanity, imparted divine and ethical knowledge, and 
formed civilisation.  Victorinus’s development of this second aspect of rhetoric 
provides a metaphysic whereby the fallen soul can eventually escape the prison of the 
flesh to ascend to the divine.  Taken together, the task of the ideal orator is to draw 
the audience’s attention away from this world and, through the eloquent imparting of 
philosophical knowledge, to enable it to begin the journey of reintegration into the 
One. 
 In Augustine’s theology, God is the ideal orator who seeks to convert and 
draw people towards an everlasting participation in himself.  In order to achieve this, 
the devil, who expresses a false fluency that yokes souls to worldly delights, must be 
overcome.  In other words, the attention of the audience (humankind) is devoted 
entirely to the opposing orator (the devil) and so before its members can even begin 
to be persuaded by the ideal orator (God) their attention must be diverted.  In keeping 
with Ciceronian principles, this will only happen if the devil’s charming fluency is 
defeated by God’s own eloquence: eternal wisdom and spiritual delight must 
overcome worldly wisdom and worldly delight.  In a rhetorical contest, of course, 
there will always be a transitional period, a moment when the charm and argument of 
the two orators are, as it were, evenly matched and the outcome in doubt.  Similarly, 
there will always be the danger that the opposing orator will mount a ‘charm 
offensive’ and once again draw the audience’s attention back to himself.  Such is the 
                                               
799
  Cicero, De orat. 1.30. 
269 
 
dynamic at play until the contest is finally concluded and one orator emerges as 
victor. 
 We have already examined Augustine’s extended portrayal of this moment of 
balance in his account in Book Eight of the Confessiones, where he recalls praying 
for chastity but not yet.800  Christian wisdom had convinced him of the need for 
conversion, but he had not yet been filled with sufficient delight to desire to live 
accordingly.  This left his inner self divided and his will so conflicted that it seemed 
as though he had, in an almost Manichaean sense, two wills competing against each 
other. The cause of this intolerable situation was that his ‘old loves’ continued to try 
to ‘persuade’ him not to turn his back on them.801  The very thought of forsaking 
those worldly delights kept him from complete conversion.  The whole account is 
portrayed with rhetorical undertones.  Sacred words and ‘Lady Continence’ tugged 
him in one direction while the ‘whisperings’ of old pleasures pulled him in the 
other.802  He was as an audience caught between two masterful orators. 
 This is precisely the redemptive situation in which the Holy Spirit plays its 
most vital role.  Augustine draws from Romans 5.5 the idea of God’s delight being 
poured into the hearts of people through the agency of the Holy Spirit.  This infusion 
of love and delight breaks the subject’s obsession with worldly and diabolical 
delights so that he or she can be converted and sanctified.  But this only introduces a 
second stage in which the rhetorical contest effectively divides the individual into two 
audiences: one still drawn to the old delights and the other increasingly drawn to 
God’s delight.  Now, the Holy Spirit’s task is to impart an ever increasing ‘delight in 
righteousness’ (delectatio iustitiae) so that the individual’s soul can be re-formed and 
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united in its service to God.  Once the whole heart and mind of the individual have 
been conquered by delectatio victrix, he or she will ascend through love to that 
eternal contemplation of the Lord’s delight that is a perfect participation in God.  
While Romans 5.5 is central to the development of Augustine’s approach to the first 
phase, his exegesis of Romans 7.21-25 becomes central to the development of his 
approach to both delectatio iustitiae and delectatio victrix. 
 
Romans 5.5 
Augustine expresses his conception of the Holy Spirit as God’s gift to both 
creation and, more particularly, humankind in some of his earliest works.  In most 
cases he discusses the Holy Spirit as a redemptive ‘gift’ and in many of these 
instances he either alludes to or directly quotes Romans 5.5; indeed the passage 
appears more than two hundred times in his writings, and this figure does not include 
examples where it lurks just beneath the surface of his thought.803 In her brief article 
on Augustine’s use of Romans 5.5, M.-A. La Bonnardière helpfully lists the various 
ways in which the verse is used both before and during the Pelagian controversy.804  
According to her, prior to 411, the verse was used primarily to discuss the joyful 
patience of the righteous in times of tribulation, express the sanctification of the 
faithful, or to undermine Donatism.  After that date, Augustine employs the passage 
mainly to defend the supremacy of the Holy Spirit in initiating faith and to contend 
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that all goods enjoyed by the faithful are owed entirely to the gift of the Holy 
Spirit.805 
 Augustine’s first detailed discussion of the Holy Spirit in light of Romans 5.5 
is found in the first book of De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus 
manichaeorum (387-389).  In chapter thirteen he defines living rightly as striving for 
happiness by an upright life, which means ‘to love virtue and wisdom and truth—to 
love with our whole heart and with our whole soul and with our whole mind the 
virtue which is inviolate and invincible...’806 Such a whole-hearted love, however, is 
beyond human capacity, and so the Holy Spirit sanctifies the faithful so they can be 
‘inflamed with the full and perfect love’ that keeps them from being ‘converted away’ 
(converti) from God and conforms them to ‘Him rather than to the world...’807  Love 
sets the faithful apart from the world and enables them to be ‘confounded no longer 
with those things which should be subject to us’.808  This sanctifying love is the ‘work 
of the Holy Spirit’ that arises in the heart through the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.  
Finally, in a passage that is reminiscent of Victorinus, Augustine writes: 
Inspired by the Holy Spirit, this love leads us to the Son, that is, to the wisdom 
of God through whom the Father Himself is known.  If wisdom or truth is not 
desired with all the powers of the soul, it shall not be found at all, but if it is 
sought after as it deserves to be, it cannot withhold itself nor hide from those 
who love it....It is love that asks, love that seeks, love that knocks, love that 
discloses, and love, too, that abides in that which has been disclosed.809  
Augustine presents wisdom or truth here as something that eludes human awareness 
without the aid of love.  It must be sought after with ‘all the powers of the soul’, 
which Augustine identifies as love.  If wisdom is desired with a whole-hearted love, 
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then it cannot remain distant just as Victorinus’s wisdom cannot remain beyond those 
who seek it philosophically.  Augustine may have replaced philosophy with an 
infused love, but in both cases wisdom must somehow be mediated in order to be 
realised. 
From this point onwards, we will return to texts that we have already 
examined to note how Romans 5.5 is used in each instance.  First, at around the same 
time that Augustine wrote De moribus, he composed his ep. 11, the end of which can 
similarly be compared with Victorinus’s thought: ‘...there flows through the Son both 
a knowledge of the Father, that is, of the one principle from whom all things come, 
and a certain interior and ineffable tenderness and sweetness of remaining in this 
knowledge and scorning all mortal things, which gift and function is properly 
attributed to the Holy Spirit’.810  Wisdom is united here with an ‘interior and ineffable 
tenderness and sweetness’ (interior et ineffabilis suavitas atque dulcedo) that enables 
one to remain in that wisdom and apart from the world.  Augustine reiterates this 
view a few years later in the passage from De fide et symbolo (393) from which we 
mined so much information about the Holy Spirit’s identity.  After quoting Romans 
5.5, he explains that because of this outpouring, the Holy Spirit is called a gift, 
‘because no one enjoys what he knows unless he loves it. To enjoy the Wisdom of 
God is nothing else but to cleave to him in love; and no one has an abiding grasp of 
anything unless he loves it’.811  From these three early passages we can already 
perceive a paradigm in which the human soul is aided by the Holy Spirit to detach 
itself from the world and become aware of and remain attached to Wisdom thereby 
performing the same function as eloquent philosophy in Victorinus’s commentary.  
As Carol Harrison indicates, ‘If understanding and reason are associated with the Son 
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in the early works, then love and delight are associated with the Holy Spirit.  Reason 
and delight are as inseparable in these works, however, as the union of the persons of 
the Trinity; we cannot have one without the other...’812  As early as 389, therefore, 
Augustine was conceiving of the role of Christ and the Holy Spirit, Wisdom and 
Delight, in agreement with Cicero’s idea of Wisdom and Eloquence: the faithful 
never receive one without the other. 
 This idea that faith can only really be present if it is conjoined with delight 
makes its clearest early appearance in Ad Simplicianum.  As we have seen, Augustine 
begins his argument by indicating that Christians have been commanded to ‘live 
righteously’ so that they may enjoy everlasting felicity.813  But this is impossible 
without faith since it is a prerequisite for the reception of the Holy Spirit who inspires 
a love for righteousness.  Yet this faith may not be summoned by an act of will, but 
must come in response to a ‘calling’ (vocatione) and ‘by some testimony 
(testificatione) borne to the truth’, a phrase redolent of forensic rhetoric.814  By now, 
we should not be surprised that Augustine conceives of the reception of faith in terms 
of a ‘calling’.  Both Scripture and Augustine’s rhetorical and philosophical 
background push him towards the idea that truth is expressed by a ‘testimony’: it is 
the doctrina of which the subject must be convinced.  But then he asks, ‘Who can 
welcome in his mind something which does not give some delight?  But who has it in 
his power to ensure that something that will delight him will turn up, or that he will 
take delight in what turns up?’  For truth to enter the mind it must be accompanied by 
delight and Augustine the rhetor recognises that individuals have no more control 
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over this delight than an audience has over an ideal orator’s charm.815   But even to 
have a chance of receiving the expressed truth in such a way as to be moved or 
converted, that truth must be conjoined to a delight that is part of the gift of the Holy 
Spirit.  Returning to the language used in mor. 1.17.31, Augustine advises that we 
should therefore ‘ask that we may receive...seek that we may find...knock that it may 
be opened to us’.  The will to seek out the truth through faith is itself a gift of the 
Holy Spirit, which in light of mor. 1.17.31 can be understood as arising from the 
outpouring of love.  Delight therefore provides the ‘motive-power’ (movente) that 
‘stirs’ (excitante) the mind to receive in faith the testimony of truth.816 
 In commenting on this passage from Ad Simplicianum, John Burnaby suggests 
that Augustine is arguing that delight works on the will to spur it into motion.817  In 
other words, the reception of the Holy Spirit introduces a delight that compels the will 
to act: in this case, to receive the testimony of truth in such a way as to be converted 
and to begin living righteously.  In Augustine’s own words, the Holy Spirit does what 
the unaided will cannot: it ‘persuades’ or ‘moves’ the will towards faith (voluntas 
moveatur ad fidem).818  And the manner in which the Holy Spirit persuades is by 
imparting the necessary delight for truth to be both known and loved.  Without that 
infusion of delight the soul remains unconvinced; either it does not perceive the 
testimony of the truth or it remains untouched by its call.  In other words, truth speaks 
mutely until it is united with delight.  Only after the soul experiences a delight in the 
truth does it receive the motive to love God and the desire to live righteously.   
Finally, Sermo 71.18 (416/17), written late in Augustine’s career, allows us to 
begin to understand why the gift of delight originates in the Holy Spirit.  In 
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discussing the nature of the Holy Spirit, he states that, ‘by what is common to them 
both the Father and the Son wished us to have communion both with them and among 
ourselves’.819  What is ‘common to them both’ is none other than the Holy Spirit (as 
we have seen), and it is the Holy Spirit as communio that is given to the faithful to 
bind them together and make them one.  Furthermore, ‘By this gift we are reconciled 
to the godhead, and by this gift we delight in God (eaque delectamur)’.  The gifts of 
communion, reconciliation, and delight come to the faithful by the outpouring of the 
love into their hearts through the gift of the Holy Spirit.  That love, in turn, makes the 
knowledge of truth efficacious.  Augustine asks what use would ‘knowing any kind 
of good’ be if one did not also love that truth and concludes: ‘Now just as truth is 
what we learn by, so charity is what we love by, and enables us both to know things 
more thoroughly and enjoy them when known more happily’.  Here Augustine 
implies that delight is connected in some mysterious way to the communion shared 
between the Father and the Son, which he has repeatedly identified as the Holy Spirit.  
If one recalls that in De Trinitate 6.11 he conceives of the Holy Spirit as the 
‘sweetness’ of Begetter and the Begotten pervading all creation, and in ep. 11 speaks 
of that sweetness being poured into the hearts of the faithful to enable them to cling to 
the truth of the Son, then we can begin understand the nature of this delight: delight is 
not simply the experience of having the Holy Spirit poured into the believer’s heart; it 
is the Holy Spirit himself. 
 These passages throw light on the various ways La Bonnardière notes that 
Augustine employs Romans 5.5.  So, for example, in ep. 55 (400), Augustine 
connects the Sabbath rest directly to the ‘sanctification in the rest of the Holy Spirit’ 
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that comes through delight.820  Until the soul has experienced spiritual delight, it 
remains restless, moving ‘upwards and downwards’ seeking a permanent rest:   
And many things delight us through the body, but there is no eternal rest in 
them, nor even a long rest, and for this reason they rather soil the soul and 
weigh it down so that they impede its pure weight by which it is carried to 
higher things.  When, therefore, the soul finds delight in itself, it does not yet 
find delight in an immutable reality, and for this reason it is still proud 
because it regards itself as the highest, though God is higher....But when the 
soul finds delight in God, it finds in him the true, certain, eternal rest that it 
was seeking in other things and was not finding there.821 
He concludes that the only way the soul can find delight in God, and therefore eternal 
rest, is through love being poured into the heart through the reception of the Holy 
Spirit.822  Similarly, Augustine interprets the ‘joyful chariot’ mentioned in Ps. 67.18 
as the Church, which is ‘thousands of joyful people’ made so by the outpouring of the 
Holy Spirit.823  Finally, in his long letter to Honorius on grace (411/412), Augustine 
suggests that the outpouring of the Holy Spirit evokes an inner song or praise of God 
that comes through the outpouring of love.  Referring to Eph. 5.19, he writes: ‘For 
this joy is within, where the sound of praise is both sung and heard: by this sound he 
is praised who is to be loved gratuitously with the whole heart, the whole soul, the 
whole mind and who sets his lover ablaze for himself by the grace of his holy Spirit.  
For what else is the new song but the praise of God?’824  As in Book Ten of the 
Confessiones, the experience of delight induces the praise of God.825 
 What we discover in all these passages is in a sense the logical conclusion of 
Augustine’s close connection of love with delight.  First, he identifies the Holy Spirit 
as the ‘love from God’ and as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.  From this, 
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he naturally begins to think of the Holy Spirit as identified, in some special way, with 
God’s delight.  He is ‘wholly blissful delight’ and the ‘sweetness of the Begetter and 
the Begotten’.  And so, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit into the faithful must then 
be also an infusion of love, and if so, then an infusion of delight: to be filled with the 
Holy Spirit is to be filled with love is to be filled with delight.  Spiritual delight 
therefore springs from the Trinity, sweeping up believers into the sweet communio of 
the Trinity through the reception of that communio, i.e. the Holy Spirit, into their 
hearts. 
A final aspect of Augustine’s approach to Romans 5.5 that merits observation 
is that he does not seem to hold open the possibility of righteousness by itself 
delighting a person enough for him or her to embrace faith.  People cannot, as is the 
case with the experience of beauty, be enamoured and delighted with righteousness.  
The delight must come from elsewhere: namely, the Holy Spirit.  This becomes clear 
if we compare the dynamics of Ad Simplicianum with those of De sermone Domini in 
monte.  There, the suggestion itself provides the delight that the will must resist or 
else be overcome.  In Ad Simplicianum one has both the suggestion (God’s vocatione 
or the ‘testificatione borne to truth’) and the ultimate persuasion (moveatur ad fidem).  
But the delight that enables the suggestion to persuade seems to come from an 
external agency, the appearance and gift of the Holy Spirit.  The Holy Spirit must 
invade the fallen heart and infuse the delight necessary for binding the believer to 
righteousness with the glue of charity.  But this should not surprise us.  The delight 
that charms an audience in Cicero’s portrait is not found in the teaching itself but is 
conveyed by the manner in which the orator arranges and expresses that teaching.  
God, who expressed the teaching (the Law) also expresses the delight that persuades 
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the faithful to accept and hold fast to the teaching: God’s eloquence is his spiritual 
delight.  
 
Romans 7 
It remains now to examine how Augustine understands the manner of the 
contest between God and sin and what the movement towards one or the other looks 
like.  In the main, he accomplishes this approach through his interpretation of 
Romans 7.   That chapter is filled with words and concepts that are central to 
Augustine’s theology—bondage, the will and desire, the flesh versus the spirit, and 
delight—and so it should not be surprising that it plays such a commanding role in 
the development of his scheme of redemption.  Moreover, the overarching framework 
of the passage avails itself of a rhetorical interpretation: sin and righteousness 
contend with each other to direct Paul’s will.   Augustine repeatedly turns to Roman 
7, often in long and detailed exegeses, to develop his understanding of the inner 
struggle faced by one in the midst of both conversion and sanctification.  Largely 
through his wrestling with this passage, Augustine ultimately develops the belief that 
for people truly to be free they must both delight in and desire to obey God’s will; 
only then can the restless heart find peace.  As with Cicero’s orator, God must 
persuade the believer to want what he wants. 
The passage itself, indeed the whole thrust of Paul’s argument at this point in 
Romans, still causes difficulties for Biblical scholars.826  But in general terms, Paul is 
in the midst of discussing the two types of slavery presented to people—slavery to sin 
or to God—and in Chapter 7 addresses more specifically the problem of the will.  The 
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presenting question—and one that naturally catches Augustine’s attention—is why 
people continue to commit sins even when they know right from wrong.   Paul speaks 
of this as an inner struggle between his ‘carnal’ and his ‘inmost’ self that is beyond 
his own powers to resolve.  His heart delights in God but his carnal self remains so 
committed to sin that he continues to do the things he no long desires doing.  
Ultimately, the ‘law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus’ sets him free from bondage to 
sin and death.827   
 Scholars by and large agree that Augustine’s interpretation of Romans 7 
changed over time.828  J. Partout Burns argues that in his early works, Augustine 
‘protected the inviolability of the human will’ by insisting that once the good that 
ought to be done is discovered the individual has the power to choose it.  The 
inclination to act otherwise arises from the ‘concupiscence of the flesh’ and is 
reinforced by custom.  Burns maintains that Augustine held that God frees the 
believer from this habit while at the same time respecting ‘a certain human 
autonomy’ by ‘dispositions already within the will’.829  Charity then strengthens the 
will that has already chosen the good so that it can continue to overcome 
concupiscence and custom.830  Burns concludes that grace ‘persuades and facilitates 
rather than [sic] coercing and necessitating’.831  Burns also argues that according to 
Augustine’s early view, Romans 7 refers to a person under the Law not yet called to 
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believe or given the grace to perform the good.832  By the start of the Pelagian 
controversy, however, Augustine had changed his mind, insisting that a person can 
only perform the good through the help of the Holy Spirit, and therefore he 
reinterprets Romans 7 as Paul speaking about his own post-conversion struggle 
against sin.833 
 Burns’ argument is supported by William S. Babcock who focuses more 
sharply on Augustine’s interpretation of Romans during the period of 394-396.  
Babcock argues that through his study of Romans, Augustine came to realise that the 
carnal self can only be overcome through the intervention of God’s grace.834  Prior to 
this development, Augustine had held that a person’s moral progress towards God 
was ‘more or less a linear continuum, a steady progression from the recognition of 
God as the eternal good to the willing of God as one’s own highest good’.835 After 
studying Romans 7-9, however, he forsook this view for one that involves four stages 
that reflect humanity’s relation to the Law and the Incarnation: ante legem, sub lege, 
sub gratia, in pace.836  Augustine then concluded that the transition from sub lege to 
sub gratia is impossible without God’s aid.837 
 Frederick Van Fleteren shares and develops Babcock’s basic thesis.  Drawing 
from Augustine’s discussion of Romans 7 in diu. qu. 83 64, Van Fleteren argues that 
as late as 393 Augustine held that a person turns to God in an act of ‘fiduciary faith’ 
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so that he or she may be helped by the ‘grace of liberation’.838  At this point, 
Augustine believed that a person ante legem possesses concupiscence and consents to 
it in ignorance.  A person sub lege possesses concupiscence, recognises what it is, but 
consents to it out of weakness; the Law is only ever performed out of fear.  
Concupiscence remains in the person sub gratia but he or she is not drawn to it nor 
consents to it.  Now, the Law is performed with delight.  Finally, only in pace, when 
the body perfectly serves the spirit, will there be a total absence of concupiscence.839  
Van Fleteren maintains that Augustine’s conversion to his later view occurs, not 
surprisingly, in the midst of composing Ad Simplicianum where (1.2.3) he determines 
in light of Romans 9.11-13 that faith itself is a gift from God.840  Van Fleteren points 
to Retractationes 2.1, where Augustine states that he came to realise that Romans 7 
actually refers to the spiritual man under grace wrestling with the pull of earthly 
desires.841 
 Leaving aside for a moment the argument about Augustine’s understanding of 
where the initiative of faith lies, it is worth noting that a rhetorical framework lurks 
unspoken behind all these accounts.  Although, this can be seen most clearly in 
Burns’ portrayal of God as one who ‘persuades’ rather than coerces, it is also to be 
found in Babcock’s and Van Fleteren’s account of Augustine’s eventual embrace of a 
four-staged life of a believer in which the individual is drawn and consents to various 
delights.  All implicitly agree that ultimately Augustine came to understand the will 
as being at the mercy of delight, drawn irresistibly to consent either to earthly 
pleasures or heavenly delight.   In general terms, therefore, all these scholars 
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understand Augustine as interpreting Romans 7 in terms of persuasion.  According to 
their view, the early Augustine gave a higher place to the individual will than at the 
time of the Pelagian controversy, but even then God called and persuaded, even if 
only (in Burns’ view) through the ‘external grace’ of teaching and calling, themselves 
rhetorical activities.  None of these accounts, however, even mentions Augustine’s 
rhetorical background or attempts to understand Romans 7 in the context of his wider 
theology.  The shared hypothesis (albeit bolstered in Van Fleteren’s case by 
Augustine’s Retractationes) is that in the midst of composing Ad Simplicianum 
Augustine moved from a more philosophical position (that provided space for the 
initiating activity of the will) to a more conservative one.  The assumption in each 
case is that the change in Augustine’s position marked a new development in his 
thought. 
 But, assuming there was a change, what if this change were actually a 
reversion to an earlier understanding of the will?  It is remarkable that Augustine’s 
later interpretation of Romans 7 agrees remarkably with Ciceronian rhetorical theory.  
The journey from ante legem to in pace is concurrently a journey from a will ruled by 
worldly delights to a will ruled by the delight of the Holy Spirit.  The movement from 
ante legem through sub lege, sub gratia to in pace is driven, as Burns recognises, by 
persuasion; in the midst of the movement the will is divided between the lure of two 
delights and becomes divided between the carnal and the inner self.  Augustine’s 
ultimate position is therefore not unlike Cicero’s in the introduction of De inventione.  
In both, humanity moves through persuasion from a bestial nature to one that 
embraces a civilising truth.  Cicero’s wisdom and Augustine’s Law are both equally 
impotent in converting carnal humanity; but when aided by Cicero’s eloquence or 
Augustine’s delight then carnal humanity is transformed.  Consent is central to both, 
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and in both consent only really comes about through a transformation of the heart.  
Cicero and Augustine alike hold that the will must be not just convinced but also (and 
to a greater degree) affected if it is ultimately to be changed. 
 Although he does not connect Augustine’s understanding to rhetoric, Eugene 
TeSelle does helpfully acknowledge this dynamic at play in Augustine’s 
interpretation of Romans 7.  He approaches Augustine’s interpretation through his 
psychology of persuasion as presented in De sermone Domini in monte to argue that 
Augustine conceives of two conflicting delights, one binding the will to ‘misdirected’ 
delight and the other a delight in the law of God.842  TeSelle argues that Romans 5.5 
influenced Augustine’s thinking, causing him to understand God as infusing delight 
into the subject so that he or she can overcome worldly delight.843  He concludes, 
‘This new delight “draws” and “leads” the will, inviting consent and making it 
possible’.844  What is this but the language of rhetoric, of winning consent through 
persuasion?   
 Augustine attempts first to grapple at length with Romans 7 in De diversis 
quaestionibus 83 66, written in the midst of his post-ordination intensive Scriptural 
study between 394 and 395.845  His four stages of development towards eternal life 
make their first appearance here.  He describes the first stage, prior to the reception of 
the Law, as ‘an animal, carnal state’ that is reminiscent of Cicero’s original human 
state of living ‘after the fashion of beasts’.846  In the second state, under the Law, 
people recognise right from wrong, but ‘overcome by sin’s habits, we sin because 
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faith does not yet assist us’.847  Eventually, this state gives way to the next when the 
believer ‘trusts fully’ in the ‘Deliverer’ and is ‘no longer overcome by the delight of 
an evil habit (vincimur delectatione consuetudinis malae) when it strives to draw 
(ducere) us into sin’.848  Still, sin continues to try to ‘seduce’ the believer, even 
though the believer does not yield.  Finally, after the ‘mortal body’ is infused with the 
fullness of life in heaven, the believer is at long last at peace.849  Again like Cicero’s 
presentation of the origin of civilisation, the end result is unity, harmony and peace 
where before there was only disharmony and discord.  Augustine understands the 
moment of transition to be between the person sub lege and sub gratia, which he 
identifies with Romans 7.24-25.  The Law allows the individual to know the 
difference between good and evil; the Law also admonishes because even with that 
recognition the individual is powerless to perform the good.  In other words, the Law 
allows people to perceive that they are in bondage to sin and ruled by their sinful 
habits.850  This helplessness gives rise to the necessary humility whereby one will 
appeal for help.  And once one has been raised up from bondage, he or she will then 
recognise the ‘grace of the Deliverer’.  What allows this freedom is the appearance of 
‘a love which would posses the mind by an inward delight (interiore delectatione), 
lest the mind be drawn to sin by the delight of temporal things’.851  Finally, Augustine 
concludes, ‘Therefore, in the first [phase of] activity, which is prior to the Law, there 
is no struggle with the pleasures of this world; in the second, which is under the Law, 
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we struggle but are overcome; in the third, we struggle and overcome; in the fourth, 
we do not struggle, but we rest in perfect and eternal peace’.852  
 Augustine returns to this scheme in his short commentary on Romans.  For the 
most part, his description reiterates what has already been described in diu. qu. 83 66: 
in the first stage, people consent to or approve of sin (approbamus peccata) and 
therefore enact it;853 in the second, however, people ‘confess’ that they commit the 
sins they wish not to commit which results in the realisation that they cannot of their 
own will perform the good;854 in the third, people resist the ‘fleshly desires’ because 
they are ‘fixed in the grace and love of God’;855 and in the final, people enjoy perfect 
peace because they have been transformed through the resurrection of the body.856  
Once again, it is possible to read the movement of Augustine’s scheme in rhetorical 
terms.  At the beginning, people are entirely under the sway of sin to which they have 
given their approval.  That approval or consent is essential to their transformation; in 
order to enjoy the final peace, that consent must be wrested away from sin and given 
over to God’s righteousness.  To begin the process of conversion, therefore, God 
presents his case, as it were, by providing the Law.  The admonition of the Law 
makes those in bondage to sin aware of their state and instils in them a desire to be 
free.  In this way, their attention is redirected towards God, who then provides the 
grace for them to be led to will what he wills.  The lure of sin remains after this 
outpouring of grace, but as long as consent is withheld the faithful remain with God 
until at long last they enjoy the peace of his complete victory over their sinful desires. 
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 Missing from these treatments of Romans 7, however, are the role of the Holy 
Spirit, an interplay with Romans 5.5, and the necessary presence of love and delight 
within the movement from sin to eternal life.  Thus far, Augustine has only stated that 
in response to the penitent’s plea for help, God leads him or her to a state of grace and 
freedom from the bondage of sin.  In his commentary on Galatians, however, he 
finally gives both the Holy Spirit and delight their role within the dynamic of Romans 
7.  Although the reiteration of the scheme itself is found in Expositio Epistulae ad 
Galatas 46, of more interest is what precedes and follows that chapter.  In chapter 44, 
Augustine draws upon Romans 13.10 to demonstrate how the Law is really fulfilled 
through love: ‘And since faith obtains the Holy Spirit, through whom the love of God 
has been poured out in the hearts of those who work righteousness, no one should 
take any pride whatsoever in good works prior to the grace of faith’.857  In his note for 
this passage, Eric Plumer points out that ‘obtains’ (impetrare) implies ‘seeking’ and 
‘asking’, which suggests that Luke 11.9 may lurk behind this as it does in mor. 
1.17.31 and Simpl. 1.2.21.858  Augustine also refers to faith here as a grace, implying 
that faith itself originates with God.  The grace of faith seeks out the Holy Spirit who 
then pours out love into the heart of the penitent so that he or she can be transformed 
from a life sub lege into a life sub gratia. 
 But Augustine has still not explained the dynamics of this transformation.  
Why does the infusion of love through the gift of the Holy Spirit free the penitent 
from a bondage to sin?  After explaining the four stages of transformation, however, 
he turns to the heart of the matter.  In a person sub gratia, the fruits of the Spirit as 
spelled out in Timothy 1.8-10 govern.  Why?  Augustine explains: 
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Now these good things reign if they so delight (si tantum delectant) us that in 
the midst of temptations they keep the mind from rashly consenting to sin (ne 
in peccati consensionem ruat). For we necessarily act in accordance with what 
delights us more, as for example when the beauty of an attractive woman 
meets our eyes and moves us towards a delight in fornication. But if, through 
the grace that is in faith in Christ, that inmost loveliness—the pure beauty of 
chastity —delights us more, we will live and act in accordance with that, not 
behaving with sin reigning in us so that we obey its desires, but with 
righteousness reigning through love with great delight. And we know that 
whatever we do in love is pleasing to God.  Now what I have said about purity 
and fornication I want to be understood of the other things as well.859 
In the end, eternal life depends on delight; a person will go where delight leads.  In 
grappling with Romans 7, Augustine has come to two convictions: first, that if to be 
free means to do as one pleases, then God must enable the individual to be pleased 
with righteousness in order for him or her to be free; second, that the dynamic of 
Romans 7 and of human salvation accords with his own rhetorical training.  In order 
for God to transform sinners, he must infuse them with a delight in righteousness that 
will overcome their delight in the world and sin.  God must be more eloquent than 
sin.  In the end, the four stages of salvation conform remarkably well to Augustine’s 
three stages of temptation: suggestion, delight, consent.  The Law is the suggestion 
that is powerless unless it delights.  The Holy Spirit infuses that delight in the Law so 
that the mind consents freely to perform it.  In Ciceronian terms, the Law states the 
doctrina to which people must be persuaded and the Holy Spirit provides the 
delectatio that moves them towards final approval: the end result is a freedom that 
comes from delighting in what God wills.  
 In his Retractationes, Augustine later admitted that in initially working out 
this scheme, he ‘tried hard to maintain the free choice of the human will, but the grace 
of God prevailed’.860  Grappling with Romans 7 in light of Romans 9.10-29 in his 
letter to his old mentor Simplicianus, however, induced a change of heart that caused 
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him to believe that even faith itself is a gift from God.  As we have already noted at 
length, Peter Brown made much of this conversion moment that transformed 
Augustine from a man with a high view of ‘human autonomy’ (to use Purtout Burns’ 
phrase) to the intractable foe of the Pelagians.  While there is no need to review the 
merits of this viewpoint, it is important to note three things about Augustine’s 
supposed conversion.  
 First, considering Augustine’s earlier language about the movement from ante 
lege to sub gratia, his change of heart was not terribly momentous.  If he did uphold a 
certain autonomy of the will in his earlier works, it was an autonomy undergirded by 
God’s internal call and external admonition without which the will would never have 
begun to the turn towards God.  Just as importantly, Augustine always conceived of 
the will as belonging to a rational creature entirely dependent upon God and subject 
to the direction of delight, be that an unwholesome, worldly delight or a higher 
delight in truth and beauty.   Finally, the will that does respond to God’s call and the 
admonition of the Law is one that is utterly in bondage to the habit of sin.  In the end, 
if Ad Simplicianum does show an adjustment, then it is an exceedingly small one 
from a concept in which a divinely aided will recognises through God’s admonition 
that it must turn to him to a concept in which a divinely aided will is infused with the 
recognition and ability to turn to God.  On one level, Ad Simplicianum marks only a 
change of degree in the bondage of the will.  As will be shown, however, the 
introduction of the Holy Spirit as the infuser of love and delight enriches Augustine’s 
scheme and brings it into accord with the rest of his developing thought. 
 Second, the change, however small it may be, is best understood as a 
reversion to something more akin to a Ciceronian understanding of motivation with a 
will passing, in spite of itself, from being governed by one master to another through 
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a movement of delight and persuasion.  If the goal of Cicero’s orator is to compel an 
audience to will what he wills then the contest between opposing orators is ultimately 
a contest of wills, both between the two orators and between the two orators and the 
audience.  As has been shown, within such a presentation there is very little room for 
an active, autonomous will on the part of the audience; people are passively swayed 
by the presentation and charm of the speakers.  They do not choose to give their rapt 
attention and to delight in the words of one orator over the other but are swept up by 
the charm of the more eloquent speaker. In much the same way, in Ad Simplicianum 
people do not choose to turn to God and to delight in righteousness; they are swept up 
by the unexpected arrival of delight through the power of the Holy Spirit. 
 Finally and importantly, Augustine states that in working through Romans 7 
in light of Romans 9 he came to see Romans 7 as referring also to the ‘spiritual man’ 
or the person sub gratia.861  This is a vital discovery on his part because it provides 
him with what one might call a pastoral insight into the on-going struggle of the 
faithful with sin and grace in terms of rhetoric.  Now, the battle of wills and delights 
not only occurs during the process of conversion but also after conversion in the 
process of sanctification.  The dramatic intervention of God in giving the Holy Spirit 
through that infusing delight does not automatically result in victory.  Rather it results 
in a divided will as the rhetoric of the world and God battle through delight for 
governance.  That contest only comes to its conclusion when God’s delight is 
victorious over worldly delights.  With this final apprehension, Augustine’s rhetorical 
dynamic of salvation encompasses the process of both conversion and sanctification. 
 Augustine most clearly describes this new rhetorical dynamic of sanctification 
in his remarkable series of sermons on Romans 7 and 8 preached between 417 and 
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  Ret. 2.1.  See Van Fleteren, ‘Augustine’s Exegesis of Romans’, 96 for a discussion of this 
point. 
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419 and in Tractate 41 of his sermons on the Gospel of John probably preached in 
419.  In these works we find a well-developed concept of a Christian’s lifelong 
struggle with sin and virtue expressed in terms of delight.  The governing metaphor, 
particular for the sermons, is of warfare, with Augustine employing various types of 
martial language to emphasise both the gravity and difficulty of progressing in faith 
towards salvation.  In terms of his four-stage process of salvation, almost his entire 
focus is on the growth from sub gratia to in pace.  His conclusion in all of these 
works is that the just will only enjoy a state of living in pace at their death when 
God’s spiritual delight finally overcomes the seduction of temporal and sinful 
delights. 
 Between 417 and 419, Augustine preached ten sermons on Romans 7 and 8.  
Although the traditional ordering of the sermons is not entirely chronological 
(arranged instead according to the expounded Scriptural texts) many of them were, in 
fact, preached as a kind of sermon series. Sermo 151 in many ways sets the tone for 
all of the succeeding sermons: ‘...the life of the just in the body is still a warfare, not a 
triumphal celebration’.862  Concupiscence and bad habits contend with the Holy Spirit 
for control of the will, seeking to lure the just into giving their consent to sin.863  As 
always, consent is the key to the whole theory; all the efforts of sin are devoted to 
inducing the just to consent to enacting it.  As long as consent is withheld, sin fails to 
reclaim the just, although it continues to plague them with sinful desires.  Augustine 
asks: 
So what is the good that I do?  That I don’t consent to a bad desire.  I do good, 
and I don’t carry the good through; and my enemy, lust, does evil and doesn’t 
carry the evil through.  How do I do good and not carry through with the 
good?  I do good when I do not consent to the evil lust; but I do not carry 
                                               
862
  s. 151.2. 
863
  s. 151.4.  Augustine uses the example of drunkenness, not without a sprinkling of humour, to 
express his point. 
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through with the good, so as not to covet or have any lust at all.  So again, 
how does my enemy too do evil and not carry through with the evil?  It does 
evil, because it stirs up an evil desire; it does not carry the evil through, 
because it does not drag me into committing the evil.864 
This passage can, of course, be easily understood according to Augustine’s 
psychology of sin.  Because they have not reached the stage of peace, the just remain 
plagued by sinful suggestions that stoke desire through the delights they offer.  
Augustine maintains that not even the holy are free from these suggestions.865  But as 
long as these sinful suggestions are resisted and consent is withheld—in short, as long 
as they remain unpersuasive—they fail to divert the just away from their movement 
towards the peaceful rest of eternal life. 
 Augustine illustrates how even the holy are plagued by such sinful suggestions 
in sermo 154 by dwelling on Paul’s own struggles: ‘So what are we saying, my dear 
brothers and sisters?  That the apostle had no lust in his flesh, which he would rather 
not have, but which he didn’t consent to, though it arose, tickled his fancy, gave him 
ideas, drew him on, boiled up, tempted him?’866  Augustine’s reply is that Paul did 
struggle because he had not yet reached the perfection of the angels.  This clearly 
establishes the state of the faithful: their fancy is tickled by sinful delights that stir 
them up and seek to draw them back towards slavery.  But again, consent is crucial.  
Paul is worthy of imitation because even though he experienced the conflict of the 
spirit against the flesh, he withheld consent.  Yet, until he reached the ‘safe haven of 
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  s. 151.7. 
865
  s. 151.8. 
866
  s. 154.3 (PL 38.834): ‘Non habebat ullam concupiscentiam Apostolus in carne sua, quam 
habere nollet; cui tamen existenti, titillanti, suggerenti, sollicitanti, aestuanti, tentanti non 
consentiret?’ 
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that home country’,867 he remained, like all Christians, a divided person with the 
mind and the flesh opposing one another.868   
 The reason why people remain divided even after they have consented to the 
Law is that they have within them two opposing delights.  The role of delight is key.  
The faithful do not withhold consent from sin through some exertion of the will.  
Augustine argues that one may will not to commit sin and yet sin anyway.869  The just 
withhold consent because the ‘delight in the Law of God’ exceeds the delight of sin.  
Augustine illustrates this vividly:  
You see lust kicking up a rumpus outside, you issue a decree against it, to 
cleanse your conscience. ‘I don’t want to,’ you say, ‘I won’t do it.  Granted it 
would be delightful, I won’t do it, I have something else to delight in.  For I 
delight in the law of God according to the inner self.  Why are you rowdily 
proposing foolish, temporal, transient, vain and harmful delights, and telling 
me about them like a chatterer? (garrula)’870 
The battle for consent then is a conflict of delights, each seeking to lure the will to 
consent and subsequently to move either towards or away from God.  Augustine later 
describes this contest of delights in unambiguous rhetorical language:  ‘So now if the 
mind doesn’t consent to sin tickling its fancy, making suggestions, beckoning it on; if 
the mind doesn’t consent, because it has other inner delights of its own in no way to 
be compared with the delights of the flesh; so if it doesn’t consent, and there is in me 
something dead and something alive, death is still striving, but the mind’s alive and 
not consenting’.871 
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  s. 154.7. 
868
  s. 154.9. 
869
  s. 154.10-12. 
870
  s. 154.12 (PL 38.838). 
871
  s. 154.14 (PL 38.839): ‘Jam ergo si mens non consentit peccato titillanti, suggerenti, 
blandienti; si mens non consentit, quoniam habet alias interius delectationes suas, 
delectationibus carnis ex nulla parte conferendas: si ergo non consentit, et est in me quiddam 
mortuum, et quiddam vivum, mors adhuc contendit, sed mens viva non consentit.’ The 
emphasis is mine. 
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 Although sermo 159 may have been preached in 417 rather than 419, it sums 
up the entire series of sermon about the inner conflict of the faithful in light of 
Romans 7 and 8 and conceives of that struggle most obviously in terms of delight; 
indeed, it contains much that we have examined in previous chapters.  Augustine 
begins by describing the ‘present journey in exile’, the stage of in gratia, as a journey 
towards ‘the enjoyment of the final vision (fruamur specie)’.872  The just begin with 
faith and ‘arrive at vision (perveniatur ad speciem)’.873  In other words, the life of the 
faithful, as we have seen, is a movement towards the beata vita which is a 
contemplative vision of the Lord’s delight.  In order to make progress towards that 
Beatific Vision, the faithful must love justice and the first stage of sanctification is to 
prefer the love of justice to everything else that ‘gives delight (delectant)’.874  This 
leads to the passage we have already examined in which Augustine allows for a 
delight in other things as long as one delights most in justice.875   
 Augustine now digresses by describing the types of delight that compete with 
a delight in justice.  First he mentions lawful delights that appeal to the faithful in 
their ‘weakness’: food and drink, sunlight, the glow of the moon and stars, 
‘melodious voice and a lovely ditty’, sweet smells, and lawful pleasures of the 
flesh.876  These are examples of the delights woven by God into creation and 
examples of the created beauty that delight the senses and properly point towards 
God.  Next he proceeds to describe unlawful delights by opposing each of the above 
examples with sinful alternatives: theatrical shows, songs of music halls, the odour of 
incense offered to demons, pagan banquets, and the embrace of harlots.  He 
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  s. 159.1 (PL 38.868). 
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  s. 159.1 (PL 38.868). 
874
  s. 159.2 (PL 38.868). 
875
  See pp. 165-166. 
876
  s. 159.2. (PL 38.868): ‘...delectat canora vox et suavissima cantilena, delectat odor bonus; 
delectant etiam tactum nostrum quaecumque pertinent ad carnis aliquam voluptatem.’ 
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punctuates each example by stating that the one delights in ‘the first sort lawfully, the 
second unlawfully’ until finally concluding, ‘So you see, dearest friends, that our 
bodily senses provide us with delights both lawful and unlawful.  But let our delight 
in justice be such that it beats even lawful delights; and put justice before the delight 
that you enjoy lawfully’.877  The faithful can only continue to love justice more than 
anything else if they delight in justice above all else. 
 This barrage of delights—lawful, unlawful, and in justice—creates an inner 
struggle as each kind of delight competes for the subject’s love.  Augustine states 
that, ‘One only loves...what delights one’ before reminding his congregation that 
Psalm 36.4 (37.4) commands them to delight in the Lord.878  Next, he identifies 
justice as God himself: to delight in justice is really to delight in God.  He makes 
much the same point in Tractate 26 of his sermons on John’s Gospel.  There he 
explains that people are drawn by pleasure, ‘not by necessity but by pleasure 
(voluptas), not by obligation but by delight (delectatio)’.879  This being the case, then 
how much more powerful must be the pull of ‘those whose delight is in the truth, 
whose delight is in happiness, whose delight is in justice, whose delight is in eternal 
life...because each of those is Christ’.880  And so the delight in righteousness that 
marks the faithful from the unfaithful is actually a delight in God that draws them 
towards the Beatific Vision. 
 Next, Augustine describes the dynamic involved in the conflict of delights.  
He offers the example of gold: it is ‘a delight’ and to say that it is anything but 
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  s. 159.2 (PL 38.869): ‘Justitia sic delectet, ut vincat etiam licitas delectationes; et ei 
delectationi qua licite delectaris, praepone justitiam’. 
878
  s. 159.3.  
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  Jo. eu. tr. 26.4 (CCL 36.261). 
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  Jo. eu. tr. 26.4 (CCL 36.261): ‘...qui delectatur veritate, delectatur beatitudine, delectatur 
justitia, delectatur sempiterna vita, quod totum Christus est?’ 
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beautiful would be ‘insulting the Creator’.881  But then a ‘tempter’ appears who says 
that he will take the gold away unless the person delighting in the gold perjures 
himself.  On the other hand, he will give more if he does as the tempter requires.  And 
so the Christian is placed in a difficult position: ‘Two kinds of delight are fighting it 
out in you; now I ask you the question, which you prefer, which delights you the 
more, gold or truth?’882  The obvious answer is that truth ought to delight more even 
though it is imperceptible to the senses.  Augustine reminds his flock that they did not 
live as sinners out of fear but because sins delighted them.  So Christians ought to live 
righteously not because they fear divine retribution but because they delight in the 
righteousness itself.883  Justice should be preferred to gold because it is more 
delightful than gold.   
 The last sermon in our survey is Tractate 41 of Augustine’s sermons on John’s 
Gospel preached at roughly the same time as these other sermons.  Though the 
sermon itself is an exposition of John 8.31-36, Augustine’s discussion of 
humankind’s slavery to sin leads him to dwell at length on Romans 7.  The first state 
of freedom from slavery is to enjoy a life without crime, which Augustine defines as 
serious sin.884  But there remains in the newly freed person an enticement to return to 
slavery, to a life of sin. 885 Both slavery and freedom coexist in the same person, each 
enticing the will with delight.  Augustine explains:  
...insofar as we are slaves to God, we are free; insofar as we are enslaved to 
the law of sin, we are still slaves.  Hence the Apostle says what we began to 
say, ‘I am delighted with the law of God according to the inner man’.  See 
wherein we are free, wherein we are delighted with the law of God.  Freedom 
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  s. 159.5 (PL 38.870) : ‘Ecce delectat te aurum tuum, oculos tuos delectat: metallum est 
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  s. 159.5. 
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delights (libertas enim delectat).  For as long as you do what is just out of 
fear, God does not delight you (Nam quamdiu timore facis quod justum est, 
non Deus te delectat).  As long as you do it, still as a slave, he does not delight 
you; let him delight you and you are free.  Do not fear punishment, but love 
justice.886 
Delight in justice therefore brings freedom with it because the faithful are finally 
living as they please; only that pleasure or delight comes from God.  But that freedom 
cannot be fully enjoyed in this life, because worldly delights still seek to lure the 
faithful back into bondage to sin.  The choice as ever, though, is between two forms 
of bondage—one that is death, the other that is, paradoxically, perfect freedom—and 
the reason for this is that the will is controlled by delight: bondage to God and 
bondage to sin are therefore both a bondage to delight. 
   
De spiritu et littera 
All of the themes that we have examined in the course of this study come 
together at the start of Augustine’s second work against the Pelagians, De spiritu et 
littera, written in 412.  The work is an epistolary response to his friend the tribune 
Marcellinus887 who had asked Augustine how he could maintain that it was 
technically possible for someone to be sinless even though, apart from Christ, this had 
never happened nor was likely to happen.  Augustine’s reply dwells at length on the 
relationship of the Law and the Spirit by expounding 2 Corinthians 3.6: ‘the law kills, 
but the spirit gives life’.   
In his introduction, Augustine maintains that apart from God’s assistance, the 
human will is absolutely unable to ‘attain righteousness or make progress in tending 
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  Jo.eu. tr. 41.10.3 (CCL 36.363). 
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  Augustine had written his first anti-Pelagian treatise, Punishment and the Forgiveness of Sins, 
to Marcellinus, an Imperial Commissioner, who not long after Augustine composed De spiritu 
et littera was executed for his apparent involvement in a local revolt.  See Brown, Augustine 
of Hippo, 337. 
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(tenendo) toward it’.888 Then, after briefly laying out the Pelagian position—that God 
created human beings with a free will that is curbed by an ignorance that the 
commandments and the example of Christ remedy—Augustine describes what he 
means by ‘God’s assistance’: 
Besides the fact that human beings are created with free choice of the will and 
besides the teaching by which they are commanded how they ought to live, 
they receive the Holy Spirit so that there arises in their minds a delight 
(delectatio) in and a love for that highest and immutable good that is God, 
even now while they walk by faith, not yet by vision.  By this [love] given to 
them like the pledge of a gratuitous gift, they are set afire with the desire to 
cling to the creator and burn to come to a participation (accedere ad 
participationem) in that true light, so that they have their well-being from him 
from whom they have their being.  And when what we should do and the goal 
we should strive for begin to be clear, unless we find delight in it and love it 
(nisi etiam delectet et ametur), we do not act, do not begin, do not live good 
lives.  But so that we may love it, the love of God is poured out in our hearts, 
not by free choice which comes from ourselves, but by the Holy Spirit who 
has been given to us.889 
Here we have all the elements of Augustine’s thought presented in a concise manner.  
Free will and the commandments are not enough for salvation; delight must be 
poured into the human heart so that a yearning to participate in God, the highest good, 
arises.  No one will begin to act, to tend in a direction that leads to an everlasting 
participation in God unless he or she is given a delight and love for the righteousness 
that is both a proper way of life and the goal of human existence.  Delight drives the 
movement and is the motivation that compels the faithful towards participating in 
God for both their being and well-being; all of which comes from receiving the Holy 
Spirit.  Expressed again is the conviction that the commandments—the knowledge of 
what the good life is—is not sufficient for salvation; one must delight in that 
knowledge in order to enact it.  Truth must be delightful in order to be embraced by 
the fallen mind.   
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 The reason why God pours delight into the human heart is because otherwise 
humankind is utterly enslaved to sin and death: ‘...without this Spirit we find delight 
in sinning so that we are enslaved’.890 Without the intervention of the Holy Spirit, 
people remain incapable of moving away from death and nothingness towards the 
wholeness of an everlasting participation in God.  In order to convert them, to 
persuade them away from their subjection to the delights of sin, God infuses his own 
delight, through giving the Holy Spirit, so that they can then begin the process of 
sanctification.  After delight is infused by the Holy Spirit, that process of 
sanctification finally begins, introducing a life of struggling against the old passions 
and delights as the ‘new condition [of delighting in righteousness] is being increased 
in the interior human being from day to day as we are set free from the body of this 
death by the grace of God through Jesus Christ, our Lord’.891  Ultimately, freedom of 
the will only develops through the increase of a delight in righteousness; the gift of 
the Holy Spirit is necessary for one to ‘...delight in not sinning so that we have 
freedom’.892 
  
Delectatio Victrix 
We can now see how Augustine’s approach to the process of salvation is 
multi-layered.  First, he conceives of the Holy Spirit as the communio of the Father 
and Son, which he metaphorically describes as a loving embrace.  The Holy Spirit is 
also a ‘blissful delight’ because he is supremely identified with the love of God and 
the love from God.  Love and delight cohere, one might say, because they cohere as 
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nobis utnon peccare delectet, ubi libertas est...’ 
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the Holy Spirit.  As would be recognised in later medieval thought, if the Holy Spirit 
is the Love shared by the Lover and the Beloved, then he is also their shared 
delight.893  Second, primarily because the Holy Spirit is given to those whom God 
wishes to save, Augustine prefers to conceive of the Holy Spirit as a gift.  Drawing 
from Romans 5.5, he becomes convinced that the gift of the Holy Spirit must also be 
a gift of love and delight.  This means that the delight that arises in one who comes to 
faith is not merely a subjective feeling, an individualistic ‘strange warming of the 
heart’, but the mind’s perception of the Holy Spirit who is God’s own delight.  Third, 
all people must receive the Holy Spirit in order to overcome their slavery to worldly 
delights.  Without that reception they remain absolutely bent on proceeding by their 
sinful habits further away from God towards death and damnation.  Without the 
infusion of a divine delight, they blithely embrace their own ruin and destruction.  
But, fourth, by receiving the Holy Spirit and being infused with a divine delight, they 
are converted, turned back towards their Creator, and begin the process of 
sanctification, itself a growth in, through, and towards delight.  The goal of this 
sanctification is the beata vita, an eternal participation in God that is nothing else than 
the eternal contemplation of the Lord’s own delight: in short, the Beatific Vision.  
Fundamentally, therefore, each saved soul is won and deified through a victorious 
delight that conquers the delights of sin, the world, and the devil.894 
 Finally, Augustine expresses this entire scheme of salvation in rhetorical 
terms.  The scene, if you will, opens with the devil already in command of the 
audience.  He has won them through his suggestion of delights that seduced the 
audience into consenting and performing sin or in placing their entire attention on 
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temporal delights.  They are absolutely under his will and impotent to free themselves 
from his charming oratory.  Like Cicero’s corrupt orators, he has used deception and 
a false fluency to lead them to their own destruction.  But God presents truth to the 
audience of humanity by giving his Son, the very Word through whom they were 
created and formed, who participates in their nature and who, through his death and 
resurrection, enables them to turn back towards him.   But they cannot embrace this 
truth unless they are filled with a delight for that truth; they cannot believe in Christ 
the Word unless they are given the freedom—the love—to delight in him.  The Holy 
Spirit therefore becomes God’s eloquence, enabling through his own sweetness the 
audience to embrace the truth that turns them away from their own ruin.  Once the 
audience has recognised God’s Truth and responded to his Eloquence, they are at first 
swayed from one orator to the other as spiritual delight contends with worldly 
delights for control of the audience’s will.  Ultimately, however, God’s Eloquence is 
victorious and the audience finds wholeness and freedom in at last willing what God 
wills.  Then restless hearts become still, warfare gives way to peace, and a delight 
that is none other than God himself is all in all. 
 
Conclusion 
This study began with two evocative moments in Augustine’s life—his arrival 
in Milan in 384 and his final retirement to his library in Hippo in 427—when his 
thoughts turned to his first true intellectual mentor: Cicero.  Between those two 
periods of his life lay over forty years of devotion not simply to God and the Church 
but also to words.  Indeed, his devotion to words predated his later pious devotion, 
beginning in childhood under the tutelage of a grammarian, growing painfully in 
adolescence under a strict but facile rhetor, seething within a troubled heart in early 
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manhood before finally blossoming in his mature ministry, first as a priest and then as 
a bishop.  From his discovery of Hortensius, Augustine’s devotion to eloquence 
became enriched and governed by a deeper devotion to wisdom, and from then on he 
struggled, consciously or not, to become Cicero’s ideal orator in whom wisdom and 
eloquence excelled.  But ultimately it was in theology that he found a wisdom that 
was eloquent in its own right without the need of ornamented language or stylistic 
rhetoric. 
 Rhetoric remained central throughout Augustine’s life: his conversion 
transformed him from an aspiring practitioner of philosophical rhetoric into the most 
accomplished practitioner of theological rhetoric of his day.  The overwhelming 
majority of his works are examples of public literature: an obvious point if one 
considers that his sermons are no less oratorical than Cicero’s orations. At a much 
deeper level, however, Augustine was converted from being a man who sought to use 
rhetoric to express wisdom (at least as an ideal, even though he spent his time 
teaching young, unappreciative aristocrats) into one who saw himself mainly as a 
vehicle through whom wisdom could express itself eloquently: by the time he 
composed Book Four of De doctrina Christiana, he no longer considered eloquence 
to be something he himself crafted because he had come to realise that true 
eloquence, an eloquence that always and reliably expresses wisdom, is simply the 
presence and work of the Holy Spirit.   
 When one reads Augustine’s theology in this light, it can be seen as more than 
simply the foundation for later medieval theology; more profoundly, his theological 
understanding of redemption is the theological fulfilment of Ciceronian rhetoric.  By 
transforming Cicero’s republic into the whole cosmos, his audience into all of 
humanity, and his ideal orator into God, Augustine unintentionally freed classical 
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rhetoric from its classical moorings at the very moment that the classical world in the 
West was crumbling.  By conceiving of rhetoric theologically, Augustine enabled 
classical rhetoric to survive the eclipse of civilitas on which it had always depended. 
 As has been shown, Augustine inherited a rhetoric that was seeking a way to 
survive in an increasingly autocratic world.  The facile rhetoric of much of Second 
Sophistic was a poor heir of the polished rhetoric of the Late Republic; the 
philosophical rhetoric of Marius Victorinus, Dio Chrysostom and Martianus Capella 
could not long survive the decline of western urban society.  But Augustine’s 
reshaping of rhetoric according to the principles of Christian theology, and in 
particular his emphasis on the role of delight within redemption, helped enable 
rhetoric to become situated in a theatre inconceivable to Cicero: the monastery, where 
deliberative oratio could elide into a prayerful oratio. 
Thus, it is remarkable that Augustine, who produced in his confession, 
sermons, letters, treatises, commentaries, and controversies far more examples of 
oratorical literature than anyone else in the classical age, has not been better 
appreciated as a classical rhetorician arguably without equal.  In this regard, hopefully 
this study has shown that Augustine the rhetorician demands as much scholarly 
attention as Augustine the classical philosopher.  Moreover, a proper appreciation of 
Augustine the rhetorician will come not through a myopic focus on Book Four of De 
doctrina Christiana but through the study of his whole theological approach.  In his 
thought, the two cannot be easily separated. 
 Finally, just as Augustine’s conversion transformed him, so too did it 
transform both rhetoric and theology in West.  Although he never devoted an entire 
work to his concept of a God who pours delight into the hearts of the faithful so they 
can be freed from a bondage to sinful delights, that scheme thereafter remained at the 
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heart of western Christianity.  Thanks to his insights, dilectio and delectatio will recur 
with remarkable regularity in medieval monastic literature.  No longer will God be 
conceived simply as the covenantal God of the Scriptures or the Supreme Being of 
Neoplatonic philosophy; now he will also be conceived as the Eloquent Wisdom who 
calls out to people in love, draws them to him by love, and transforms and sustains 
them through love.  Thanks largely to Augustine, God came to be perceived as a 
persuasive God whose eloquence is ultimately a delight that captures the heart and 
converts the mind, thereby fastening the soul through love to himself.    
 At the same time, however, Augustine’s insights helped to transform pastoral 
theology.  As Kolbet demonstrates in Augustine and the Cure of Souls, Augustine’s 
development of the classical idea of a philosophical rhetor introduced to the world 
what we might call therapy: the idea that words and wisdom can help to heal the soul.  
His rhetorical genius provided him with a profound insight into both the matters of 
human motivation and the impotence of the will.  In other words, his recognition of 
the potency of delight—particularly worldly delights—over the human will caused 
him to realise that the good and virtuous can never simply be chosen (in a Pelagian 
manner), let alone wilfully enacted, unless the heart is first wooed with delight.  
Freedom for Augustine is, therefore, not a capacity always to do what one wills but 
the capacity always to delight in what is good.  That reliable delight only comes 
through the Divine Eloquence who is the Holy Spirit; only through his delight is the 
will given the power always to will the good.  Ultimately for Augustine, ‘blissful 
delight’ makes the recipient soul delightful and leads it by an enjoyment of spiritual 
delight into the eternal delight of the Beatific Vision. 
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